Austin v. Denver

20 Citing cases

  1. People v. Barron

    677 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 15 times
    Examining a court’s common law power to punish a defendant for criminal contempt

    E.g., Losavio, Jr. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 180, 512 P.2d 266 (1973); Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252, 28 P. 961 (1892). The power to punish for criminal contempt is an inherent and indispensable power of the court and exists independently of legislative authorization.Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); People ex rel. Attorney General v. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 P. 912 (1906), writ of error dismissed sub nom. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).

  2. In Interest of J.E.S

    817 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1991)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that a statute that was amended to abrogate a court's power to incarcerate juveniles who act in violation of a court order was unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine

    See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924) ("That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice."); Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184, 397 P.2d 743, 745 (1964) ("Intrinsic in tribunals following the common law . . . is the right to protect themselves against insults and indignities, interference with the administration of justice, and disobedience of their orders."); Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252, 259, 28 P. 961, 963 (1892) ("The power to punish contempts is universally recognized as inherent" in all courts and "essential to the performance of the very functions for which courts are created."); Hughes v. People, 5 Colo. 436, 446 (1880) ("the power to punish for contempt is an incident to all courts of justice" and "is essential to the effective administration of law"). The inherent and indispensable nature of the courts' right to punish contemptuous conduct necessarily shields this judicial power from legislative control under the separation of powers doctrine.

  3. In re Burckhalter

    389 B.R. 185 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008)   Cited 17 times
    Noting that the plaintiff "must establish . . . that the obligation appears in a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record."

    See, e.g., Kourlis v. Port, 18 P.3d 770, 773 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) ("[C]ontempt is neither a statutory nor a common-law crime. Instead, the authority to punish contempt is an exercise of a court's inherent powers to enforce obedience to its orders.") (citing Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743, 745-46 (1964)). COLO. R. Civ. P. 107(a)(1).

  4. People v. Shell

    148 P.3d 162 (Colo. 2006)   Cited 64 times
    Holding in the absence of preemption by the federal courts, the state court has the power to sanction an individual for the unauthorized practice of law in a federal action

    See id. Where an individual previously has been enjoined by the court against practicing law without a license, violations of that injunction are punishable in contempt proceedings conducted pursuant to C.R.C.P. 107.Cf. Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184, 397 P.2d 743, 745 (1964) ("The power to punish for contempt, as a punitive measure or to coerce obedience, is an inherent and indispensable power of the courts."). Shell argues in passing that the proceedings below were constitutionally insufficient.

  5. State v. Price

    672 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1996)   Cited 10 times

    The inherent power to punish for contempt has long been recognized as part of our country's common law. Perkins, Criminal Law, at 531 (citing Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36, 10 S.Ct. 424, 426, 33 L.Ed. 801, 804 (1890); In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P. 227 (1893); Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); In re Hayes, 72 Fla. 558, 73 So. 362 (1916); State ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Coleman, 347 Mo. 1238, 152 S.W.2d 640 (1941)). "The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of [the] power [to punish for contempt]."

  6. Lloyd Raymond Co. v. District Court

    732 P.2d 612 (Colo. 1987)   Cited 6 times

    See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1984); Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); Pittman, 149 Colo. 380, 369 P.2d 85. Under Order 85-3, a minimum fine of $500 is imposed for late settlement of matters scheduled for trial of more than one day, regardless of the reasons for delay. The rule does not permit the trial judge in an appropriate case to forego imposition of a fine altogether or impose a fine of less than $500. In effect, Order 85-3 imposes a penal sanction without providing any opportunity for a hearing.

  7. People v. Razatos

    699 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1985)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that the record did not support remedial contempt order because it did not establish defendant had the ability to pay the ordered restitution at the time of the hearing

    P.R. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 346, 350 (Colo. 1981); Wright v. District Court, 192 Colo. 553, 555, 561 P.2d 15, 16-17 (1977); Ealy v. District Court, 189 Colo. 308, 310, 539 P.2d 1244, 1245-46 (1975); Austin v. City County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 184-85, 397 P.2d 743, 746 (1964). A remedial contempt order must be supported by findings of fact establishing that the court's order has not been complied with and that the alleged contemner has the present ability to comply.

  8. In re P.R. v. Dist. Ct.

    637 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 13 times

    The purpose of the hearing is to ascertain the guilt of the accused by deciding contested factual issues. See Austin v. Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). Where indirect contempt has been charged, as distinguished from contemptuous conduct occurring in the presence of the court, the respondent is entitled to notice of the charge, the right to be represented by counsel at the hearing, the right to call and confront witnesses, the right to an adjudication by the court, and, in the absence of an overriding and compelling interest, the right to have the hearing conducted in open court.

  9. Wright v. Dist. Ct.

    561 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1977)   Cited 8 times
    Finding of contempt must precede imposition of sanctions

    "The citation and a copy of the motion and affidavit shall be served upon such person a reasonable time before the time designated." Under C.R.C.P. 107(c), a defendant has the right to have notice of the purpose of the hearing and to have an opportunity to be heard. Ealy v. District Court, 189 Colo. 308, 539 P.2d 1244 (1975); Austin v. Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964). We have recognized that the contempt citation "plays a very important role in enabling the person charged to understandably shape his course and prepare his defense."

  10. Ealy v. District Court

    539 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1975)   Cited 6 times

    Not a single one of these requirements was met in the present case. In Austin v. Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964), this court reversed a contempt judgment involving alleged misconduct in the presence of and an affront to the dignity of the court. The defendant in that case supposedly made an improper communication to a jury member during a trial recess.