See, e.g., Kourlis v. Port, 18 P.3d 770, 773 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) ("[C]ontempt is neither a statutory nor a common-law crime. Instead, the authority to punish contempt is an exercise of a court's inherent powers to enforce obedience to its orders.") (citing Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743, 745-46 (1964)). COLO. R. Civ. P. 107(a)(1).
The ultimate determinant of "the validity of contempt procedures is whether due process of law is accorded." In re Marriage of Lamutt, 881 P.2d 445, 446 (Colo.App. 1994) (citing In re Marriage of Peper, 38 Colo.App. 177, 554 P.2d 727 (1976)); see also Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184, 397 P.2d 743, 746 (1964) (in contempt proceedings, courts should improvise procedure that accords with due process).
See id. Where an individual previously has been enjoined by the court against practicing law without a license, violations of that injunction are punishable in contempt proceedings conducted pursuant to C.R.C.P. 107.Cf. Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184, 397 P.2d 743, 745 (1964) ("The power to punish for contempt, as a punitive measure or to coerce obedience, is an inherent and indispensable power of the courts."). Shell argues in passing that the proceedings below were constitutionally insufficient.
The power to impose punitive sanctions for such conduct is an inherent and indispensable power of the court. It is not derived from statute and exists independent of legislative authority. People v. Razatos, supra; People v. Barron, supra; Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). A.
Instead, the authority to punish contempt is an exercise of a court's inherent powers to enforce obedience to its orders. See also Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). Accordingly, because punitive contempt (formerly known as "criminal contempt") is not a criminal offense, a plain reading of § 16-10-101 demonstrates that it is not applicable.
The inherent power to punish for contempt has long been recognized as part of our country's common law. Perkins, Criminal Law, at 531 (citing Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36, 10 S.Ct. 424, 426, 33 L.Ed. 801, 804 (1890); In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P. 227 (1893); Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); In re Hayes, 72 Fla. 558, 73 So. 362 (1916); State ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Coleman, 347 Mo. 1238, 152 S.W.2d 640 (1941)). "The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of [the] power [to punish for contempt]."
See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924) ("That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice."); Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184, 397 P.2d 743, 745 (1964) ("Intrinsic in tribunals following the common law . . . is the right to protect themselves against insults and indignities, interference with the administration of justice, and disobedience of their orders."); Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252, 259, 28 P. 961, 963 (1892) ("The power to punish contempts is universally recognized as inherent" in all courts and "essential to the performance of the very functions for which courts are created."); Hughes v. People, 5 Colo. 436, 446 (1880) ("the power to punish for contempt is an incident to all courts of justice" and "is essential to the effective administration of law"). The inherent and indispensable nature of the courts' right to punish contemptuous conduct necessarily shields this judicial power from legislative control under the separation of powers doctrine.
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1984); Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); Pittman, 149 Colo. 380, 369 P.2d 85. Under Order 85-3, a minimum fine of $500 is imposed for late settlement of matters scheduled for trial of more than one day, regardless of the reasons for delay. The rule does not permit the trial judge in an appropriate case to forego imposition of a fine altogether or impose a fine of less than $500. In effect, Order 85-3 imposes a penal sanction without providing any opportunity for a hearing.
P.R. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 346, 350 (Colo. 1981); Wright v. District Court, 192 Colo. 553, 555, 561 P.2d 15, 16-17 (1977); Ealy v. District Court, 189 Colo. 308, 310, 539 P.2d 1244, 1245-46 (1975); Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184-85, 397 P.2d 743, 746 (1964). A remedial contempt order must be supported by findings of fact establishing that the court's order has not been complied with and that the alleged contemner has the present ability to comply.
E.g., Losavio, Jr. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 180, 512 P.2d 266 (1973); Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252, 28 P. 961 (1892). The power to punish for criminal contempt is an inherent and indispensable power of the court and exists independently of legislative authorization.Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); People ex rel. Attorney General v. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 P. 912 (1906), writ of error dismissed sub nom. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).