The Relocation Act supplements state procedures by setting a minimum standard of recovery available to all eligible displacees. If the eminent domain laws of a particular state do not provide sufficient payments to satisfy this standard, then the URAA authorizes federal funds to make up the difference. Auraria Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 183 Colo. 441, 517 P.2d 845 (1974) offers a good illustration of this principle. There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that, as a matter of state law, a condemnee's goodwill and lost profits were not compensable under eminent domain.

Syllabus Point 2, Shenandoah Valley Railroad Co. v. Shepherd, 26 W.Va. 672 (1885).Auraria Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 183 Colo. 441, 446, 517 P.2d 845, 848 (1974). We have expounded upon our holding in Shepherd and held that evidence showing “past annual profits derived from a business conducted on the [condemned] property ... offered as an index to the market value of the property, is ordinarily inadmissible[.]”

This is consistent with Colorado state law. See Auraria Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 517 P.2d 845, 847 (Colo. 1974) ("Constitutional objections to the eminent domain proceedings should be raised in those proceedings and be determined by the court in limine and not by way of a collateral injunction proceeding.").

Relocation benefits are provided for by section 31-25-105(1)(j). Denver argues that since the relocation benefits are not required under the Colorado or Federal Constitutions, see Auraria Businessmen v. DURA, 183 Colo. 441, 517 P.2d 845 (1974), therefore relocation benefits cannot be paid unless they are to be paid from a federally assisted program, in which case, they are required by the Federal Uniform Relocation Acquisition Policies of 1970, 84 Stat. 1894 (codified in scattered sections of 42, 49 U.S.C.). We cannot agree with this evasive logic.

The foundation for the rule is that (1) the business itself is not being condemned and can be relocated, and (2) business profits are more a function of the entrepreneurial skills of management than of the value of the land. Auraria Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 183 Colo. 441, 517 P.2d 845 (1974); City and County of Denver v. Hinsey, 177 Colo. 178, 493 P.2d 348 (1972); 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 19.3[1], p. 19-48.1 (Rev. 3d ed. 1975). Under the business profit rule, evidence of the character and volume of business conducted on the premises is admissible only for the purpose of showing a use to which the land could be put. Denver v. Hinsey, supra; Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Cook, supra; City and County of Denver v. Quick, 108 Colo. 111, 113 P.2d 999 (1941).

We do not find either of the other theories sufficiently persuasive to cause us to deny compensation for the damages suffered here. 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 13.3 (Rev. 3rd Ed. 1974); Almota Farmers E. W. Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 791, 35 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945); Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345, 45 S.Ct. 293, 69 L.Ed. 644 (1925); City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705 (1915); Auraria Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver U.R.A., 183 Colo. 441, 517 P.2d 845 (1974); Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis.2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380, 384 (1970). 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 13.3 (Rev. 3rd Ed. 1974); Sange, "The Unsoundness of California's Non-Compensability Rule as Applied to Business Losses in Condemnation Cases", 20 Hastings L.J. 675 (1969).

For all of these reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals remanding this case to the trial court, but with instructions to consider and decide the merits of defendants' counterclaim by proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. In a demurrer filed in this court plaintiff for the first time contends that the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, and the regulations mentioned in defendants' counterclaim, do not provide for the remedy of damages sought by defendants, citing Tullock v. State Highway Commission of Missouri, 507 F.2d 712 (8th Cir 1974); Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agcy., 499 F.2d 502 (DC Cir 1974); La Raza Unida of Southern Alameda County v. Volpe, 488 F.2d 599 (9th Cir 1973); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir 1971); Whitman v. State Highway Commission of Missouri, 400 F. Supp. 1050 (WD Mo CD 1975); and Auraria Business Against Con., Inc. v. Denver U.R.A., ___ Colo ___, 517 P.2d 845 (1974). However, we do not read those decisions as supporting plaintiff's position, at least under the facts of this case.

Unlike other jurisdictions, Georgia does not statutorily restrict compensable elements of damages in eminent domain proceedings, but instead relies on a system of case-by-case adjudication. This was referred to in footnote 1 in the Colorado case of Auraria Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, (Colo.) 517 P.2d 845 (1974), citing Bowers v. Fulton County, 227 Ga. 814 ( 183 S.E.2d 347) (1971). United Family contends that the nonpayment of the prepayment penalty not only amounts to failure of just and adequate compensation, but also works a constitutionally proscribed impairment of contract.

On the theory that profits derived from such a business are more a function of the entrepreneurial skills of management than the value of the land, evidence of business profits is not admissible as a determinant of the fair market value of the condemned property. Auraria Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 183 Colo. 441, 517 P.2d 845 (1974); City and County of Denver v. Hinsey, 177 Colo. 178, 493 P.2d 348 (1972). See 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, §§ 12.3121 and 13.3 (3rd ed. 1971). Under the business profits rule, evidence of the character and volume of business conducted on condemned property is admissible only for the limited purpose of showing a use for which the property may be utilized.

The party whose land is sought may raise constitutional objections and the court may address them in limine. Auraria Businessmen Against Confiscation, Inc. v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 183 Colo. 441, 445, 517 P.2d 845, 847 (1974); see also § 38–1–101(2)(a), C.R.S.2015 (“All questions and issues, except the amount of compensation, shall be determined by the court[.]”). “If the trial court concludes that the condemnor has established the right to condemn the property in question, it may grant immediate possession of the property.”