See id. Where an individual previously has been enjoined by the court against practicing law without a license, violations of that injunction are punishable in contempt proceedings conducted pursuant to C.R.C.P. 107.Cf. Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184, 397 P.2d 743, 745 (1964) ("The power to punish for contempt, as a punitive measure or to coerce obedience, is an inherent and indispensable power of the courts."). Shell argues in passing that the proceedings below were constitutionally insufficient.
P.R. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 346, 350 (Colo. 1981); Wright v. District Court, 192 Colo. 553, 555, 561 P.2d 15, 16-17 (1977); Ealy v. District Court, 189 Colo. 308, 310, 539 P.2d 1244, 1245-46 (1975); Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184-85, 397 P.2d 743, 746 (1964). A remedial contempt order must be supported by findings of fact establishing that the court's order has not been complied with and that the alleged contemner has the present ability to comply.
In those instances where direct contempt is charged, although such acts are not within the personal knowledge of the judge but require the taking of testimony, it is our finding that the court may proceed summarily, i. e., forthwith without the necessity of formal written charges, provided the record affirmatively shows that the defendant was orally and informally given reasonable notice of the charge against him. See Austin v. Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743, wherein the defendant upon hearing was convicted of direct contempt and fined $100. The Supreme Court of Colorado held, in the syllabus:
Obviously, the notice of the stepparent adoption provided to the Father by the order terminating his parental rights came too late to satisfy the requirements of due process. Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743. For this reason the referee and the trial court were without authority to adjudicate his rights pursuant to that petition.
See Smith v. District Court, supra. A procedure which accords with due process of law is essential. See Austin v. Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). I.
See, e.g., Kourlis v. Port, 18 P.3d 770, 773 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) ("[C]ontempt is neither a statutory nor a common-law crime. Instead, the authority to punish contempt is an exercise of a court's inherent powers to enforce obedience to its orders.") (citing Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743, 745-46 (1964)). COLO. R. Civ. P. 107(a)(1).
See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924) ("That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice."); Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184, 397 P.2d 743, 745 (1964) ("Intrinsic in tribunals following the common law . . . is the right to protect themselves against insults and indignities, interference with the administration of justice, and disobedience of their orders."); Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252, 259, 28 P. 961, 963 (1892) ("The power to punish contempts is universally recognized as inherent" in all courts and "essential to the performance of the very functions for which courts are created."); Hughes v. People, 5 Colo. 436, 446 (1880) ("the power to punish for contempt is an incident to all courts of justice" and "is essential to the effective administration of law"). The inherent and indispensable nature of the courts' right to punish contemptuous conduct necessarily shields this judicial power from legislative control under the separation of powers doctrine.
E.g., Losavio, Jr. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 180, 512 P.2d 266 (1973); Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252, 28 P. 961 (1892). The power to punish for criminal contempt is an inherent and indispensable power of the court and exists independently of legislative authorization.Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); People ex rel. Attorney General v. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 P. 912 (1906), writ of error dismissed sub nom. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
The purpose of the hearing is to ascertain the guilt of the accused by deciding contested factual issues. See Austin v. Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). Where indirect contempt has been charged, as distinguished from contemptuous conduct occurring in the presence of the court, the respondent is entitled to notice of the charge, the right to be represented by counsel at the hearing, the right to call and confront witnesses, the right to an adjudication by the court, and, in the absence of an overriding and compelling interest, the right to have the hearing conducted in open court.
Instead, the authority to punish contempt is an exercise of a court's inherent powers to enforce obedience to its orders. See also Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). Accordingly, because punitive contempt (formerly known as "criminal contempt") is not a criminal offense, a plain reading of § 16-10-101 demonstrates that it is not applicable.