And the court has stated that once a municipality has "opted to provide police protection, [it] ha[s] a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police department in the same circumstances." Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 581-82, 684 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984). The court in Austin cautioned, however, that "[t]his is not a duty to protect each citizen within the [municipality's] geographic boundaries from all harms.

We respectfully, but summarily, conclude that Morton cannot and does not revive the Massengill doctrine after Ryan's express abandonment of that doctrine. Ryan was explained and followed in Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 684 P.2d 151 (1984). In Austin, a police dispatcher received an anonymous call advising that Austin's life might be in danger.

When government has "opted to provide police protection, [it] ha[s] a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police department in the same circumstances." Austin v. City of Scottsdale , 140 Ariz. 579, 581-82, 684 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984).¶ 33 Stair argues Austin supports imposition of a duty when law enforcement actors know of danger but fail to prevent its consequences.

When a municipality chooses to provide police protection, it has "a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police department in the same circumstances." Id. at 313, ¶ 29, 206 P.3d at 762 (quoting Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 581-82, 684 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984)). But a municipality does not have a duty to protect each of its citizens from all harms.

In Arizona, if police endeavor to provide specific protection to a particular person, they generally only have “a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police department in the same circumstances.” Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579 , 581-82, 684 P.2d 151 , 153-54 (1984).

In Austin v. City of Scottsdale, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that public officers and employees must be held accountable for negligent acts performed during their official duties. 140 Ariz. 579, 581-82, 684 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984). When law enforcement performs a caretaking function, opting to provide police protection to foster public safety, public policy supports the formation of a generalized duty:

However, "if police endeavor to provide specific protection to a particular person, they generally ... have ‘a duty to act as would a reasonably careful and prudent police department in the same circumstances.’ " Hogue, 240 Ariz. 277, ¶ 12, 378 P.3d at 723, quoting Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 581-82, 684 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984). Thus, "Arizona courts have found that police conduct has created a special relationship giving rise to a duty only in specific circumstances, for example when police take a 911 call about a potential threat and tell the caller that they will take action on that information."

The dissent in Vasquez specifically recognized that duties of care may arise from conduct a person has undertaken, and that although the police owed no duty to protect citizens from “all harms,” a duty of reasonable care arose to protect the surviving family members of a crime victim once the police “opted to provide police protection.” Id. at 318, ¶ 49, 206 P.3d at 767 (citing Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 145, ¶ 18, 150 P.3d at 232) (quoting Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 581–82, 684 P.2d 151, 153–54 (1984)); Stanley v. McCarver, 208 Ariz. 219, 221, ¶ 7, 92 P.3d 849, 851 (2004).

Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board, 146 Ariz. 352, 354, 706 P.2d 364, 366 (1985). Plaintiffs cite Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 684 P.2d 151 (1984), to establish that Maricopa County owed them such a duty. In Austin, the Scottsdale police department received a telephonic warning that an identified person's life was threatened, but failed to follow its ordinary emergency procedures to notify the threatened victim or his family.

" 134 Ariz. at 311, 656 P.2d at 600. The Supreme Court of Arizona reaffirmed Ryan in Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 140 Ariz. 579, 684 P.2d 151 (1984), where the city was found liable for the death of an individual when the police department failed to act on an anonymous call which communicated the fact that his life was in danger. The Arizona Court of Appeals has followed Ryan to find municipal liability for negligent building inspection, Brown v. Syson, 135 Ariz. 567, 663 P.2d 251 (1983), and for failure to insure code compliance before issuing a permit, Bischofshausen v. Pinal-Gila Counties, 138 Ariz. 109, 673 P.2d 307 (1983).