Opinion
2023-CA-0493-MR
09-27-2024
KEVIN AUGUN APPELLANT v. CHRISTOPHER M. COYLE AND ANDREW S. ARMSTRONG APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Harry B. O'Donnell IV Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ANDREW ARMSTRONG: W. Douglas Kemper Cyrus G. Dutton IV Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE KENNETH H. GOFF, II, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CI-00111
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Harry B. O'Donnell IV Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ANDREW ARMSTRONG: W. Douglas Kemper Cyrus G. Dutton IV Louisville, Kentucky
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND CALDWELL, JUDGES.
OPINION
ACREE, JUDGE:
Appellant, Kevin Augun, appeals the Meade Circuit Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 31, 2020, Appellant and Appellee Christopher Coyle were involved in a motor vehicle accident. Appellant was sitting at a stop sign when Coyle, making a left turn, entered Appellant's lane and struck his vehicle. Andrew Armstrong was a passenger in Coyle's car.
According to Appellant, immediately after the vehicles collided, Armstrong got out of Coyle's vehicle and went to Appellant's driver side door. Armstrong then opened the door and pulled Appellant out of his vehicle. As Appellant fell out of his vehicle, he struck the pavement and broke bones in his foot and ankle. The two then engaged in a verbal confrontation, which escalated when Armstrong struck Appellant several times. Law enforcement soon arrived at the scene to end the altercation.
According to the responding officer's report, Appellant indicated Armstrong "came up to his door, opened it and pulled him out of the vehicle; striking him several times. Officer did observed [sic] several lacerations to [Appellant's] legs(s) and feet." Record (R.) at 88. A second witness, who was in the vehicle directly behind Appellant when this incident occurred, also gave a statement to law enforcement. According to the police report, this witness indicated Armstrong "got out of his car and forced [Appellant] out of vehicle and began assaulting him several times." R. at 88.
Law enforcement indicated Appellant's injuries did not appear to be related to the crash, and they sent him "to the hospital for an injury not related to the motor vehicle accident." R. at 88. Appellant adopted the facts as laid out in the police report in his response to one of Appellees' discovery interrogatories. R. at 79.
On May 31, 2022, Appellant initiated this lawsuit against Appellees. Appellant alleged the accident was the primary cause of his injuries and filed suit under KRS 304.39-010 et seq., the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA). On January 24, 2023, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the motor vehicle collision was not the cause of Appellant's injuries and, thus, he was unable to recover under the MVRA. Appellees argued the one-year statute of limitation for personal injury suits barred Appellant's complaint as it was untimely. Complaints seeking compensation under the MVRA have a two-year statute of limitation per KRS 304.39-230.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
The Meade Circuit Court granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment. This appeal now follows.
ANALYSIS
A circuit court properly grants summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56.03. "An appellate court's role in reviewing a summary judgment is to determine whether the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact exist[ed] and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Feltner v. PJ Operations, LLC, 568 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. App. 2018). Thus, appellate courts review a circuit court's summary judgment de novo. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Bank v. Stamper, 586 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Ky. 2019).
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, "where the movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances" summary judgment is appropriate. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). "[A] party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat that motion without presenting at least some affirmative evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial." Hubble v. Johnson, 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky. 1992) (citing Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480).
There is only one issue on appeal for this Court to address. Appellant contends the circuit court erred by applying the one-year statute of limitation for personal injury claims found in KRS 413.140(1)(a). Appellant argues the two-years statute of limitation found in KRS 304.39-230 should govern because his injuries were the result of him alighting from a motor vehicle. To support this argument, Appellant contends he sustained his injuries when Armstrong pulled him from the car.
Appellees counter by arguing Appellant is not a victim of a motor vehicle accident, and that his injuries did not arise out of his use of a motor vehicle. Upon review of the case law and the record, we agree with Appellees.
The purpose of the MVRA is "[t]o provide prompt payment to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to whose negligence caused the accident in order to eliminate the inequities which fault-determination has created" and "[t]o encourage prompt medical treatment and rehabilitation of the motor vehicle accident victim by providing for prompt payment of needed medical care and rehabilitation[.]" KRS 304.29-010(2), (3). Further, "[i]f the accident causing injury occurs in this Commonwealth every person suffering loss from injury arising out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle has a right to basic reparation benefits, unless he has rejected the limitation upon his tort rights as provided in KRS 304.39-060(4)." KRS 304.39-030(1) (emphasis added). Finally, KRS 304.39-040(2) states:
Basic reparation obligors and the assigned claims plan shall pay basic reparation benefits, under the terms and conditions stated in this subtitle, for loss from injury arising out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. This obligation exists without regard to immunity from liability or suit which might otherwise be applicable.(Emphasis added.)
Thus, a review of the MVRA makes it abundantly clear that "[t]he plain language of the statutes provides for the payment of basic reparation benefits to the victims of motor vehicle accidents for injuries arising out of the use of a motor vehicle." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Rains, 715 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Ky. 1986) (emphasis in original). It is also important to note that the "use" of a motor vehicle includes: "any utilization of the motor vehicle as a vehicle including occupying, entering into, and alighting from it." KRS 304.39-020(6) (emphasis added).
In Rains, the Kentucky Supreme Court sought to answer "whether there must be some causal relationship between the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and an injury sustained while using a motor vehicle to entitle the injured person to basic reparation benefits as a result of the injury. K.R.S. 304.39-020, 304.39-030, and K.R.S. 304.39-040." Rains, 715 S.W.2d at 232. Rains approached his own vehicle to find two individuals fighting on the hood of the car. Id. He became involved in the fight and, as Rains was trying to enter his own vehicle, one of the assailants struck him on the back of his head with a baseball bat. Id. at 232-33. Rains filed a claim with his insurance company which was denied because it did not arise from the use of a motor vehicle. Id. at 233.
The Kentucky Supreme Court agreed that Rains's injuries did not arise from the use of his motor vehicle notwithstanding that he suffered his injuries while attempting to enter his vehicle. Id. The Court reasoned "no motor vehicle contributed" to Rains's injuries, and the vehicle was merely among the "incidental" trappings of his assault by an individual with a baseball bat. Id. Rains was not the victim of a motor vehicle accident. Id. Accordingly, Rains was not among the class of victims contemplated by the MVRA. Id. at 234.
Appellant, too, is not among that class of victims contemplated by the MVRA. Both Rains and Appellant were assaulted outside of their vehicles. Neither Rains, who was struck while attempting to access his vehicle, nor Appellant, who was injured after being pulled out onto the pavement, received injuries directly from the use of their motor vehicles. Appellees note the police report records both Appellant and the witness behind him as describing Armstrong as forcing Appellant out of his vehicle.
The responding officer noted that Appellant's injuries did not appear to have been sustained as the result of the car accident, and the officer's report indicated Appellant was transported to the hospital for injuries unrelated to the car accident. The report also indicates the officers were responding to a "non injury motor vehicle accident." R. at 88. The police report creates no genuine issue of material fact regarding the cause of the injuries to Appellant's foot or ankles being anything other than Armstrong's assault.
However, Appellant argues Rains is inapplicable here. He instead contends his injuries arose from alighting a motor vehicle, which does fall strictly under the definition of "use" in KRS 304.39-020(6). By this logic, when Armstrong pulled Appellant from the vehicle, Appellant was involuntarily alighting from the vehicle and broke bones in his foot and ankle. To support this argument, Appellant directs this Court to the reasoning in West American Insurance v. Dickerson, 865 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1993).
In Dickerson, Dickerson alighted from a vehicle in an icy parking lot, and after walking away from the vehicle, she slipped on ice and injured her arm. Id. at 322. At issue in Dickerson was the definition of the term "alighting from" because "the lack of a causal relationship [was] not so clearly discernible as appeared in [Rains]." Id. Ultimately, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that "an individual has not finished 'alighting' from a vehicle at least until both feet are planted firmly on the ground." Id. (citation omitted). To support its adoption of this rule, the Court noted:
It is sufficient if the injury is a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle which, by this approach, determines that "alighting from" is a question of degree. As a general rule, there is a rational limit to the activity that may be said to be encompassed within the term "alighting from" which is the time and place at which the individual, after alighting, shows an intention, evidenced by an overt act based upon that intention, to undertake a new direction of activity.Id.
Appellant's reliance on Dickerson is misplaced for two reasons. First, the Court indicates that alighting from a vehicle is the volitional act of exiting a vehicle with the purpose of becoming a pedestrian. Here, Armstrong dragged Appellant out of the vehicle; he did not volitionally undergo the act of alighting from the vehicle.
Second, being dragged out of the vehicle is not the natural or reasonable consequence of using a vehicle, nor would it be a natural or reasonable consequence of the accident that happened here. Coyle ran into Appellant; Armstrong, who was not involved in the accident, then assaulted Appellant. This is similar to the second factual scenario in Rains.
In Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, a case decided by the Supreme Court in consolidation with Rains, an individual shot through the rear window of a moving vehicle. Rains, 715 S.W.2d at 233. The shooter immediately killed the driver with one of his shots, and the vehicle wrecked; it overturned before coming to rest. Id. The shooter then shot James Marshall, a passenger in the other vehicle, as he crawled away from the wreck. Id. He survived the assault and made a claim against the insurer of the vehicle in which he had been a passenger. Id.
Although Marshall was shot while a passenger in a moving motor vehicle, the shooting was not a natural or reasonable consequence of using a motor vehicle. The Court reasoned there was no evidence "to suggest that the shooting was causally related to the use of the vehicle." Id. at 234. Similarly, no evidence exists here that the injury Appellant sustained was the result of his use of the motor vehicle. His injuries are not unlike that of Rains and Marshall - they were inflicted by an assailant whose actions were unrelated to either his or his victim's use of a vehicle. A claimant's mere physical proximity to vehicles is not enough to bring a claim within the scope of the MVRA.
Appellant's injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle but were caused by a third-party's intentional tort of physically assaulting him. Because his injuries are unrelated to the use of an automobile, the two-year statute of limitation found in KRS 304.39-230 does not apply. Appellant's complaint is barred by the one-year statute of limitation for personal injury claims found in KRS 413.140(1) ("The following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued: (a) An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff ....").
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Meade Circuit Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.
ALL CONCUR.