Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. M57139
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This partition action concerns the physical division of the Aurignac Ranch, a 9, 518 acre cattle ranch in Monterey County collectively owned by nine family members with various ownership interests. The five appellants, who include Helen Aurignac, her daughter Jacqueline Traynor, and her grandchildren Jeffrey Dennis Traynor, Michael Paul Traynor and Gregory Michael Traynor, together own a 61.35 percent interest in the ranch. The remaining 38.65 percent is owned by the four respondents, Leslie Ann Cederquist and her children Paul Albert Aurignac, Paulette Ann Aurignac, and Patrick Eugene Aurignac. The trial court appointed Justice Nat A. Agliano (retired) as referee pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. After a trial and two inspections of the property, the referee ultimately issued a second revised report and recommended interlocutory judgment of partition. The report recommended a physical division of the property that the referee believed was consistent with the parties’ ownership interests, proportionate in economic value, and suitable for operating two separate cattle ranches. The trial court confirmed the referee’s report and recommendation and entered an interlocutory judgment of partition.
Appellants contend that the interlocutory judgment of partition is not fair and equitable because their portion of the divided ranch includes land of diminished value, due to the presence of oil and gas leases, oil extraction equipment, and a waste site, without a compensating award of additional acreage. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the referee’s report and recommendation because substantial evidence supports the factual findings and therefore we will affirm the interlocutory judgment of partition.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Aurignac Ranch (the Ranch) consists of separate smaller cattle ranches that members of the Aurignac family began acquiring in 1870. The original owners of the Ranch were appellant Helen Aurignac and her husband Paul Aurignac. After Paul Aurignac died in 1971 various family members obtained undivided ownership interests in the Ranch through inheritance and other means. At the time of the partition action, the Ranch was comprised of approximately 57 separate legal parcels with varying ownership interests.
The Ranch property encompasses land of different physical characteristics, including steep hillsides covered with heavy brush, scrub brush, rolling meadows, and flat to sloping grasslands. However, the Ranch is viewed as having three main sections: the Garrissere Ranch and Los Lobos section, which has 3, 400 acres of steep, hilly and rolling land; the 1, 650 acre Tamaranda section, which is also steep, hilly, and rolling; and the 4, 300 acre, gradually flattening Hames Valley. The parties agreed during the partition proceedings that a geographically separate fourth section of the Ranch, known as the Creason, would be awarded to respondents.
Most of the Ranch property is located on the west side of Highway 101 near the town of San Ardo in southern Monterey County. At the present time, the property is primarily used for cattle ranching and recreation, although in past years various family members engaged in agriculture and hog farming. The approximately 104 acres of the Ranch that lies on the east side of Highway 101 include a defunct gas station. The parties agreed during the partition proceedings that the gas station site and building would be awarded to appellants.
Appellant Helen Aurignac is considered the family matriarch. She is the mother of appellant Jacqueline Traynor and the grandmother of Jacqueline’s sons, appellants Jeffrey Dennis Traynor, Michael Paul Traynor, and Gregory Michael Traynor. Helen Aurignac has sole ownership of a 2.5 acre residential parcel in the Ranch. Respondent Leslie Ann Cederquist was married to Paul and Helen Aurignac’s late son, Albert Aurignac. Leslie Ann Cederquist and Albert Aurignac had three children, respondents Paul Albert Aurignac, Paulette Ann Aurignac, and Patrick Eugene Aurignac. Cederquist has lived on the Ranch since 1966 and is the sole owner of a residential parcel. At the time of the partition action, Cederquist was the only party who resided on Ranch property.
B. The Partition Action
1. Pretrial Proceedings
On December 12, 2001, respondents filed a complaint for partition in kind, partnership dissolution, and an accounting, and for declaratory and injunctive relief. Only the partition action is at issue in the present appeal. Appellants filed a cross-complaint for partition by sale and for an accounting. The trial court appointed Justice Nat A. Agliano (retired) (hereafter, the referee) as special referee pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 872.820, subdivision (b), 873.010, 873.060, and 639, subdivision (a). Among other things, the trial court authorized the referee to determine whether the Ranch should be partitioned by sale or in kind. The parties subsequently agreed that the Ranch should be physically separated into two separate ranches suitable for cattle operations, with one ranch awarded to appellants as tenants in common and the other ranch awarded to respondents as tenants in common. The parties also stipulated that the referee was authorized to try all issues necessary to partition and to make recommendations to the trial court.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
Trial on the partition action commenced on November 15, 2004, and was continued to January 19, 2005. On April 22, 2004, the referee personally viewed the Ranch property.
Prior to trial, the parties submitted the reports of their expert real estate appraisers. Respondents submitted the September 1, 2004 report of John W. Piini, a specialist in the appraisal of agricultural and open space properties who is a member of the Appraisal Institute and a certified general real estate appraiser. Appellants submitted the August 19, 2004 report of Tony Correia, an accredited rural appraiser, an associate member of the Appraisal Institute, and a certified general real estate appraiser.
Piini’s report included a detailed description of the Ranch property and his opinions regarding its highest and best use and value. He concluded that the highest and best use was cattle grazing, recreation, and oil extraction, with the potential for vineyard development if a proven water source and road access were provided. Using the sales comparison approach, in which the value of the Ranch was based on comparison to recent sales of comparable large ranches in excess of 2, 500 acres, and excluding oil, gas and mineral rights, Piini determined that the Ranch property had a value of $475 per acre. Piini’s value conclusion included the following statement: “[I]n the final analysis, consideration is given to the ownership interest which excludes a leased fee interest in the oil leases. To many buyers, this would eliminate any consideration of this property for there is no financial benefit to offset the risk and adverse impact of having active oil leases on approximately 20 percent of the ranch. Because of this situation, it is concluded that the present day market value of the fee simple interest, which excludes the oil, gas and mineral rights and is subject to the oil and gas leases, is at the low end of the value range indicated from the sales.”
Appellants’ appraiser, Tony Correia, concluded in his report that the highest and best use of the Ranch property was to consider “selling separately the service station site, the Creason Parcel, and the ranch as a whole for investment purposes with grazing as an interim use.” To determine value, Correia also used the sales comparison approach, stating that “The Sales Comparison Approach is often considered the most reliable indication of current market value as it best reflects the actions and motivations of buyers and sellers within the market. Given the availability of comparable sales data within the subject area, the Sales Comparison Approach is considered an appropriate valuation tool to determine the current market value of the subject properties.” After comparing several sales of properties with physical characteristics similar to those of the Ranch, Correia concluded that the land value of the Ranch was $750 per acre. While Correia noted that the Ranch was currently used for cattle grazing and “some oil production, ” he did not discuss whether the oil and gas leases or the existing oil production facilities had any impact on his appraisal.
2. Trial
Since appellants contend that the interlocutory judgment of partition is not fair and equitable because their portion of the divided ranch includes land of diminished value, due to the presence of oil and gas leases, oil extraction equipment, and a waste site, without a compensating award of additional acreage, our summary of the trial testimony focuses on the evidence relevant to that issue.
Respondent’s expert real estate appraiser, John W. Piini, testified that he specializes in appraising ranch and other agricultural properties in the areas of Monterey County, San Benito County, and southern Santa Cruz County. In the last 10 years, Piini has appraised over 20 such properties in Monterey County. He has also appraised ranch properties in five partition actions. At respondent’s request, Piini appraised the Ranch, spending about 140 hours on the appraisal and two days visiting the property. Piini determined the Ranch property, with its different sections and variety of terrain, is typical of cattle ranches in southern Monterey County.
Piini used the sales comparison approach in his appraisal of the Ranch property. He identified the sales of four ranches in southern Monterey County, relatively close to San Ardo, that were comparable to the Ranch in location and size. The sales comparison approach is the method most commonly used in appraising ranch properties. Piini determined that the market would not recognize a difference in price for parts of the Ranch on a per acre basis and therefore he valued the entire Ranch, with its intermixing of land types, on a $475 per acre basis. He did not use the zone value approach, where different parts of a property are valued separately. He was also not aware of any grazing ranch in Monterey County that had been appraised or sold based on the characterization of individual acres by slope or vegetation. Piini further testified that the highest and best use for the Ranch was for cattle grazing and recreation. He believes that the market for ranches is being driven by the recreational buyer and that income from cattle grazing is a secondary consideration.
Piini also took into account the nine oil leases on the Ranch property, although oil, gas and mineral rights were excluded from his appraisal. He was concerned that oil extraction activity on the property had an “adverse impact on the ownership interest” because of the potential liability for environmental cleanup and the lack of control as to oil drilling operations. An oil lease would also diminish the desirability of the site for rural residential use. Piini further stated that the oil and gas operation “detracts from the value of the property and that a knowledgeable buyer would be concerned about those oil leases and [the] oil operation that exists on the property. [¶] And, because of that, my final valuation conclusion was $475 per acre, which was near the lower end of the value range as indicated from the four sales.”
After analyzing the parties’ proposed divisions of the Ranch property, Piini determined that appellants’ proposed division was not equitable. One reason was that appellants’ proposed division gave them 65 percent of the ranch acreage, although their ownership interest was approximately 60 percent. Another reason was that the shape of respondent’s portion would make it very difficult to sell as a separate property.
Piini proposed an alternative division of the Ranch that would represent a 60/40 division of the value of the property. Under Piini’s proposed division, each separate ranch would have similar attributes, including a speculative potential for vineyard development, good grazing land, and recreational land with wildlife habitat for hunting. Piini recognized, however, that the land where the waste disposal site and oil wells are located is of lesser quality and desirability than the land in the Hames Valley.
Appellants’ real estate appraiser, Tony Correia, testified that he is an accredited rural appraiser who specializes in agricultural and rural properties, with a particular specialty in appraising vineyards and wineries in California. However, his experience in Monterey County was limited to appraising one ranch in connection with a conservation easement.
After being retained by appellants to appraise the Ranch, Correia inspected the property and came up with a fair market value for the Ranch as a whole using the sales comparison approach. After the first day of trial, appellants asked him to prepare a zone of value analysis of the Ranch in order to “come up with relative values of a proposed division of the ranch.” A zone of value analysis allows him to determine a property division that will achieve economic equality.
Following appellants’ instructions, Correia developed a model of the relative values of the various portions of the Ranch, which was based on three steps. First, he analyzed the Ranch’s topography, soils, and vegetation cover and classified the land into different categories. He generally determined that the land categories included, in order of value, land suitable for irrigated agriculture with a water source, land suitable for agriculture without a water source, gentle sloping grassland suitable for cattle grazing, and steep or low lying brush-covered land. The land categories also included oil improvements, which included “about 30 acres where there’s waste water sumps [and] some other sites where there’s some actual extraction improvements on the property.”
Regarding the oil improvements, Correia explained that “the exist[ence] of oil extraction facilities will have a negative effect on the precise area where those facilities are located, but [will] have very little, if any effect on the overall ranch, and, in some cases, can have a positive effect on the overall ranch if, in fact, the use of those facilities creates construction of any improvements; for example, roads or water. The distinction is between the specific acre where it’s located and the total ranch.”
The second step in the zone of value analysis was to determine the amount of acreage and the ownership percentages in each land category. Correia then decided, in the third step, the relative values of each land category based on comparable sales of land in each category. Assuming that irrigable agricultural land had a value of 100 percent, the remaining land categories had a lesser relative value, as follows: level agricultural land--30 percent; sloping agricultural land--25 percent; grassland and gentle sloping brush--15 percent; steeper lands--6 percent; and oil improvement land--3 percent. Based on his zone of value analysis, Correia concluded that respondents owned 39.91 percent of the Ranch property, with a relative value of 44 percent because they owned more land of higher value, while appellants owned 60.09 percent, with a relative value of 56 percent.
Correia reviewed respondents’ proposed division of the Ranch, as drawn by Piini, and determined that under that proposal respondents would receive 51.9 percent of the value of the Ranch while appellants would receive only 48 percent of the value. Accordingly, while Correia found that respondents’ proposed division achieved an appropriate 60/40 split of Ranch acreage, it “created a disparity in terms of value.” Appellants’ proposed division, on the other hand, would give 35 percent of the Ranch acreage and 42.48 percent of the relative value to respondents and 65 percent of the acreage and 57.52 percent of the relative value to appellants. However, Correia conceded that there was a margin of error of 10 to 15 percent with respect to the amount of acreage attributed to any zone or land category.
Kent Dawkins, a rural real estate broker employed by an agricultural real estate company, testified that he had sold about 15, 000 acres in the Monterey County area. After visiting the Ranch, he determined that the pasture land was overgrazed and the fencing was in need of repair. However, he agreed that the highest and best use of the Ranch property was a combination of cattle ranching and recreation. Dawkins also stated that he believed that the oil production facilities on the Ranch would be a detriment unless income was received from the oil production.
John W. Lacey, who had testified as an expert in two prior partition cases, testified regarding his opinion of the Ranch property. He is a rancher involved in numerous cattle operations in California including a 60, 000 acre ranch in Inyo and Mono counties and a 200, 000 acre ranch in Kern County. He is also a former president of the California Cattleman’s Association. After visiting the Ranch, Lacey determined that the land was overgrazed and the fencing and water systems were in need of repair. Lacey also reviewed the parties’ proposals for the physical partition of the Ranch. He concluded that the respondent’s division, as drawn by Piini, was the most practical and equitable division with respect to cattle ranching because it would allow two cattle operations, with an equitable division of cattle carrying capacity, appropriate fencing, access, potential for water, and room for holding fields and other facilities. Lacey found appellants’ proposed division to be impractical due to problems with adequate access and fencing.
Respondent Leslie Ann Cederquist testified that an oil extraction operation existed on Ranch property prior to 1971, when she and her husband Albert Aurignac built a waste disposal site for oily waste from the Ranch and waste water from oil fields in the San Ardo area. In 1981, Cederquist expanded the waste disposal site in exchange for giving appellants Helen Aurignac and Jacqueline Traynor one-sixth of the gross receipts. However, in the late 1980’s the Regional Water Quality Control Board required them to clean up the waste disposal site. Since 1994, the waste disposal site has been undergoing a closure process. Grass has been growing on top of the site and, at the time of trial, complete closure was anticipated in 2005 with some monitoring of the site thereafter.
Cederquist desired a physical partition of the Ranch because she and her son Paul Aurignac want to continue the family tradition of ranching and farming on the property and enjoying the rural lifestyle. As an experienced cattle rancher, she believed that the partition of the ranch proposed by respondents would allow the appellants to operate a cattle ranch on their portion of the property.
Cederquist’s son, Paul Aurignac, testified that he is also an experienced cattle rancher. He assisted in developing the physical division proposed by respondents, which follows ridge tops, ridge lines and watershed boundaries as much as possible and allows separate access and water distribution systems. In his opinion, the portion of the Ranch that respondents proposed to be awarded to appellants could operate as a cattle ranch. He was concerned that appellants’ proposed division would award appellants all three sets of cattle handling facilities on the Ranch and would not provide an adequate location for respondents to build new cattle handling facilities. Additionally, he felt that under appellants’ proposed division the portion of the Ranch awarded to respondents would have inadequate water resources, would require new fencing that would be difficult to construct, and would also necessitate a new road. Further, he pointed out that appellants’ proposed division did not follow watershed boundaries.
Regarding the potential for vineyard development on the Ranch, Kurt Gollnick, the chief operating officer for Scheid Vineyards, testified that there was little potential for a vineyard in the southern Hames Valley due to the lack of water, the lack of access, and the very poor market for the red grape varieties for which the land is suitable.
Denise Duffy, a self-employed land planning and environmental consultant, testified regarding the process for obtaining a lot line adjustment for agricultural property in Monterey County. She reviewed the parties’ proposals for the physical division of the Ranch and determined that appellants’ proposal more closely followed the existing legal lot configurations and would require only one lot line adjustment. Respondents’ proposed division appeared to require eight lot line adjustments, which would take approximately two to three months longer for Monterey County to process.
Appellant Gregory Traynor testified that he was involved in preparing the proposed division of the Ranch that appellants presented at trial. On November 13, 2005, after the first day of trial in the partition action, he met with appellants Jacqueline Traynor and Jeffrey Traynor and appellants’ appraiser, Tony Correia, in the office of appellants’ attorney to create their proposed division. Gregory Traynor also reviewed respondents’ proposed division and visited the Ranch to take numerous photographs of the property. He believes that respondents would like to award most of the higher quality land to themselves and awarded the lesser quality land to appellants. He also believes that some parts of the Tamaranda section are covered in oil production facilities. Upon partition, appellants intend to lease their portion of the Ranch for a cattle operation run by Gene Mattos, a former tenant of the Ranch.
In his testimony, Gene Mattos stated that he was present on the Ranch as a foreman and later as a tenant rancher from approximately 1967 to July 2004. Mattos recalled that he was present at the office of appellants’ attorney when appellants developed their proposed division of the Ranch with their appraiser Tony Correia. He answered appellants’ questions about the water system, power, topography, and grazing on the Ranch. Having reviewed the parties’ proposals for the physical division of the Ranch, Mattos testified that he could operate a cattle ranch under either proposal.
3. The Referee’s Reports and Recommendations
The referee issued his first report of referee and recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition on May 2, 2005. In his report, the referee stated that while the parties had agreed to a physical partition of the Ranch to create two separate ranches, they disagreed regarding the location of the dividing line and the allocation of land that was proportionate in economic value to their ownership interests.
In making his findings and conclusions, the referee weighed the evidence and considered counsels’ arguments. He also compared the parties’ competing proposals for division of the Ranch. Appellants’ proposed division, the referee found, would award 35 percent of the Ranch acreage to respondents and 65 percent to themselves. Respondents’ proposal would award each party a percentage of Ranch acreage that was consistent with their ownership interests of approximately 40 percent (respondents) and 60 percent (appellants). He also found that “[a] portion of the land proposed for [appellants] is subject to oil leases and contains oil-producing facilities and equipment. The lease payments presently belong to Helen Aurignac. The parties appear to agree that, for purposes of this partition, the leases do not affect [the] value of the property awarded to [appellants].” Further, the referee noted that “[a] portion (approximately 40 acres) of the property awarded to [appellants] includes a site used for disposal of oil drilling residue.”
The referee then made a number of findings and conclusions, including the finding that the highest and best use of the Ranch property is livestock grazing and recreation. Because recreational use such as hunting, horseback riding, and hiking, in combination with cattle grazing, strongly influenced the market value of comparable properties, the referee also found that the aesthetic qualities of the Ranch, particularly the “canyons, slopes and high ridges of the The Garrissere, Los Lobos and Tamaranda [sections] are significant and important value enhancing factors.” For that reason, the referee determined that the zone of value analysis used by respondents’ expert, Tony Correia, was not an appropriate appraisal method for the Ranch because that method “is not, according to credible evidence, applicable to the subject and comparable properties where hills, steep terrain, canyons and other aesthetic features of land are as highly valued.”
The referee then selected respondents’ proposal for division as the “best and most equitable physical division of the Ranch considering its overall topography as well as its highest and best use for cattle grazing and recreational purposes.” He found that respondents’ proposal would award the parties land in proportion to their ownership interests in terms of both quantity and economic value. Further, the referee found that respondents’ proposal would provide land that was sufficient for two cattle operations and permit “convenient fencing, road access and provision of utilities in a manner consistent with the land’s natural topography and watersheds.” He stated that “[t]hese facts satisfy the requirements of [section] 873.210 that the property be divided and the portions allotted to the parties, ‘quality and quantity relatively considered, according to their interests in the property . . . .’ ”
Finally, the referee acknowledged the statutory requirement that physical division be done according to existing parcel lines if possible. However, he determined that “substantial prejudice would result and little utility served if the line were to be drawn along existing parcel lines.”
Based on his findings and conclusions, the referee recommended that the Ranch be partitioned as generally shown on Exhibit P to his report (which reflected respondents’ proposed division), except for the portions solely owned by Helen Aurignac and Leslie Cederquist, and then as specifically determined by survey and official boundary line adjustment.
Appellants subsequently requested reconsideration of the referee’s report and recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition. They asserted that the report erred in several respects, because (1) they were entitled to additional acreage of 40 acres since respondents were given the 40-acre waste disposal site; (2) they were entitled to an additional 160 acres to accurately reflect their percentage ownership of the Garrissere Ranch section; (3) they were entitled to an additional 1000 acres of Hames Valley land to compensate them for taking the lower value oil lease land; (4) the allocation of Highway 101 frontage was inequitable; and (5) the allocation of cattle grazing land was inequitable.
Respondents opposed the request for reconsideration. With respect to the oil lease land and the waste disposal site, they asserted that appellants were not entitled to any additional award of Ranch acreage. In their view, the waste disposal site has no value because nothing can be built on the property, environmental monitoring is continuing, and they have agreed to indemnify appellants for any potential liability. As to the oil lease land, respondents argued that the allocation to appellants creates a unity of interest between the surface and oil, gas and mineral rights; only a very small portion of Ranch surface contains ongoing oil and gas operations; and appellant’s expert, Tony Correia, opined that the oil production facilities increased the value of the Ranch land.
On September 6, 2005, the referee issued a referee’s revised report and recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition. He revised his previous report and recommendation in two respects: (1) Appellants were allocated an additional 73 acres bordering Highway 101 to make the allocation of highway frontage fair and equitable; and (2) Appellants were allocated an addition 74.5 acres of flat grazing land in the Hames Valley to correctly reflect their percentage ownership interests in the Garrissere Ranch.
However, the referee rejected appellants’ request for an additional 1000 acres of Hames Valley land to compensate them for receiving oil lease land in their portion of the divided Ranch. He reasoned as follows: “Regarding the effect of oil, gas and mineral leases, the question is whether the land subject to such leases has less value than other land. The leases affect approximately 20% of the entire ranch. In the proposed division, [respondents] and [appellants] each receive land that is subject to such leases. [Appellants] receive substantially more of such land than do [respondents]. In addition, a number of acres allocated to [appellants] in fact contain drilling facilities and equipment. On the other hand, it appears the [appellants] currently receive the related lease royalties. It also appears that [respondent] Leslie Cederquist has at least a 20% remainder interest in such royalties, although not yet realized. Nevertheless, adjustment by allocation of additional land is not ordered. First, [appellants] have not shown why their rights as lessor and fee owners have not substantially merged. Further, in the referee’s view, the evidence simply does not provide a credible basis for determining the nature or extent of diminution in value of land affected by such leases or by the presence of oil drilling equipment and facilities. Short of speculation, no rational finding of diminished value can be made. Accordingly, [appellants’] request for this adjustment is denied.” The referee also revised his recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition to recommend the Ranch be partitioned as shown on the modified exhibit P attached to the revised report and recommendation.
Appellants subsequently requested reconsideration of the revised report and recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition. They asserted that (1) they were entitled to an additional 23.5 acres to correct an arithmetic mistake; (2) the report erred in indicating that the waste disposal site had no value; (3) there was conclusive evidence of the diminished value of the land subject to oil and gas leases and extraction equipment, consisting of John Piini’s expert testimony; and (4) they should be awarded land in the Hames Valley encompassing a proven water source.
Respondents also requested reconsideration of the revised report and recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition. They contended that it was physically impossible to award appellants 73 acres of Highway frontage; the highway frontage awarded to respondents was necessary for their cattle operation; and appellants did not need 73 acres of highway frontage to support their cattle operation.
Thereafter, the referee determined that it was necessary to again view the Highway 101 frontage portion of the Ranch. His visit, with counsel and parties present, took place on February 17, 2006. On February 28, 2006, the referee issued a second revised report and recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition.
The second revised report and recommendation stated that the Ranch should be physically divided as shown in exhibit P, which was modified to award appellants an additional 171 acres to correct two previous calculations regarding the Garrissere Ranch and the total number of Ranch acres. Fourteen of the additional acres were allocated to appellants to allow both parties sufficient Highway 101 frontage land to conduct cattle operations. The remaining 157 additional acres awarded to appellants were allocated in the Hames Valley. In sum, the referee awarded appellants “5, 839.75 acres and improvements thereon constituting 61.35% of the total ranch acreage” while respondents were awarded “3, 678.85 acres and improvements thereon including the property on the east side of Highway 101 all constituting 38.649% of the total ranch acreage.”
The modified exhibit P attached to the second revised report and recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition was not included in the record on appeal.
However, the referee again rejected appellants’ claim that they were entitled to additional acreage to compensate them for receiving land subject to oil leases and extraction facilities. The referee explained that, “It is true that [appellants] receive more of such land than do [respondents] and, in addition, portion of such acres contain extraction equipment and are scarred by drilling activity. However, there are countervailing value factors. As stated, substantial land allocated to [respondents], including that on the east side of Highway 101, is also subject to oil and gas leases. For all the evidence shows or fails to show, parts of such land may be subjected to drilling activities in the future. Further, in the referee’s view, the evidence simply does not provide a credible basis for determining the nature or extent of diminution in value of the land affected by such leases or by the effect of oil drilling equipment and facilities. In addition, substantial land awarded to [respondents] east of Highway 101 is in a flood zone and likewise of arguable lesser value. Short of speculation, no rational finding of diminished value of [appellants’] land in comparison to that of [respondents] can be made. Accordingly, [appellants] request for a value adjustment is denied.” The referee also determined that no evidence supported appellants’ contention that a lower value should be assigned to the former waste disposal site. The referee also directed the parties to prepare a new map in conformity with the second revised report and recommendation, to be filed in the superior court.
Appellants sought reconsideration of the second revised report and recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition, for several reasons. They no longer agreed to take the service station site; they objected to the award of the only potential home site to respondents; they objected to receiving over 200 acres of land scarred by oil and gas extraction equipment erroneously valued the same as other ranch land; and they did not wish to share in the cost of a certain water well. Respondents objected to the request for reconsideration.
The referee did not reconsider the second revised report and recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition. Instead, he submitted the second revised report and recommendation to the trial court on March 20, 2006.
4. The Trial Court’s Order
Respondents moved for an order confirming the referee’s second revised report and recommendation and entering it as an interlocutory judgment of partition. They argued that the referee had painstakingly reviewed an enormous amount of evidence; had evaluated a myriad of issues with respect to dividing the large Ranch into two separate cattle ranches; and, while the referee had generally adopted Piini’s proposed division, he had modified the dividing line several times. They asserted that the referee had made a final dividing line that divided the Ranch equitably because he had considered water, access, fencing, utilities, infrastructure requirements, zoning, topography, Williamson Act contracts, present and future uses for the land, and the practicalities of dividing two post-partition cattle ranches.
The Williamson Act “empowers local governments to establish ‘agricultural preserves’ consisting of lands devoted to agricultural uses and other uses compatible therewith. ([Gov. Code, ] § 51230.) Upon establishment of such preserves, the locality may offer to owners of included agricultural land the opportunity to enter into annually renewable contracts that restrict the land to open space use for at least 10 years. ([Gov. Code, ] §§ 51240, 51242, 51244.)” (Sierra Club v. City of Hayward (1981) 28 Cal.3d 840, 851.) In exchange, the tax base for the land is based on its value as open space rather than land suitable for development. (Ibid.)
Appellants filed opposition to the motion to confirm the referee’s second revised report and recommendation. They also filed a motion to modify or set aside the second revised report and recommendation. Appellants argued that for several reasons the referee had failed to recommend a fair and equitable partition of the Ranch. First, appellants believed that they were awarded land of diminished value due to oil and gas leases and the presence of oil extraction equipment without an award of compensating acreage. Second, the configuration of the partition gave respondents a greater percentage of the most desirable Ranch land. Third, the recommended partition requires lot line adjustments while the partition requested by appellants did not. Finally, appellants asserted that the referee’s direction that the parties cooperate with respect to a certain water well was not feasible. Appellants therefore requested that their proposed division of the Ranch be adopted by the trial court.
The trial court issued its order after submission on June 20, 2006. The trial court confirmed the referee’s second revised report and entered it as an interlocutory judgment of partition, finding that the recommended partition achieved an equitable division of the Ranch that established two viable, operating cattle ranches. In so ruling, the trial court rejected all of appellants’ challenges to the referee’s recommended partition.
Specifically, the trial court determined that the evidence did not bear out appellants’ contention regarding the diminished value of the land where oil and gas extraction facilities existed, stating that “[t]here were mixed opinions expressed on that subject. Furthermore, oil related facilities represent only one attribute of the land and many other valuation considerations also factor in, such as highway access and road frontage. [¶] The evidence satisfies this Court that the referee considered all of these variables and adopted a property division that is equitable and awards the parties their proportional shares, both in quantity and value.”
Thereafter, appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Partition
The term “partition” means “ ‘the procedure for segregating and terminating common interests in the same parcel of property.’ [Citations.]” (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1404-1405.) The statutes governing partition are set forth at section 872.010 et seq. “However, although the action of partition is of statutory origin in this state, it is nonetheless an equitable proceeding. [Citations.]” (Elbert, Ltd. v. Federated Income Properties (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 194, 200.)
The trial court may appoint a referee to “to divide or sell the property as ordered by the court” (§ 873.010, subd. (a).) Pursuant to section 873.210, “[t]he referee appointed by the court to make a division of the property shall divide the property and allot the several portions to the parties, quality and quantity relatively considered, according to their interests in the property as determined in the interlocutory judgment.” Thus, “[q]uality and quantity are to be considered in the allotments by the referee but the determinative factor is that each party shall receive an allotment equal to his [or her] interest in the whole of the property.” (Richmond v. Dofflemyer (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 745, 760.)
Although the report and recommendation of the referee are advisory, the referee “clearly serves as the initial examiner of the facts, and perhaps the law, in a partition action, under the aegis of the appointment court. The referee’s determinations are either accepted by the court, modified, or set aside. (§ 873.290, subd. (b).)” (Gray v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 165, 171.) Thus, confirmation of the referee’s report and recommendation constitutes an adoption of the facts found by the referee. (Worcester v. Worcester (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 56, 61.)
“If the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to partition, it shall make an interlocutory judgment that determines the interests of the parties in the property and orders the partition of the property and, unless it is to be later determined, the manner of partition.” (§ 872.720, subd. (a).) An interlocutory judgment of partition is appealable pursuant to section 904.1, subdivision (a)(9).
B. The Standard of Review
The standard of review for an interlocutory judgment of partition is abuse of discretion. (Capuccio v. Caire (1929) 207 Cal. 200, 211; Camicia v. Camicia (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 487, 490.) The question of whether the referee could have made “in certain respects a more just and equitable division of certain portions” of the property to be partitioned is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court upon review of the report of the referee. (Capuccio v. Caire, supra, 207 Cal. at p. 211.) Thus, if the evidence conflicts, the findings of the trial court will be “taken as conclusive where . . . there is sufficient evidence to sustain them.” (Camicia v. Camicia, supra, 65 Cal.App.2d at p. 490; Felder v. Felder (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 718, 724.)
Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, “the reviewing court must start with the presumption that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the judgment; it is appellant’s burden to demonstrate otherwise.” (Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 368.) “Under that standard, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citations.]” (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) “It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact. Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment.” (Id. at pp. 630-631.)
“We emphasize that the test is not the presence or absence of a substantial conflict in the evidence. Rather, it is simply whether there is substantial evidence in favor of the respondent. If this ‘substantial’ evidence is present, no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the judgment must be upheld. . . . [Citations.]” (Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.) “In short, even if the judgment of the trial court is against the weight of the evidence, we are bound to uphold it so long as the record is free from prejudicial error and the judgment is supported by evidence which is ‘substantial, ’ that is, of ‘ “ponderable legal significance, ” ’ ‘ “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value . . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in confirming the referee’s second revised report and recommendation for an interlocutory judgment of partition because the recommended partition is not fair and equitable. Specifically, appellants argue that they should have been awarded additional Ranch acreage to compensate them for receiving 250 acres “encumbered by the oil and gas extraction equipment and facilities” and the 31-acre waste disposal site.
According to appellants, the trial court’s finding that the evidence did not support their contention regarding the diminished value of the land where oil and gas extraction facilities existed is a finding that is not supported by substantial evidence. They rely on Piini’s opinion, as stated in his appraisal report, that the per acre fair market value of the entire Ranch is reduced due to the presence of oil and gas extraction equipment and facilities. Appellants interpret Piini’s report to indicate that the per acre fair market value of the oil and gas land is diminished by a minimum of $35 per acre and a maximum of $135 per acre. Further, appellants complain that the trial court did not set forth any evidence to support its findings that there were mixed opinions regarding the value of the land with oil and gas extraction equipment and there were other value considerations that compensated for the diminished value of that land.
Respondents assert that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it adopted the referee’s recommendation regarding the partition of the Ranch because the recommendation was supported by substantial evidence. They contend that the referee divided the Ranch in a way “that allows for two post-partition, viable cattle ranches and that accurately reflects the parties’ vested interests” in the Ranch. Further, respondents argue that the referee did not err in relying on Piini’s opinions as to how the Ranch should be valued and divided, because Piini’s opinions were based upon the way the real estate market commonly values and purchases ranch properties and the practical considerations involved in creating two viable cattle ranches. Respondents also contend that appellants misconstrue Piini’s testimony regarding the value of the oil and gas land. In their view, rather than opining that the land subject to oil and gas leases and extraction equipment was diminished in value from $35 to $135 per acre, Piini testified that he assigned a lower per acre value to the Ranch as a whole based upon the assumption the oil, gas and mineral rights were not being divided.
Respondents also point out that appellants failed to provide citations to the record where their arguments reference the record, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), and on that basis they request that appellants’ arguments be disregarded. We observe that appellants have not provided citations to the record for their factual assertions that they were awarded 90 percent of the oil and gas lease land and 250 acres scarred by oil extraction equipment and facilities. However, even assuming that these facts are correct, we are not convinced by appellants’ argument that the partition of the Ranch recommended by the referee and confirmed by the trial court constitutes an abuse of discretion.
In arguing that the partition is inequitable because the portion of the Ranch awarded to them includes some land of lesser value, appellants implicitly request that this court resolve the conflict between the experts regarding the proper method of valuing the Ranch by choosing the opinion of their expert, Tony Correia, that the Ranch land should be divided on the basis of a zone of value analysis. Appellants’ argument also requires us to reweigh the evidence regarding the oil and gas land and to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. We may not do so because “ ‘resolution of conflicts in the evidence, assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the opinions of the experts were all matters within the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.]’ ” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 204.) As we have discussed, our review is limited to a determination “as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment.” (Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 630-631.)
Having reviewed the entire record, we find that substantial evidence supports the interlocutory judgment of partition. The referee’s recommended partition, as adopted by the trial court, principally relied on the opinions of John Piini, respondents’ appraiser. Appellants have not challenged Piini’s qualifications as an expert appraiser of Monterey County ranch land. Piini testified that based on the sales comparison approach, he would place a fair market value on the Ranch as a whole of $475 per acre. His evaluation included his opinion that the presence of oil and gas leases and oil extraction equipment and facilities would diminish the overall value of the Ranch. However, Piini also testified that ranches with physical characteristics and size (over 2500 acres) similar to those of the Ranch and primarily used for cattle ranching and recreation, were not bought and sold on the basis of the characterization of individual acres but rather as entire large ranches.
Furthermore, Piini’s proposal satisfied the parties’ desire that the Ranch be divided into two separate, viable cattle ranches. John Lacey, respondents’ expert cattle rancher, testified that Piini’s proposed partition was, as Piini had opined, the most practical and equitable division with respect to cattle ranching because it would allow two cattle operations, with an equitable division of cattle carrying capacity, appropriate fencing, access, potential for water, and room for holding fields and other facilities.
Thus, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s partition of the Ranch on the basis of the evidence showing that the overall value of the Ranch is $475 per acre; that the acreage allotted to appellants and respondents is in proportion to their respective ownership interests; that the acreage awarded is therefore also proportionate in overall quality; and the partition will result in a physical division of land that is suitable for operating two separate cattle ranches.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the referee’s second revised report and recommendation for interlocutory judgment of partition after determining that the evidence satisfied the court that the property division recommended by the referee was equitable and awarded the parties their proportional shares of the Ranch in both quantity and value. (Capuccio v. Caire, supra, 207 Cal. at p. 211; Camicia v. Camicia, supra, 65 Cal.App.2d at p. 490.) We will therefore affirm the judgment.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
McAdams, J., Duffy, J.