c. Sanctions in Similar Cases ¶20. Johnson repeatedly compares her case to Attorney U v. Mississippi Bar , 678 So. 2d 963 (Miss. 1996), but Johnson's case is vastly different. In Attorney U , the Complaint Tribunal issued a public reprimand, and this Court reversed, finding that the attorney was not required to report the misconduct because he did not have sufficient knowledge of it.

Concerning the knowledge requirement, the board considered various legal authorities interpreting both Louisiana Rule 8.3(a) and Model Rule 8.3(a), and determined that a lawyer's duty to report professional misconduct is triggered when, under the circumstances, a reasonable lawyer would have "a firm opinion that the conduct in question more likely than not occurred." See Attorney U v. Mississippi Bar, 678 So.2d 963 (Miss. 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. I (2000).

This Court conducts a de novo review in bar disciplinary matters. Attorney U v. The Mississippi Bar, 678 So.2d 963, 969 (Miss. 1996); The Mississippi Bar v. Alexander, 669 So.2d 40, 41 (Miss. 1996); Mississippi Rules of Discipline Rule 9.4 (1997).

The cases the circuit court relied upon to support this proposition do not apply. They concern conduct explicitly prohibited by rule, Attorney U v. Mississippi Bar , 678 So.2d 963 (Miss. 1996) (Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct prohibiting a fee-splitting agreement), or by statute, Bank of New Mexico v. Freedom Homes, Inc. , 94 N.M. 532, 612 P.2d 1343, 1344 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (statute prohibiting an unlicensed person from recovering real estate commissions). In contrast, section 73–22–3 contains no language prohibiting profit-sharing between certified orthotists or prosthetists and non-licensed persons.