Lau's Corp. , 261 Ga. at 492 (1), 405 S.E.2d 474. See also Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker , 267 Ga. 785, 786-787, 482 S.E.2d 339 (1997) (same); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard , 211 Ga. 373, 377 (1), 86 S.E.2d 311 (1955) ("The petition in this case, which alleged that the defendants well knew that dangerous, reckless, and lawless characters and persons who were strangers frequented the premises described during the nighttime, including prowlers and hoboes, was sufficient to charge the defendants with the duty to anticipate the criminal act alleged, and to exercise ordinary care to protect its employees therefrom."); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f (1965)
ARGUED JUNE 10, 1957 — DECIDED JULY 3, 1957 — REHEARING DENIED JULY 22, 1957. This case is here by writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the application therefor alleging error by that court in rendering its judgment of affirmance, that (a) the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, and (b) the trial court did not submit an issue to the jury which had been stricken from the petition on demurrer as claimed by the plaintiff in error, although the issue of negligence was not erased or obliterated therefrom and the jury not so advised, thereby ignoring the binding authority set forth in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373 ( 86 S.E.2d 311). The Court of Appeals opinion is reported in Executive Committee of the Baptist Convention v. Ferguson, 95 Ga. App. 393 ( 98 S.E.2d 50), and it is not necessary to set out in detail a further statement of the case, inasmuch as the opinion here fully covers the evidence necessary for consideration of the grounds of alleged error. DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice.
Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199 , 202-03 (1) (296 SE2d 693 ) (1982) (punctuation omitted); accord Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373 , 377 (1) (86 SE2d 311 ) (1955).
Additionally, while the intervening criminal act of a third person will often insulate a defendant from liability for an original act of negligence, that rule does not apply when the defendant had reason to anticipate the criminal act. See Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 460-62, 68 S.Ct. 140, 92 L.Ed. 73 (1947) (holding that employers have a duty to anticipate and protect their employees from foreseeable dangers at the work-place even though the danger came from the criminal act of a third party); Atl. C. L. R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373, 86 S.E.2d 311, 315 (1955) (same); see also Doe v. Prudential-Bache/A.G. Spanos Realty Partners, L.P., 268 Ga. 604, 492 S.E.2d 865, 866 (1997) (landlord and tenants); Se. Stages v. Stringer, 263 Ga. 641, 437 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1993) (common carriers and passengers); Bradley Center, 296 S.E.2d at 696 (doctors and mental health patients); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 302B, cmt. e. But Georgia courts will not expand traditional tort concepts merely because a harm is foreseeable.
The Court finds that a duty of care can be established based on these allegations under long-recognized negligence principles articulated in Georgia law. For example, in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373, 86 S.E.2d 311 (1955), a railroad employee was required to work through the night in a one-room building in an isolated part of the defendants’ railyard, frequently opening the door to deliver messages to other workers. Godard, 86 S.E.2d at 315.
DECIDED MARCH 16, 1956 — REHEARING DENIED MARCH 29, 1956. This case is based on the Federal Employers Liability Act, and has once before been appealed to this court. It was transferred to the Supreme Court and decided in A. C. L. R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373 ( 86 S.E.2d 311). Before the trial of the case the second time, the petition was amended as to the specification of negligence charged in paragraph 20 (b) (which paragraph before amendment is set out in headnote 2 of A. C. L. R. Co. v. Godard, supra, and was held subject to special demurrer) by adding thereto the italicized portion of the following: "In knowingly maintaining its depot in an isolated part of Madison, out of sight and hearing of officers of the law, without maintaining any guard or patrol of said premises, while knowing that dangerous characters, hoboes or prowlers frequented said area." Upon the second trial the jury again found in favor of the plaintiff.
Id. at 1368. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373, 86 S.E.2d 311 (1955), a Georgia Supreme Court case recognizing negligence principles based on foreseeability. In Godard, a railroad employee was required to work through the night in a one-room building in an isolated part of the defendants' railyard, where he was attacked.
Such a restrictive and inflexible approach does not square with common sense or tort law, and represents a significant departure from precedent of this Court. See Days Inns of America v. Matt, supra; Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 492 (1) ( 405 S.E.2d 474) (1991); and Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373, 376 (1) ( 86 S.E.2d 311) (1955). To the extent that Savannah College of Art Design supports such an analysis for determining foreseeability, it is overruled.
Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Gresham, 260 Ga. 391 ( 394 S.E.2d 345) (1990). If the proprietor has reason to anticipate a criminal act, he or she then has a "duty to exercise ordinary care to guard against injury from dangerous characters." Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373, 377 ( 86 S.E.2d 311) (1955). In this case, the undisputed facts show that the Haskinses were invitees on the restaurant property. It is also undisputed that Mr. Van, the proprietor, knew about one previous purse snatching in his parking lot.
"The general rule that the intervening criminal act of a third person will insulate a defendant from liability for an original act of negligence does not apply when it is alleged that the defendant had reason to anticipate the criminal act." Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 373, 377 ( 86 S.E.2d 311) (1955). See Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 177 ( 210 S.E.2d 350) (1974); Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327, 338 ( 26 S.E.2d 698) (1943).