The stay under subsection (a)(3) applies to "any action, whether against the debtor or third-parties, to obtain possession or to exercise control over property of the debtor." AH. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001 (emphasis in original); see also Marroquin v. D N Funding, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (holding stay was intact against nondebtor third party for action that sought to evict debtor and nondebtor from property of the estate); Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (holding that stay under 362(a)(3) is applicable to all entities of "any act to obtain possession of . . . or to exercise control over property of the estate") (quoting 11 U.S.C.S. ยง 362(a)(3)). Further, "[a] declaratory judgment action against a debtor is an `act to . . . exercise control over property of the estate', 11 U.S.C.S. ยง 362(a)(3), insofar as it seeks to affect . . . estate property."
Two Texas courts have adopted the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1989), holding that some actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are voidable rather than void. See Walker's Country Place, Inc. v. Central Appraisal Dist., 867 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1993, no writ); Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ). This minority position is contrary to the Texas Supreme Court's position in Howell, 839 S.W.2d at 92, which was decided after Sikes.
The general rule is that only the bankrupt party is eligible for relief under the stay. Darr v. Altman, 20 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.); Paine v. Sealey, 956 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.); Marroquin v. D N Funding, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ). Exceptions to this rule exist for Section 362(a)(1) and (3). Section 362(a)(1) has exceptions when the assets of the bankruptcy estate would be jeopardized.
c. v. Brite Day Const., Inc., 821 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex.App. โ Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Nautical Landings Marina, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank in Port Lavaca, 791 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex.App. โ Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied); Huddleston v. Texas Commerce Bank-Dallas, N.A., 756 S.W.2d 343, 345-46 (Tex.App. โ Dallas 1988, writ denied); Star-Tel, Inc. v. Nacogdoches Telecommunications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Tex.App. โ Houston [1st Dist] 1988, no writ); Southern County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 736 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Tex.App. โ Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Wallen v. State, 667 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.App. โ Austin 1984, no writ); Community Investers IX, Ltd. v. Phillips Plastering Co., 593 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex.Civ.App. โ Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ); but see Walker's Country Place, Inc. v. Central Appraisal Dist. of Taylor, 867 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex.App. โ Eastland 1993, no writ) (holding actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are voidable, not void); Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex.App. โ Dallas 1990, no writ) (same); Cissne v. Robertson, 782 S.W.2d 912, 919 (Tex.App. โ Dallas 1989, writ denied) (same). Even if we were to adopt the "voidable" approach taken in Sikes, appellees would not be entitled to summary judgment.
S.I. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1148; In re Davis, 191 B.R. 577, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (compiling citations).S.I. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1147-48; Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.Ct.App. 1990). Few courts have discussed subsection (b)(1) in detail, particularly the conduct necessary for property such as a cause of action to be "involved in" the foreign proceeding.
See In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1152-53 (5th Cir. 1987) (under Texas law "a corporation may pierce its own corporate veil and hold accountable those who have misused the corporation in order to meet its corporate obligations . . . [The] alter ego action is . . . `property of the [bankruptcy] estate.'"); Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.Ct.App. 1990) (adopting S.I. Acquisition to hold that creditor is stayed from asserting alter ego claim against a controlling shareholder because such claim belongs to the bankrupt estate). S.I. Acquisition noted that granting the bankruptcy trustee exclusive standing to assert alter ego claims furthers the bankruptcy policy of ensuring that all similarly situated creditors are treated fairly: the alter ego action "is based upon allegations that if proven would benefit all [the debtor's] creditors, i.e., making more assets available to satisfy [the debtor's] debts. . . . If [the individual creditor's] action is not stayed it would collect its claim from a pool of assets that should be available to all creditors."
; In re Bayless Markets, Inc., 108 B.R. 721 (D.Ariz. 1989) (While recognizing that complaints filed in violation of an automatic stay are voidable, avoided complaints filed by party who had knowledge of the bankruptcy filing.); Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 285 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (Default judgment entered against debtor while stay was in effect was voidable. Default judgment found inoperative against debtor.
The debtor's bankruptcy estate is comprised of all the debtor's legal or equitable interest in property as of the commencement of the bankruptcy action. In re MortgageAmerica, 714 F.2d 1266, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1983); Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.App. 1990, no writ); see also 11 U.S.C. ยง 541(a)(1). Whether a proceeding is "against the debtor" within the meaning of section 362(a)(1) is determined from an examination of the posture of the case at the initial proceeding.
Ordinarily, the automatic stay under section 362 does not extend to actions against parties other than the debtor, such as codebtors, guarantors, sureties, or other nondebtor parties. Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ); In re Chugach Forest Products, Inc., 23 F.3d 241, 246 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dos Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993); Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983). An exception to this general rule is sometimes utilized in situations where the assets of the bankruptcy estate would be jeopardized in allowing court proceedings to proceed against the codefendant.
The debtor's estate is comprised of all the debtor's legal or equitable interests in property as of the commencement of the bankruptcy action, including rights of action which are bestowed by federal or state law. In re MortgageAmerica, 714 F.2d 1266, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1983); Audio Data Corp. v. Monus, 789 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ); see also 11 U.S.C.A. ยง 541(a)(1) (West 1993). As such, the automatic stay of Section 362(a) is far-reaching "and should apply to almost any type of formal or informal action against the debtor or the property of the estate.