Austin v. Harris County Bail Bond Board

7 Citing cases

  1. Burns v. Harris C.B.B

    971 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App. 1998)   Cited 3 times

    Despite Burns' protestations that she is only bound by the statutory section regarding new applications, we must consider all of the facts in construing the statutory scheme regarding bail bond licenses. In construing the statute, we find instructive the case of Austin v. Harris County Bail Bond Board, 756 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). In Austin, the appellant's license had been revoked and he sought to renew it after curing the violation for which his license had been revoked.

  2. Opinion No. DM-108

    Opinion No. DM-108 (Ops. Tex. Atty. Gen. Apr. 20, 1992)

    " 684 S.W.2d at 179 (emphasis in original). Compare Austin v. Harris County Bail Bond Board, 756 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (upholding a board's denial of an application based on applicant's violation of the act when previously licensed). Citing Deckard, the court stated that "the Board's ability to review an applicant's past record as a licensed bail bondsman does not impose an additional qualification, burden, condition, or restriction in excess of or inconsistent with the statutory provisions."

  3. Pruett v. Harris

    249 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. 2008)   Cited 45 times
    Granting board discretionary authority to revoke or suspend license for violation of rule adopted by board showed Legislature intended to confer broad regulatory powers

    Id. at 580 (citing Tex. Liquor Control Bd. v. Super Sav. Stamp Co., 303 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (cited with approval in Gerst, 432 S.W.2d at 706)); see also Black v. Dallas County Bail Bond Bd., 882 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ) (holding that the "broad grant of authority to supervise and regulate all phases of the bonding business impliedly authorizes the Board to enact rules on any phase of the business"). The authorities Pruett relies upon for a restricted interpretation of the Board's powers are distinguishable in that they were either based upon a narrower grant of authority in a predecessor statute, Bexar County Bail Bond Bd. v. Deckard, 604 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ), involved powers explicitly limited by statute, Camacho v. Samaniego, 831 S.W.2d 804, 812 (Tex. 1992), or interfered with detailed licensing regimes established by the Legislature, Austin v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 756 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). Here, the scope of the Board's explicit power is unambiguously broad, and Pruett can point to no part of the Occupations Code that would appear to single out solicitation as an impermissible area of agency rule-making.

  4. Grimes Cnty. v. Ellen

    267 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. App. 2008)   Cited 17 times

    By contrast, a bondsman whose license has been revoked must reapply for a new license. See, e.g., Austin v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 756 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). Allowing a trial court to rehear the evidence and reach its own determination while confining its options within the boundaries of section 1704.252 harmonizes statutory language with legislative intent to prevent sureties from issuing bail bonds while in default of forfeiture judgments.

  5. Opinion No. GA-0575

    Opinion No. GA-0575 (Ops. Tex. Atty. Gen. Oct. 2, 2007)

    See Tex. Fire Cas. Co. v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd, 684 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also R.R. Comm`n of Tex., 844 S.W.2d at 685. A bail bond board may not adopt a rule that "conflicts with or exceeds the statutory authority" of chapter 1704. Tex. Fire Casualty Co., 684 S.W.2d at 178-79; accord Walstadv. Dallas County BailBondBd, 996 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Austin v. Harris County BailBond Bd., 756 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1988, writ denied); Bexar County Bail Bond Bd. v. Deckard, 604 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ). We first consider a bail bond board's legislative authority to promulgate rules.

  6. Dallas County Bail Bond Bd. v. Stein

    771 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App. 1989)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that a conviction resulting in probation is final for the purpose of revoking a bail bondsman's license

    In that opinion, the attorney general relied heavily upon prior case law holding that bail bond boards may not impose burdens, conditions, or restrictions in addition to those which the Bail Bond Act imposes. See Austin v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 756 S.W.2d 65, 67 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Texas Fire Casualty Co. v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 684 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bexar County Bail Bond Bd. v. Deckard, 604 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1980, no writ). We think that the attorney general's reliance on these cases was misplaced.

  7. Opinion No. JM-1012

    Opinion No. JM-1012 (Ops. Tex. Atty. Gen. Jan. 31, 1989)

    Id. at 217. You suggest that Austin v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 756 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) may control the issue. In that case the appellant urged that the county bail bond board denied his application for a license on a basis set forth for suspending a license under section 9 of article 2372p-3 rather than for the lack of a statutory qualification for approving his application.