This court has not considered the question, but it has been held that the circumstance alone that an automobile passenger is sleeping at the time of a collision is not sufficient to withdraw the question of his contributory negligence from the jury. Rather, this circumstance should be considered along with all other relevant ones by the jury in deciding whether there was contributory negligence. ( Aurora National Bank v. Galauner (1967), 81 Ill. App.2d 132, 135; Dursch v. Fair (1965), 61 Ill. App.2d 273, 285; Thompson v. Riemer (1936), 283 Ill. App. 371, 376.) It has been held that a defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict that the plaintiff was contributorially negligent on the sole ground that the plaintiff was asleep ( Ramirez v. Deters (1976), 41 Ill. App.3d 935; Dursch v. Fair (1965), 61 Ill. App.2d 273; Thompson v. Riemer (1936), 283 Ill. App. 371; Smith v. Courtney (1935), 281 Ill. App. 530); similarly it has been held that it was error to grant a plaintiff a new trial on the ground that his sleeping amounted to freedom from contributory wilful and wanton misconduct as a matter of law ( Aurora National Bank v. Galauner (1967), 81 Ill. App.2d 132). See generally W. Prosser, Torts sec. 65, at 420 (4th ed. 1971); 5 D. Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice sec. 215.23 (3d ed. 1966); Comment, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 622 (1959); 17 Minn. L. Rev. 222 (1933); see also 2 F. Harper F. James, Torts sec. 16.7, at 921-22 (1956).
It appears from such language that the trial court concluded that under the evidence Deaver and Samples were in the exercise of ordinary care as a matter of law. [4] The rule is usually stated that due care may be inferred from a consideration of all of the circumstances shown by the evidence, together with the evidence of habits of due care. Hughes v. Wabash R. Co., 342 Ill. App. 159, 95 N.E.2d 735; Karlock v. New York Cent. R. Co., 333 Ill. App. 655, 78 N.E.2d 122; Turnbull v. Porter, 55 Ill. App.2d 374, 206 N.E.2d 97; Lobravico v. Checker Taxi Co., Inc., 84 Ill. App.2d 20, 228 N.E.2d 196; Aurora Nat. Bank for Use of Knott v. Galauner, 81 Ill. App.2d 132, 224 N.E.2d 604. IPI No. 10.08 is phrased to advise the jury of the inferences which may be drawn from the evidence of habits of due care and concludes: ". . .
Even though "[a] single transaction of business is sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)," Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), a defendant "transacts business" only when it "purposefully avails [itself] of the privilege of conducting activities within [New York]." Cutco, 806 F.2d at 365 (citing McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 224 N.E.2d 604, 607 (N.Y. 1967)); see also Falik v. Smith, 884 F. Supp. 862, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In other words, Plaintiff must show that "the totality of all defendant's contacts with the forum state . . . indicate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be proper."
• 4, 5 Plaintiff here was asleep at the time of the accident. Sleeping is neither contributory negligence as a matter of law ( Ramirez v. Deters (1976), 41 Ill. App.3d 935, 357 N.E.2d 546) nor freedom from contributory negligence as a matter of law. ( Aurora National Bank v.Galauner (1967), 81 Ill. App.2d 132, 224 N.E.2d 604.) However, it is a factor for the jury to take into consideration.
• 1 The courts of this State have consistently held that the question of whether a guest passenger's voluntary participation in drinking and his voluntary subjection of himself to the peril of riding with a person who had one drink constituted contributory wilful and wanton misconduct is a question of fact for the jury to decide. ( Hamas v. Payne, 107 Ill. App.2d 316, 246 N.E.2d 1; Ryg v. Brue, 91 Ill. App.2d 229, 233 N.E.2d 761; Aurora National Bank v. Galauner, 81 Ill. App.2d 132, 224 N.E.2d 604; Anderson v. Launer, 13 Ill. App.2d 530, 142 N.E.2d 838. See also Sloma v. Pfluger, 125 Ill. App.2d 347, 261 N.E.2d 323; Kitch v. Adkins, 346 Ill. App. 342, 105 N.E.2d 527.
While these cases involve suits against the driver of the car in which the guest was riding, the same principle applies to contributory negligence of the passenger in a suit against the driver of another vehicle. Attention is directed to Aurora National Bank v. Galauner (1967), 81 Ill. App.2d 132, 224 N.E.2d 604. In that case plaintiff's decedent, who was the guest passenger, was asleep.