Augustine v. Southern Bell Telephone Tel. Co.

3 Citing cases

  1. Demello v. Buckman

    916 So. 2d 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 12 times
    Stating that a trustee's discretion is limited to "the discretion conferred upon him" by "the terms of the trust"

    In other words, they are such damages as do not follow by implication of law merely upon proof of the breach. On the other hand, general damages are those which the law presumes actually and necessarily result from the alleged breach or wrong. Augustine v. S. Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956). . . .

  2. Shands Teaching Hosp. v. Beech St.

    899 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 44 times
    Reversing dismissal of provider's unjust enrichment claim against health plan administrator when no express contract existed between them.

    The measure or amount of damages is not at issue at this point in the proceedings. See Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So.2d 129, 132 (Fla. 1972) ("It is well established in Florida that where the allegations of a complaint show the invasion of a legal right, the plaintiff on the basis thereof may recover at least nominal damages, and a motion to dismiss should be overruled.") (citing Augustine v. S. Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 91 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956)); Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So.2d 626, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding that the remedy to avoid claims for impermissible elements of damage is a motion to strike the damage claim, or an objection at trial to the damage claim, but not dismissal of the complaint); Williams v. Legree, 206 So.2d 13, 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968) ("[A] complaint which sufficiently states a cause of action is not rendered vulnerable to a motion to dismiss by its allegation of an improper element of damages."). Section 215.422, Florida Statutes, which governs the processing of state warrants, vouchers and invoices, has no bearing at this juncture, if at all.

  3. Green v. Harry Savin

    455 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 3 times

    This appeal is brought from both the order dismissing Counts III and IV, see Allen v. Leybourne, 190 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), and from the order on summary judgment. Our examination of the complaint shows no pleading deficiency as to Count III. The only determination a court undertakes in considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is whether, upon examination of the four corners of the complaint, the allegations are sufficient to sustain a claim for relief. Augustine v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Co., 91 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956); Bricker v. Kay, 446 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). We affirm the summary judgment and order of dismissal as to Counts I, II, and IV. We reverse the order of dismissal as to Counts III and V, and remand for further proceedings.