Austin v. A.J. Zinda Co.

5 Citing cases

  1. Laux v. Akebono Brake Corp.

    310 Or. App. 190 (Or. Ct. App. 2021)

    As an initial matter, although decedent did not specifically recall working on Yamaha motorcycles, there is sufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to reasonably infer that Fred's Honda serviced Yamaha motorcycles during decedent's employment. See Austin v. A. J. Zinda Co. , 196 Or. App. 262, 270, 101 P.3d 819 (2004), rev. den. , 338 Or. 374, 110 P.3d 113 (2005) (noting that, regardless of whether the plaintiff could establish that he personally handled the defendant's flex connectors, he "would nevertheless be entitled to prevail [on summary judgment] if a trier of fact could reasonably find that [the plaintiff] was injuriously exposed in the workplace to asbestos fibers as a result of other employees’ handling of [the defendant]-supplied flex connectors"). Thus, the question in this case is whether evidence in the summary judgment record would allow an objectively reasonable finder of fact to conclude that Yamaha brake-friction materials contained asbestos during the time decedent worked at Fred's Honda.

  2. Griffin v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. Product Liability

    240 Or. App. 137 (Or. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 4 times

    Purcell v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 153 Or. App. 415, 423, 959 P.2d 89, adh'd to as modified on recons, 155 Or. App. 1, 963 P.2d 729 (1998), rev den, 329 Or. 438 (1999) (quoting Ingram v. ACandS, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1344 (9th Cir 1992)). We applied that standard in Austin v. A. J. Zinda Co., 196 Or. App. 262, 101 P.3d 819 (2004), rev den, 388 Or. 374 (2005), and plaintiff contends that the present case merits the same outcome. Austin was the plaintiffs appeal from an adverse summary judgment "on claims arising out of [the plaintiff's] alleged exposure to asbestos-containing products that [the defendant] distributed."

  3. Austin v. A.J. Zinda Company and Albina Fuel Co.

    110 P.3d 113 (Or. 2005)

    April 5, 2005. (A120273) ( 196 Or App 262). Riggs, J., would allow. Petition for review denied.

  4. Perman v. C. H

    220 Or. App. 132 (Or. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace was admissible because it was rationally based upon the perception of the witness

    If plaintiff has adduced such evidence, plaintiffs attorney's ORCP 47 E declaration is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether "`the presence of that asbestos played a role in the occurrence of the plaintiffs injuries.'" Purcell v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 153 Or App 415, 423, 959 P2d 89 (1998), rev den, 329 Or 438 (1999) (quoting Ingram v. ACandS, Inc., 977 F2d 1332, 1343-44 (9th Cir 1992)); see also Austin v. A.J. Zinda Co., 196 Or App 262, 270, 101 P3d 819 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005) (reversing allowance of summary judgment in favor of supplier of asbestos-containing products based, in part, on the conclusion that regardless of whether the allegedly injured plaintiff could establish that he had personally handled the defendant's asbestos-containing products in the workplace, the Plaintiffs had adduced evidence from which a trier of fact "could reasonably find that [the plaintiff] was injuriously exposed in the workplace to asbestos fibers as a result of other employees' handling of asbestos-containing products supplied by the defendant). We conclude that Plaintiffs evidence is sufficient to preclude summary judgment.

  5. West v. Allied Signal, Inc.

    200 Or. App. 182 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 19 times
    Noting that the vice president and part-time salesperson for the defendant testified in his deposition generally about the defendant's sale of gloves and acknowledged that the defendant sold "asbestos gloves"

    In his deposition, Lawrence Schick, a vice president and part-time salesperson for defendant, testified generally about defendant's sale of gloves over that period and acknowledged that defendant sold asbestos gloves. Schick did not purport to qualify his testimony regarding asbestos gloves by stating that defendant's sales of those products occurred only in a more limited period, e.g., after decedent's employment at Western Foundry. Accord Austin v. A.J. Zinda Co., 196 Or App 262, 268, 101 P3d 819 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005) (noting that the plaintiff's former employer had ordered supplies and materials from the defendant "throughout" a 13-year period and that such products had "includ[ed]" asbestos-containing products). Thus, reduced to its essentials, the summary judgment record would permit a jury to find that: (1) Western Foundry provided asbestos gloves to its workers, including decedent; (2) defendant offered a variety of products, including asbestos gloves, to its industrial customers; (3) Western Foundry bought a substantial amount of goods — at least $14,000 in unspecified products — from defendant during decedent's employment; and (4) no other supplier of industrial products to Western Foundry is identified in this record.