The contention that the claim for loss of use should not have been stricken has merit. Grounds for the ruling were not stated in the order. If the only reason for striking this claim for special damages was because sufficient facts to support the claim were not alleged, defendants' proper remedy was a motion for more definite statement pursuant to Rule 1.11(e), F.R.C.P. Augustine v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., Fla. 1956, 91 So.2d 320. If, however, the trial court's basis for striking the claim for damages was the rule contended for by defendants that damages for loss of use are not recoverable where total destruction of the article or machine is claimed, then in our opinion the trial judge erred. The authorities are divided on this proposition, and we find no controlling Florida case.

Marquette Cement v. Louisville Nashville R.R. Co., 281 F. Supp. at 947. See also Augustine v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Company, 91 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956). In other words, "general damages are awarded only if injury were foreseeable to a reasonable man and . . . special damages are awarded only if actual notice were given to the carrier of the possibility of injury. Damage is foreseeable by the carrier if it is the proximate and usual consequence of the carrier's action."

This requirement has been construed by the Florida courts to mean that a claim for special damages is sufficiently pleaded to withstand a motion to strike if it notifies the defendant of the nature of the special damages claimed." Bazal v. Belford Trucking Co., Inc., 442 F. Supp. at 1100 (citing in part Augustine v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Co., 91 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 1956)). The Bazal plaintiff alleged that he sought recovery for "emotional distress suffered." Id.