General damages, on the other hand, are damages that the law presumes actually and necessarily result from the alleged wrong or breach. See Augustine v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla.1956).The purpose of the special damages rule is to prevent surprise at trial.
Under Florida law, special damages "are considered to be the natural but not the necessary result of an alleged wrong or breach of contract." Augustine v. S. Belt Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 So. 2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956). Special damages are those that "do not follow by implication of law merely upon proof of the breach.
One of the basic purposes of a motion to dismiss is to test the over-all sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Since the complaint states a claim upon which at least nominal damages may be awarded, then it follows that the motion to dismiss the amended counter-claim should not have been granted, even though some of the damages alleged may have been non-recoverable. Augustine v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tel. Co., Fla. 1956, 91 So. 2d 320.Abstract Co. of Sarasota v. Roberts, 144 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); see also Augustine v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 So. 2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956) ("[I]f the complaint states a claim upon which at least nominal damages may be awarded, then a motion to dismiss such a complaint should not be sustained.").
General damages, on the other hand, are damages that the law presumes actually and necessarily result from the alleged wrong or breach. See Augustine v. S. Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956). The purpose of the special damages rule is to prevent surprise at trial.
In other words, they are such damages as do not follow by implication of law merely upon proof of the breach. On the other hand, general damages are those which the law presumes actually and necessarily result from the alleged breach or wrong. Augustine v. S. Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956). . . .
The measure or amount of damages is not at issue at this point in the proceedings. See Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So.2d 129, 132 (Fla. 1972) ("It is well established in Florida that where the allegations of a complaint show the invasion of a legal right, the plaintiff on the basis thereof may recover at least nominal damages, and a motion to dismiss should be overruled.") (citing Augustine v. S. Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956)); Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So.2d 626, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding that the remedy to avoid claims for impermissible elements of damage is a motion to strike the damage claim, or an objection at trial to the damage claim, but not dismissal of the complaint); Williams v. Legree, 206 So.2d 13, 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968) ("[A] complaint which sufficiently states a cause of action is not rendered vulnerable to a motion to dismiss by its allegation of an improper element of damages."). Section 215.422, Florida Statutes, which governs the processing of state warrants, vouchers and invoices, has no bearing at this juncture, if at all.
After Argonaut, this court clearly cannot compel plaintiffs to specially plead an element of damage that does not require special pleading as special damage under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.120(g); see also Augustine v. S. Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956). A trial court may be authorized to include in its standard pretrial order a requirement that a party indicate whether it is seeking prejudgment interest from the judge or from the jury.
After Argonaut, this court clearly cannot compel plaintiffs to specially plead an element of damage that does not require special pleading as special damage under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.120(g); see also Augustine v. S. Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956). A trial court may be authorized to include in its standard pretrial order a requirement that a party indicate whether it is seeking prejudgment interest from the judge or from the jury.
This requirement has been construed by the Florida courts to mean that a claim for special damages is sufficiently pleaded to withstand a motion to strike if it notifies the defendant of the nature of the special damages claimed." Bazal v. Belford Trucking Co., Inc., 442 F. Supp. at 1100 (citing in part Augustine v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Co., 91 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956)). The Bazal plaintiff alleged that he sought recovery for "emotional distress suffered." Id.
On the other hand, general damages are those which the law presumes actually and necessarily result from the alleged breach or wrong. Augustine v. S. Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956). Based upon this definition, Radcliffe's contingent liability on the guarantees were special damages which may be the natural but not the necessary result of the breach of contract.