Almost all of the cases cited by the defendant involved individual plaintiffs and in those that did not the issuance of the injunction was upheld. A rather similar factual situation was before the court in City of Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp. (1958), 16 Ill. App.2d 273, 147 N.E.2d 694. There the defendant was showing a movie entitled "Baby Doll" in violation of a city ordinance banning indecent or lewd pictures, and the City sought and obtained a temporary injunction against its further showing. In affirming the issuance of the temporary injunction, the court, at pages 281-284, said:
In order to obtain the writ a party is not required to make out a case which will in all events warrant relief at the final hearing. ( Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp. (1958), 16 Ill. App.2d 273, 147 N.E.2d 694.) It is only necessary for the petitioning party to raise a fair question as to the existence of the right claimed, lead the court to believe that he probably will be entitled to the relief prayed for if the proof should sustain his allegations, and make it appear advisable that the positions of the parties should stay as they are until the court has the opportunity to consider the case on the merits. ( Frederick Chusid Co. v. Collins Tuttle Co. (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 818, 295 N.E.2d 74.) The motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; its determination ordinarily follows an attenuated offer of evidence and argument as to controlling principles of law.
The question here is whether the issuance of the injunction was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. [1-5] The rule in regard to the power of the reviewing court to pass upon the discretion of the chancellor who issued a temporary injunction is well set out in Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Dist. Corp., 16 Ill. App.2d 273, at 285 as follows: "The law is well settled in Illinois that the trial court is vested with large discretionary power in granting an order for a temporary injunction and unless the reviewing court finds that the discretion has been abused the order will not be set aside."
• 3 Nothing in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 14, par. 12, requires a hearing before a temporary restraining order is issued if the complaint or affidavits show prima facie, that immediate and irreparable injury will result. ( Weingart v. Weingart (1959), 23 Ill. App.2d 154, 164, 161 N.E.2d 714; Bowman Shoe Company v. Bowman (1959), 21 Ill. App.2d 423, 440, 158 N.E.2d 112; City of Aurora v. Warner Bros. (1958), 16 Ill. App.2d 273, 284, 147 N.E.2d 694; and O'Brien v. Matual (1957), 14 Ill. App.2d 173, 187, 144 N.E.2d 446.) However, this statute also provides that "In case of default, or after answer, the court shall immediately inquire into the facts and circumstances of the case."
"An application for an injunction is addressed to the conscience and sound discretion of the court, and it is not controlled by technical legal rules, and unless a reviewing court finds that the discretion has been abused, the order will not be set aside. See, also, Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 16 Ill. App.2d 273, 285, 147 N.E.2d 694. [3, 4] Plaintiffs contend that support for the preliminary injunctions in the instant case is to be found in the most frequently used basis for such injunctions, namely, the preservation of the status quo pending final determination on the merits of the complaint.
The charge against the defendant covers the sale of obscene publications. The law is well settled that if a communication is obscene it does not enjoy the protection of the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and may result in the prosecution and conviction of one who indulges in its exhibition, sale and distribution. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568; City of Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 16 Ill. App.2d 273, 147 N.E.2d 694. In the Roth case the United States Supreme Court declared the test of obscenity to be ( 354 US at 489): ". . . whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
Weingart v. Weingart (supra at 158); Nestor Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Goldblatt, 371 Ill. 570, 574, 21 N.E.2d 723 (1939); Baird v. Community High School Dist. No. 168, 304 Ill. 526, 529, 126 N.E. 671 (1922); McDougall Co. v. Woods, 247 Ill. App. 170, 174 (1928). In considering the motion to strike, the allegations of fact in the complaint had to be taken as true. The court has a large discretion in the granting of a temporary injunction and unless that discretion has been abused the injunction will not be disturbed. Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 16 Ill. App.2d 273, 285, 147 N.E.2d 694 (1958); Weingart v. Weingart (supra at 158); Bowman Shoe Co. v. Bowman, 21 Ill. App.2d 423, 440, 158 N.E.2d 112 (1959). The record before us does not show an abuse of discretion by the chancellor.
None of the cases cited by plaintiff are at variance with the principles laid down in the foregoing decisions. In Aurora, City of, v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 16 Ill. App.2d 273, 147 N.E.2d 694 (1958), plaintiff's complaint was supported by four affidavits; defendants did not file an answer but presented "objections" supported by affidavits. On appeal the court concluded that the evidence established plaintiff's prima facie case and impliedly held that it established the probability of plaintiff's ultimate success on the merits.
" The rule in regard to the power of the reviewing court to pass upon the discretion of the chancellor who issued a temporary injunction is set out in Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Dist. Corp., 16 Ill. App.2d 273, at 285, 147 N.E.2d 694: "The law is well settled in Illinois that the trial court is vested with large discretionary power in granting an order for a temporary injunction and unless the reviewing court finds that the discretion has been abused the order will not be set aside."
We think not. According to the authorities cited by both parties, the primary purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the court has the opportunity to consider the case on the merits, and the showing on the pleading to obtain a temporary writ is less than that required to obtain a final permanent injunction. Aurora v. Warner Bros. Pictures Dist. Corp., 16 Ill. App.2d 273, 147 N.E.2d 694. In O'Brien v. Matual, 14 Ill. App.2d 173, 144 N.E.2d 446, we said the temporary injunction was "to prevent such acts during the pendency of the action as would preclude the court from giving the plaintiff or counterclaimant his remedy at the end of the litigation if he be entitled to such. . . . The status quo which should be preserved by a temporary injunction is the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy, and the necessity of the temporary injunction should be made apparent by appropriate allegations showing that a change in the status would cause irreparable injury."