Atlas Bank v. Doyle

9 Citing cases

  1. R.I. Hospital Trust Co. v. Letendre

    77 R.I. 411 (R.I. 1950)   Cited 1 times

    In such a case this court has held that the defendant has the burden of proof. Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R.I. 76. Defendant concedes that such is the law according to the decisions of this court but contends that it is erroneous and cites the following cases in support of his position. Tenney v. Knowlton, 60 N.H. 572; Farmers' Loan Trust Co. v. Siefke, 144 N.Y. 354; Schmitt v. Redd, 151 Va. 333.

  2. Sixth Street Realty Co. v. Horowitz

    148 A. 597 (R.I. 1930)

    Under this statute, as well as by the common law, it was necessary for the defendant to introduce evidence to overcome the prima facie case made out by the plaintiff. Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R.I. 76; 8 C.J. 994. Defendant's testimony shows that he left the completion of the purchase of the property with his broker and attorney in Miami.

  3. Portland Cattle Loan Co. v. Gemmell

    41 Idaho 756 (Idaho 1925)   Cited 11 times

    The possession of the two notes by plaintiff, with evidence of the mortgage and that they were intended as collateral security, was sufficient of itself to establish prima facie that they were given for a valuable consideration; and the prior indebtedness is presumed to be at least equal to the face of the notes, in the absence of any proof to the contrary. ( Martin v. Lee County State Bank (Tex.Civ.App.), 265 S.W. 1057; McDaniel v. Bank of Bethlehem, 22 Ga. App. 223, 95 S.E. 724; Morrison v. Citizens' Southern Bank, 19 Ga. App. 434, 91 S.E. 509; Clydesdale Bank v. Blackshear Mfg. Co., 18 Ga. App. 515, 89 S.E. 1051; Hancock v. Empire Cotton Oil Co., 17 Ga. App. 170, 86 S.E. 434; Linderman v. Atkins, 143 Ga. 366, 85 S.E. 101; Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R.I. 76, 11 Am. Rep. 219.) This being an action to collect on the collateral security, and the prior existing indebtedness being established, it was not material that it consisted of an advancement of the $34,532.

  4. First State Bank v. Radke

    51 N.D. 246 (N.D. 1924)   Cited 12 times
    In First State Bank v. Radke (N. D.) 199 N.W. 930, it was held that the burden of showing no consideration rested upon the defendant in such circumstances.

    The court in the Hudson Case quotes extensively with approval from Perley v. Perley, 144 Mass. 104, 10 N.E. 726, decided by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts in 1887. Quotation is also made from Huntington v. Shute, 180 Mass. 371, 91 Am. St. Rep. 309, 62 N.E. 380, and Delano v. Bartlett, 6 Cush. 364, and from Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R.I. 76, 98 Am. Dec. 368, 11 Am. Rep. 219. All of these cases were decided before the Negotiable Instruments Laws was adopted in the respective jurisdictions, or else, as in the case of Huntington v. Shute, the act was entirely ignored. The court relies upon the cases heretofore discussed in arriving at its conclusion and it seems to me that the weight of the decision is very greatly impaired by the fact that it rests entirely upon adjudications prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law or made without reference to its terms.

  5. Kirk v. Ball

    45 R.I. 93 (R.I. 1923)   Cited 7 times

    And he may be required to show the circumstances under which he took the note, as bearing upon this point." This rule is followed in the cases of Mumford v. Weaver, 18 R.I. 801; Third National Bank v. Angell, 18 R.I. 1; Hazard v. Spencer, 17 R.I. 561; see also Bank of America v. Senior, 11 R.I. 376, and Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R.I. 76. It is provided in Section 65, Chapter 200, Gen. Laws, 1909, that every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course; section 30 states that a valuable consideration is presumed; and section 34 provides that absence or failure of consideration is a matter of defense as against any person not a holder in due course. Complying with these rules, the plaintiff testified on direct examination that he was the holder of the note; that he acquired ownership of it about February 25, 1914; and that he turned it over to his attorney, Mr. Bolan, for collection a day or two afterwards.

  6. Collier v. Jenks

    19 R.I. 493 (R.I. 1896)   Cited 13 times

    As the defendant set up the agreement or license aforesaid as a defence to the plaintiff's action, it devolved upon him to make it out by a preponderance of evidence. See Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R.I. 76; Douglas v. Hennessy, 15 R.I. 272. An examination of the evidence offered, however, satisfies us that the verdict was right, and that it would doubtless have been for the defendant if the charge had been given as requested. Six apparently credible witnesses, including the defendant, three of whom at least were wholly disinterested, testified with much directness to the making of the contract between the plaintiff and defendant, whereby the latter reserved the right to remove the manure in question, and there was also strong corroboratory testimony to the same effect by other disinterested witnesses; while the only evidence in support of the plaintiff's claim was her own uncorroborated testimony.

  7. Rische Sons v. Planters National Bank

    19 S.W. 610 (Tex. 1892)   Cited 14 times

    Tex. 143]; Smith v. Clopton, 4 Tex. 109; McDonough v. Vansickle, 32 Tex. 134; Hopkins v. Seymour, 10 Tex. 202; Watson v. Flanagan, 14 Tex. 354; Herndon v. Bremond, 17 Tex. 432 [ 17 Tex. 432]; Blair v. Rutherford, 31 Tex. 465 [ 31 Tex. 465]; Hutchins v. Flintge, 2 Tex. 473 [ 2 Tex. 473]; Johnston v. Josey, 34 Tex. 533; Wheeler v. Bank, 3 Ct. App. C. C., sec. 153; Van Alstyne v. Sorley, 32 Tex. 518; McAlpin v. Finch, 18 Tex. 831 [ 18 Tex. 831]; Knight v. Pugh, 4 Watts Serg., 445; Greneaux v. Wheeler, 6 Tex. 515; Price v. Blount, 41 Tex. 472; Heffron v. Cunningham, 13 S.W. Rep., 259, 260; Raborg v. Peyton, 2 Wheat., 385; Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat., 172; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How., 343; Canal and Banking Co. v. Montgomery, 95 U.S. 16; Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall., 271; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet., 1; Swift v. Smith, 102 U.S. 442; Bank v. Dunn, 6 Pet., 51; Bank v. Jones, 8 Pet., 12; Henderson v. Anderson, 3 How., 73; Smith v. Strader, 4 How., 404; Lambert v. Sandford, 2 Blackf., 137; Bank v. Doyle, 9 R.I. 76; Goodpaster v. Voris, 8 Iowa 334; Hatch v. Hyde, 14 Vt. 25; Colburn v. Averill, 30 Me. 310; Mobley v. Ryan, 14 Ill. 51; Rice v. Ragland, 10 Humph., 545; Canal and Banking Co. v. Templeton, 20 La. Annual, 141; Diversy v. Moor, 22 Ill. 330; Davis v. Bartlett, 12 Ohio St. 534; Bank v. Hall, 44 N.Y. 395; Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133; Ward v. Howard, 88 N.Y. 74; Bedell v. Carll, 33 N.Y. 581; Collins v. Martin, 1 Bos. Pull., 651; Bramah v. Roberts, 1 Bing. New Cas., 469; Solomons v. Bank of England, 13 East, 135, note (a); Bank of Ireland v. Beresford, 6 Dow, 237; Dickerson v. Burke, 25 Ga. 225; Story on Prom. Notes, secs. 178, 418, 423, 453; Story on Bills, secs. 188, 191, 432, 434; 1 Dan. Neg. Inst., sec. 812, p. 609; Tied. Com. Paper, sec. 34d; 2 Rand. Com. Paper, secs. 463, 464, 995; 1 Pars. Notes and Bills, 51; 3 Kent, 110, 158, 160; 3 Story, 393; Byles on Bills, p. 291; Chitty on Bills, 8 ed., 1833, pp. 269, 270; Bayley on Bills, 5 ed., 1830, p. 170; Edw. on Bills, 289. (2) Appell

  8. C.N. Bank v. Bell

    25 N.E. 1070 (N.Y. 1890)   Cited 7 times

    In respect of any excess, it stands in the situation of Crosby, who clearly could not enforce payment. ( Gordon v. Boppe, 55 N.Y. 665; Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R.I. 76; Stoddard v. Kimball, 6 Cush. 469.) By the judgment in this case the bank was permitted to recover on this note as though it was pledged as well for the rent on the original lease as for that accruing on the new lease made in March. This was, I think, erroneous.

  9. Scott v. Wood

    81 Cal. 398 (Cal. 1889)   Cited 26 times

    And so in other cases. (See Clark v. Hills, 67 Tex. 141; Atkinson v. Goodrich Co ., 69 Wis. 13 et seq.; 50 Am. Rep. 352; Powers v. Russell, 13 Pick. 76; Morgan v. Morse, 13 Gray, 152; Nichols v. Munsel , 115 Mass. 567; Tarbox v. Eastern Steamboat Co ., 50 Me. 345; Small v. Crowley , 62 Me. 157; 16 Am. Rep. 410; Shepardson v. Perkins , 60 N.H. 77; Blodgett v. Cummings , 60 N.H. 116; Atlas Bank v. Doyle, 9 R.I. 78; 98 Am. Dec. 368; Manistee Bank v. Seymour , 64 Mich. 72.)          In the present case we think that the learned judge of the trial court fell into error from overlooking the distinction above pointed out.