E.g., Losavio, Jr. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 180, 512 P.2d 266 (1973); Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252, 28 P. 961 (1892). The power to punish for criminal contempt is an inherent and indispensable power of the court and exists independently of legislative authorization.Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); People ex rel. Attorney General v. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 P. 912 (1906), writ of error dismissed sub nom. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
See id. Where an individual previously has been enjoined by the court against practicing law without a license, violations of that injunction are punishable in contempt proceedings conducted pursuant to C.R.C.P. 107.Cf. Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184, 397 P.2d 743, 745 (1964) ("The power to punish for contempt, as a punitive measure or to coerce obedience, is an inherent and indispensable power of the courts."). Shell argues in passing that the proceedings below were constitutionally insufficient.
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1984); Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); Pittman, 149 Colo. 380, 369 P.2d 85. Under Order 85-3, a minimum fine of $500 is imposed for late settlement of matters scheduled for trial of more than one day, regardless of the reasons for delay. The rule does not permit the trial judge in an appropriate case to forego imposition of a fine altogether or impose a fine of less than $500. In effect, Order 85-3 imposes a penal sanction without providing any opportunity for a hearing.
The purpose of the hearing is to ascertain the guilt of the accused by deciding contested factual issues. See Austin v. Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). Where indirect contempt has been charged, as distinguished from contemptuous conduct occurring in the presence of the court, the respondent is entitled to notice of the charge, the right to be represented by counsel at the hearing, the right to call and confront witnesses, the right to an adjudication by the court, and, in the absence of an overriding and compelling interest, the right to have the hearing conducted in open court.
See Smith v. District Court, supra. A procedure which accords with due process of law is essential. See Austin v. Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). I.
The ultimate determinant of "the validity of contempt procedures is whether due process of law is accorded." In re Marriage of Lamutt, 881 P.2d 445, 446 (Colo.App. 1994) (citing In re Marriage of Peper, 38 Colo.App. 177, 554 P.2d 727 (1976)); see also Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184, 397 P.2d 743, 746 (1964) (in contempt proceedings, courts should improvise procedure that accords with due process).
Instead, the authority to punish contempt is an exercise of a court's inherent powers to enforce obedience to its orders. See also Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). Accordingly, because punitive contempt (formerly known as "criminal contempt") is not a criminal offense, a plain reading of ยง 16-10-101 demonstrates that it is not applicable.
[3] The procedural provisions of C.R.C.P. 107(c) are not exclusive. There is no fixed procedural formula for contempt proceedings; rather the polestar in determining the validity of contempt procedures is whether due process of law is accorded. Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). See also Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 501, 175 P.2d 387 (1946).
In those instances where direct contempt is charged, although such acts are not within the personal knowledge of the judge but require the taking of testimony, it is our finding that the court may proceed summarily, i. e., forthwith without the necessity of formal written charges, provided the record affirmatively shows that the defendant was orally and informally given reasonable notice of the charge against him. See Austin v. Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743, wherein the defendant upon hearing was convicted of direct contempt and fined $100. The Supreme Court of Colorado held, in the syllabus: