In this aspect the case is not materially different from an action on an ordinary account for goods sold and delivered containing many items sold and delivered on different days. Where the language used is similar to that contained in our statute, the authorities to which we have been referred and those we have been able to find are practically unanimous in support of our view. (See Udall Milling Co. v. Atchison etc. R.Co., 82 Kan. 256, [108 P. 137]; Wells v. Cooper, 57 Conn. 52, [17 A. 281]; Atwood v. Lockwood, 76 Conn. 555, [57 A. 280]; Town of Londonderry v. Arnold, 30 Vt. 401; Garrison v. Southern R. Co., 150 N.C. 575, 586, [ 64 S.E. 578].) The cases cited involve such provisions as "he shall forfeit five dollars . . . for every month of such neglect" ( 57 Conn. 52, [17 A. 281]); "shall forfeit $1.00 per day for each car it fails to furnish" ( 82 Kan. 256, [108 P. 137]; "shall forfeit $20.00 for each month until he shall return such inventory" ( 76 Conn. 555, [57 A. 280]); "shall forfeit and pay . . . a penalty of $5.00 for every thirty days he or she shall neglect to comply with such order of the selectmen" ( 30 Vt. 401); "forfeit and pay a penalty of $50.00 for each day it refuses to receive such freight" ( 150 N.C. 575, [ 64 S.E. 578]).

Several cases from Connecticut's highest court demonstrate that statutes similar to Section 502(c)(1) are considered "penal" and are subject to the statute of limitations for civil forfeiture. For example, the civil forfeiture statute of limitations was applied to a claim brought under a statute that required the administrator of an estate to file an inventory in probate court within two months of being named. Atwood v. Lockwood , 76 Conn. 555, 57 A. 279, 280 (1904). An administrator who failed to comply could be sued for damages of $20 per each month of delay.

1906, 203 U.S. 390, 398, 27 S.Ct. 65, 51 L.Ed. 241. The cases cited by the defendants are not persuasive. The only decisions holding an action to be for a forfeiture within the meaning of Sec. 8325 are Borough of Wallingford v. Hall, 1894, 64 Conn. 426, 30 A. 47; Atwood v. Lockwood, 1904, 76 Conn. 555, 57 A. 279, and Wells v. Cooper, 1888, 57 Conn. 52, 17 A. 281. The Wallingford case involved a forfeiture of $25 to the Borough itself; Atwood concerned a forfeiture of $20 to any one who sued a delinquent administrator; and Wells dealt with a forfeiture of $5 to any one who sued a non-filing mortgagee. In none of these cases was there any relation between any actual damages and the amount recovered. Indeed, in two of them, any one who sued might have recovered.

Mo. App. 1116, 65 S.W.2d 154; Henry v. Henry, 105 Ala. 582, 15 So. 916; Thompson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 393, 10 Sup. Ct. 1019, 14 L.Ed. 408; Delvridge v. Kaukauna, 165 Wis. 435, 162 N.W. 478; Lehigh Coal Nav. Co. v. Central Ry. Co., 35 N.J.E. 426. (8) A receiver's authority for his conduct can be derived only from a written order of court, and alleged orders not entered of record are void and without any legal effect. R.S. 1929, sec. 1826; 15 C.J., 971; Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235; Milan, Admr. v. Pemberson, 12 Mo. 598; Maupin v. Franklin County, 67 Mo. 327; Dennison v. St. Louis County, 33 Mo. 168; State ex rel. Klotz v. Ross, 118 Mo. 23; Ledbetter v. Phillips, 187 S.W. 9; Cunio v. Franklin County, 315 Mo. 405, 285 S.W. 1007; Cook v. Penrod, 111 Mo. App. 128, 85 S.W. 676; In re Bates' Guardianship, 70 Okla. 321, 174 P. 743; Gualdin v. Madison, 179 N.C. 461, 102 S.E. 851, 10 A.L.R. 1497; Judge of Probate v. Briggs, 3 N.H. 309; Renshaw v. Cook, 121 Ky. 347, 111 S.W. 377; Atwood v. Lockwood, 76 Conn. 555, 57 A. 279; Newcomb's Lessee v. Smith, 5 Ohio, 447; Dimick v. Brooks, 21 Vt. 569; Wade v. Odeneal, 13 N.C. 423; Brown v. Sceggell, 22 N.H. 548; State v. Smith, 12 La. Ann. 349; Parker v. Gregg, 23 N.H. 416. Harold R. Small for respondent; Carter Jones of counsel. (1) A receiver is not a trustee in a strict sense, but an officer of the court, and the court itself has custody of the assets in the receiver's charge.

The orders of the court could not be proven by parol. Atwood v. Lockwood, 76 Conn. 555. Advice was without its province.

* * * In order to determine conclusively when the statute begins to run we have only to determine when a suit for the recovery of any forfeiture might be first brought. There cannot be any doubt that a suit might be brought at the end of the first month's neglect, and repeated at the end of each subsequent month's neglect." This interpretation was reapplied in Atwood v. Lockwood ( 76 Conn. 555). See Conn. Gen. Stat. (1875) p. 358, § 4; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1888) § 3013. — [REP.

Its purpose, among other things, is to determine whether some child should be taken under the direct care of the state and its officials. It is true of the Juvenile Court, as of other courts of record, that in general its record is the only mouth through which it can speak. Atwood v. Lockwood, 76 Conn. 555, 558. The docket entries of the Juvenile Court are entries of judicial proceedings, and a certified transcript of them constitutes the proper proof that such proceedings have been had. Smith v. Brockett, 69 Conn. 492, 502; Dart v. Mecum, 19 Conn. Sup. 428, 431.

Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 83. As a court of record, it can speak only through its record. Atwood v. Lockwood, 76 Conn. 555, 558. A record in judicial proceedings always includes a judgment, which is "the termination and sentence of the law pronounced by the court upon the matter contained in the records." Smith v. Jewell, 71 Conn. 473, 476.