When, as here, a testator has entrusted broad discretionary powers in a trustee, a court must not interfere or substitute its own judgment, or interpretation of the facts, for that of the Trustee. See, e.g., Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 136 Conn. 266, 272-73 (1949). That is not to say that a broad grant of discretion "remove[s] a trustee from equitable control."
The rule in Connecticut regarding discretionary trusts is that the trustee, in determining whether to expend trust funds for the beneficiary's support, is entitled to take into consideration any other means of support available to the beneficiary. City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 133 Conn. 31, 47 A.2d 865 (1946); Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 136 Conn. 266, 70 A.2d 105 (1949). This, it would seem clear, is what the corporate trustee as a prudent fiduciary would do in the present situation, especially since one of its primary obligations is to conserve the trust property.
This conclusion is supported by case law in other jurisdictions. In Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 136 Conn. 266, 70 A.2d 105 (1949), the court held that the trustees of a trust created to benefit the children and grandchildren of the settlor could properly consider the grandchildren's alternate means of support in determining whether to disburse trust income. That trust provided the trustees were to
Under Connecticut law it is established that provisions such as these vest the discretion and power to make distributions for support and maintenance in the trustee, and that neither the settlor nor the beneficiaries can compel such a distribution absent a showing that such discretion has been abused. Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 136 Conn. 266, 70 A.2d 105; and Conway v. Emeny, 139 Conn. 612, 96 A.2d 221. It is to be noted that the provision of the Estate Tax Regulations to which both parties refer states that the use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment of the transferred property is considered as having been retained by or reserved to the decedent to the extent that the use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment is to be applied toward the discharge of a legal obligation of decedent.
The ruling was not erroneous since this judgment gives to Fafnir every right which it could claim if it had been joined as a separate party. See Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 136 Conn. 266, 273-74, 70 A.2d 105; see also Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. 230.
The remaindermen should have been made parties, and we decide this case only because, as hereinafter appears, our construction of the agreement and our determination of the claims of law made in respect to it deprive the remaindermen of nothing. See cases such as Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 136 Conn. 266, 273, 70 A.2d 105. The plaintiffs claim their interests in the property solely under and by virtue of the agreement, which they claim is a valid deed.
Since the heirs of Carrie A. Gowdy are parties, and since the conclusions we have reached are to the advantage of her estate, we have been willing to announce our construction of the will although her estate, as such, was not represented. See Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 136 Conn. 266, 273, 70 A.2d 105; Wilson v. D'Atro, 109 Conn. 563, 569, 145 A. 161. Inasmuch, however, as the interest of Carrie A. Gowdy in the fund here in question was vested in her prior to her death, her share of the fund will have to be distributed to her estate. 2 Locke Kohn, Conn. Probate Practice, pp. 44, 740.
It is apparent from the presence of the word "absolute" that she intended to give them considerable discretion. Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 136 Conn. 266, 269, 70 A.2d 105. The use of the qualifying adjective, however, did not give unlimited discretion, and the grant of authority, broad as it was, did not necessarily remove the trustees from judicial supervision. Restatement, 1 Trusts 187, comment j; 2 Scott, Trusts, p. 987.
Further, even though the subject Trust includes support terminology to distribute funds to any of the beneficiaries for the "care, maintenance, support, education or welfare," Courts have considered such language to warrant "merely distribution guidelines for the trustees, rather than restrictive conditions imposing any duty" on the trustee. Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 136 Conn. 266, 269, 70 A.2d 105, 106 (1948);see also Hacker v. Stark County Social Service Board. 527 N.W.2d 226 (ND 1994) ("Even though a trust may include support terminology . . . if the language of the trust grants sole discretion to the trustee to make or withhold distributions, then the trust is considered to be a discretionary trust rather than a support trust").
The Court also cited with approval two cases from other jurisdictions in which the trustee's decision to consider the beneficiary's resources was approved on account of the "absolute discretion" afforded by the terms of the trust. 515 Pa. at 444, 528 A.2d at 1344 (citing Auchincloss v. City BankFarmers Trust Co., 136 Conn. 266, 70 A.2d 105 (1949) and In reWatson's Will, 286 A.D. 950, 142 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1955)). Stoudt v. Department of Public Welfare, 76 Pa. Commw. 576, 464 A.2d 665 (1983), is the only appellate decision cited by the parties in which the trust instrument referred to the trustee's "sole discretion" concerning the payment of funds to the beneficiary.