Moreover, under § 24-3-2, evidence is admissible to explain an actor's (here, Barksdale's) conduct or motives. Williams's statements themselves, however, do not explain any conduct or motives of Barksdale's, but simply provide context for Barksdale's responses. Compare Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Slaton, 117 Ga. App. 317, 319 (2) ( 160 S.E.2d 414) (1968) (a witness who saw a person tampering with a gas meter shortly before a gas explosion (the occurrence) was allowed to testify to what the person was doing and should have been allowed to testify as to what the person said regarding his tampering with the gas line). See Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 867 ( 294 S.E.2d 482) (1982).
See Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence § 17:7 (database updated October 2018). See also Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Slaton , 117 Ga. App. 317, 320 (2), 160 S.E.2d 414 (1968). We further note that Defendants did not object to the admission of these statements during trial.
She testified that her physical limitations prevented regular duty employment, and her medical evidence showed her restrictions. See White v. East Lake Land Co., 96 Ga. 415, 420 (4) (1895); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Slaton, 117 Ga. App. 317, 319 (2) ( 160 S.E.2d 414) (1968); Edgeworth v. Edgeworth, 239 Ga. 811, 812 ( 239 S.E.2d 16) (1977); Stinespring v. Fields, 139 Ga. App. 715, 719 (3) ( 229 S.E.2d 495) (1976). Thus there is evidence, including reasonable inferences, to carry the claimant's burden to prove by a preponderance that her inability to find employment was proximately caused by her disability. Hartford Accident c. Co. v. Bristol, 242 Ga. 287 ( 248 S.E.2d 661) (1978); Aden's Minit Market v. Landon, 202 Ga. App. 219, 220 ( 413 S.E.2d 738) (1991).
Appellees contend appellant was negligent per se in failing to install a cutoff valve in apartment 1H as required by applicable City of Atlanta ordinances. Appellant counters this allegation by arguing that the code sections cited by appellees applied only to the owner and builder of the complex, and asserts also that the deposition testimony of its maintenance worker established that the unit did have a cutoff valve at the time of the incident at issue. Violation of an ordinance governing installation of gas lines and cutoff valves constitutes negligence per se. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Slaton, 117 Ga. App. 317, 321-322 (3) ( 160 S.E.2d 414) (1968). While the parties disagree as to which ordinances apply here, each ordinance at issue required a cutoff valve.
Cheney v. State, 167 Ga. App. 757, 758 ( 307 S.E.2d 288). See also Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Slaton, 117 Ga. App. 317 (2) ( 160 S.E.2d 414). Therefore, appellant's enumeration of error is without merit.
The purpose of the ordinance as a safety measure to prevent just what did happen in the present case is so obviously relevant to the consideration of proximate cause that it requires no further discussion." Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Slaton, 117 Ga. App. 317, 322 ( 160 S.E.2d 414). Although there was no ordinance sub judice, a safety recommendation by the insurance company which was ineffectively implemented is just as relevant to the consideration of proximate cause in this case. "Where the evidence is conflicting, the questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are for the jury [judge sub judice]."