Opinion
B159759.
7-14-2003
MARTIN C. ATKINSON-BARR, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AGOURA PONY BASEBALL et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Martin C. Atkinson-Barr, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Philip E. Black and Vickie Arau for Defendant and Respondent Agoura Pony Baseball. Law Offices of Alan L. Trock and Alan L. Trock for Defendant and Respondent Las Virgenes Unified School District. Pollak, Vida & Fisher, Girard Fisher, Michael Nebenzahl and Daniel P. Barer for Defendant and Respondent City of Calabasas.
Plaintiff and appellant Martin Atkinson-Barr appeals from the summary judgment in this nuisance action in favor of defendants and respondents Agoura Pony Baseball (Baseball), Las Virgenes Unified School District (School District), and City of Calabasas (City). We conclude: (1) defendants did not meet their burden as movants to prove the cause of action for private nuisance cannot be established; (2) Atkinson-Barr has standing to allege a cause of action for public nuisance; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Atkinson-Barr discovery, related to his cause of action for public nuisance. We reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Facts
Atkinson-Barr is a homeowner in the Malibu Canyon Park area of Calabasas. He alleges a nearby baseball stadium complex, constructed on land adjacent to a nearby elementary school (School), constitutes a private and public nuisance. The baseball stadium complex is owned by Baseball and located on School District land in City. Atkinson-Barr alleges Baseball, School District, and City share in the profits of the baseball stadium complex and are each responsible for the nuisance.
Allegations of the Complaint
In a prior appeal, we reversed the dismissal of the complaint and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
The operative complaint is the fourth amended complaint, in which Atkinson-Barr alleges causes of action for private and public nuisance. Specifically, Atkinson-Barr alleges the baseball stadium complex is used daily between 3:30 p.m. and dusk on weekdays, and 8:00 a.m. and dusk on weekends, from March through November. While in operation, the use of the baseball stadium complex results in, among other things: noise ("loud shouting, cheering, screaming, clapping, foot stomping and other raucous noises"); traffic congestion; baseballs flying from the fields onto neighboring property; and "public urination, foul language, tailgate parties and other lewd and obscene conduct." Atkinson-Barr alleges this conduct "interferes with the comfortable use and enjoyment of" his property and therefore constitutes a private nuisance. He alleges it also interferes with the comfortable use and enjoyment of the property of nearby residents, as well as negatively impacts the School, and therefore also constitutes a public nuisance. He further alleges he suffers a special injury from the public nuisance, in that use of the baseball stadium complex results in traffic conditions that block ingress and egress to his property. Atkinson-Barrs property is approximately 200 feet from the baseball stadium complex. Atkinson-Barr sought injunctive relief, limiting the operations of the baseball stadium complex so as not to interfere with his use and enjoyment of his property, as well as damages to compensate him for the loss in value of his property and the emotional distress he suffered.
Discovery
As will be discussed in greater detail, Atkinson-Barr attempted to conduct discovery, related to his public nuisance cause of action. When defendants refused to comply, Atkinson-Barr moved to compel responses. Defendants opposed the discovery on the theory Atkinson-Barrs sole cause of action was for private nuisance and the discovery sought was not relevant to private nuisance. The trial court denied the motions to compel discovery on the basis that Atkinson-Barr lacked standing to pursue a cause of action for public nuisance.
Motion for Summary Adjudication of Public Nuisance Cause of Action
The School District filed a motion for summary adjudication of Atkinson-Barrs cause of action for public nuisance. The sole basis of this motion was that Atkinson-Barr lacked standing to sue for public nuisance. The factual basis for this motion was that Atkinson-Barr was not a public prosecutor and was not specially injured in his property rights by the baseball stadium complex, in that all injuries he alleged were also shared by fellow community members.
Citys Motion for Summary Judgment
City joined School Districts motion for summary adjudication, and also moved for summary judgment. City argued that all of the harms alleged by Atkinson-Barr were of a public, not private, nature. As such, the only cause of action Atkinson-Barr could state was for public nuisance-for which he lacked standing.
City supported its motion with Atkinson-Barrs responses to interrogatories, in which he set forth, in greater detail, the facts on which he based his allegations of private nuisance and the harm he suffered as a result of the nuisance. City argued that this discovery demonstrated that all of Atkinson-Barrs allegations of harm related to acts taking place at the baseball stadium complex, not on Atkinson-Barrs property. As to Atkinson-Barrs allegations of noise and traffic congestion, City disregarded them as a basis for a private nuisance cause of action because "there is no noise, traffic or congestion that is affecting plaintiffs property any differently than any other neighbor."
Both School District and Baseball joined Citys motion.
Atkinson-Barrs Opposition
Atkinson-Barr opposed both motions. He submitted documents detailing the harm caused by the baseball stadium complex, both to the neighborhood in general and himself in particular. As to the cause of action for public nuisance, Atkinson-Barr argued he had standing on two bases: the public nuisance was specially injurious to him; and the nuisance also constituted a private nuisance as to him.
Defendants Reply
Defendants replied to Atkinson-Barrs opposition, arguing that Atkinson-Barr had no evidence of either a special injury or a private nuisance. Defendants also objected to Atkinson-Barrs evidence as irrelevant, lacking foundation, and lacking authentication.
First Hearing
The motions were heard on March 21, 2002. The trial court found the case to be a "very close borderline case as to whether or not this is an annoyance or a nuisance." Believing that the parties could voluntarily implement a solution to the problems posed by the baseball stadium complex, the trial court indicated its intention to grant the motion for summary judgment conditioned on defendants implementation of several mitigating measures. The trial court continued the hearing to enable the parties to reach agreement.
The measures are not part of the record, but apparently include provision of adequate toilet facilities, installation of netting to catch fly balls, keeping the baseball field clean, and limiting the hours of play.
Further Evidence
No agreement was reached on the mitigating measures. Atkinson-Barr submitted additional evidence, including declarations that resolved the authentication problems of his earlier evidence, and his own declaration further detailing the interference with his enjoyment of his own property. School District objected to this evidence as untimely.
Second Hearing
At the second hearing, the trial court clarified that it had not made a ruling on the pending motions, but had merely taken them under submission in the hope the case could be resolved in light of the tentative ruling. The trial court granted the motions for summary adjudication and summary judgment. Defendants failed to obtain rulings on any of their objections to Atkinson-Barrs evidence.
Judgment and Appeal
Judgment in favor of all defendants was entered on April 25, 2002. Atkinson-Barr filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication
A. Standard of Review
"The policy underlying motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication of issues is to "promote and protect the administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by the elimination of needless trials."" (Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 323.)
"Any party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The motion and the opposition to the motion "shall be supported by affidavits, declarations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be taken." (Id., subd. (b).) Separate statements setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the parties contend are undisputed must be included. (Ibid.) "Evidentiary objections not made at the hearing shall be deemed waived." (Ibid.) "The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact the court shall consider all of the evidence . . . and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted . . . on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, if contradicted by other inferences or evidence, which raise a triable issue as to any material fact." (Id., subd. (c); KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1028.)
A defendant or cross-defendant meets his or her burden upon a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication if that party has proved "one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) The defendant need not conclusively negate an element of the plaintiffs cause of action, but must only show that one or more of its elements cannot be established. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) The burden of proof at trial is relevant to the burden of production borne by the defendant moving for summary judgment. "If a defendant moves for summary judgment against [a plaintiff who would bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence at trial], he must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact not to find any underlying material fact more likely than not." (Id. at p. 851, original italics.) The defendant or cross-defendant can satisfy its burden either by producing evidence which negates an element of the cause of action, or by showing, through the plaintiffs or cross-complainants deficient discovery responses, that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence to establish that element. (Id. at pp. 853-854; Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 747-749; Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581.)
"Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) In opposing the motion, the plaintiff or cross-complainant may not simply rely upon allegations or denials of the pleadings; the plaintiff or cross-complainant must set forth specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.; Union Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at pp. 580-581, 593.)
"There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Although "the court may not weigh the plaintiffs evidence or inference against the defendants as though it were sitting as the trier of fact, it must nevertheless determine what any evidence or inference could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact." (Id. at p. 856, original italics.) "If [the] party moving for summary judgment . . . would prevail at trial without submission of any issue of material fact to a trier of fact for determination," the motion should be granted. (Id. at p. 855.)
On appeal, we exercise "an independent assessment of the correctness of the trial courts ruling, applying the same legal standard as the trial court in determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Iverson v. Muroc Unified School Dist. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 218, 222.) "The appellate court must examine only papers before the trial court when it considered the motion, and not documents filed later. [Citation.] Moreover, we construe the moving partys affidavits strictly, construe the opponents affidavits liberally, and resolve doubts about the propriety of granting the motion in favor of the party opposing it." (Szadolci v. Hollywood Park Operating Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 16, 19; accord, Lorenzen-Hughes v. MacElhenny, Levy & Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1684, 1686-1687.)
Summary adjudication motions are restricted to an entire cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for punitive damages, or an issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); Hood v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 323.) "A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2).)
"Where the defendant asserts a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, the summary adjudication motion is tantamount to a motion for judgment on the pleadings." (Sequoia Ins. Co. v . Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1478; Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1715, 1727.)
B. Law of Nuisance
"Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance." (Civ. Code, § 3479.) "The statutory definition of nuisance appears to be broad enough to encompass almost every conceivable type of interference with the enjoyment or use of land or property." (Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1991) 230 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1136, 281 Cal. Rptr. 827.)
"A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal." (Civ. Code, § 3480.) "Every nuisance not included in the [above] definition . . . is private." (Civ. Code, § 3481.)
This statutory dichotomy is somewhat misleading, because a nuisance can be both public and private. (Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1041; Lew v. Superior Court (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 866, 873.) A better distinction is that a private nuisance must involve an injury specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs own land, while a public nuisance affects a considerable number of persons and need not, but may, involve an interference with property rights. (Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1041-1042.)
Thus, a nuisance which is solely public does not implicate any individuals use and enjoyment of his or her land. Examples of such a solely public nuisance are the presence of a "fuel farm" with its generalized risk of a gas fire (Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1039-1040), a plant which emits pollution causing personal injury unrelated to any property right (Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1971) 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123-125, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350), or "invasion of a common and public right, which everyone may enjoy, such as the use of a highway, or canal, or public landing-place." (Fisher v. Zumwalt (1900) 128 Cal. 493, 495, 61 P. 82.) None of these nuisances implicate any individuals rights to use and enjoyment of his or her land, and are therefore solely public nuisances.
In contrast, disturbances that implicate many individuals rights to use and enjoyment of their property may be private and public nuisances. For example, noise and smells from a nearby establishment which interfere with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his or her property constitute a private nuisance (Willson v. Edwards (1927) 82 Cal.App. 564, 569, 256 P. 239), but when the noise is such that it affects an entire neighborhood, it can be prosecuted as a public nuisance (People v. Mason (1981) 124 Cal. App. 3d 348, 352-353, 177 Cal. Rptr. 284).
The question arises as to whether, when a private nuisance affects so many people that it becomes a public nuisance, it loses its character as a private nuisance. It does not. (Willson v. Edwards, supra, 82 Cal.App. at p. 569.) "If a private right of property is interfered with by the acts of the defendant, . . . the plaintiff has a right of action, even though the nuisance may become so extensive in its proportions as to affect the general public and give rise to a prosecution for the abatement thereof as a public nuisance." (Ibid.) "By the one nuisance, the private rights and property of many persons are injured. Because the nuisance affects a great number of persons in the same way, it cannot conclusively be said that it is a public nuisance and nothing more. The fact that a nuisance is public does not deprive the individual of his action in cases where, as to him, it is private and obstructs the free use and enjoyment of his private property." (Fisher v. Zumwalt, supra, 128 Cal. at p. 496.) To proceed on a private nuisance theory, the injury to plaintiff "need not be different in kind from that suffered by the general public." (Koll— Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1041.)
Moreover, when the nuisance is both public and private, the plaintiff has standing to sue for public nuisance as well as private nuisance. Normally, a district attorney or city attorney may bring a public nuisance cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 731.) Additionally, a "private person may maintain an action for a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself, but not otherwise." (Code Civ. Proc., § 3493.) This requirement is satisfied if the nuisance also constitutes a private nuisance as to plaintiff. "A private person has no direct remedy against a public nuisance unless he is injuriously affected; in other words, unless it is a private nuisance also as to him." (11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1990) Equity, § 144, p. 824.) When the public nuisance results in any substantial interference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his or her own land, "this makes the nuisance a private as well as a public one; and since the plaintiff does not lose his rights as a landowner merely because others suffer damage of the same kind or even of the same degree, there is general agreement that he may proceed upon either theory, or upon both." (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 90, p. 648; e.g., Johnson v. V.D. Reduction Co. (1917) 175 Cal. 63, 66, 164 P. 1119; Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., supra, 22 Cal. App. 3d at p. 124; Wade v. Campbell (1962) 200 Cal. App. 2d 54, 59-60, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173.)
C. Private Nuisance
Atkinson-Barr alleged a cause of action for private nuisance based on, among other things, the noise from the baseball stadium complex and the increased traffic congestion, which interfered with the use and enjoyment of his property. In Citys motion for summary judgment, joined by the other defendants, City did not attempt to argue that, factually, Atkinson-Barr did not suffer a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of his property due to the noise and traffic congestion arising from the baseball stadium complex. Instead, City argued that, as a matter of law, Atkinson-Barr did not state a cause of action for private nuisance because he did not allege harm that affected his property any differently than it affected any other property.
City is mistaken as to the law. As discussed above, a plaintiff may allege a cause of action for private nuisance provided there is substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs property, regardless of the number of other individuals who suffer a similar interference. Thus, as a matter of law, City failed to defeat Atkinson— Barrs cause of action for private nuisance.
In any event, we note that the evidence City introduced in support of its motion for summary judgment is sufficient to show a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Atkinson-Barr suffered a substantial interference with his use and enjoyment of his property. City relies on Atkinson-Barrs responses to interrogatories in order to show that the only harms Atkinson-Barr claimed constituted a public nuisance. But those interrogatory responses demonstrate Atkinson-Barr based his private nuisance cause of action on, among other things, the noise that interfered with his enjoyment of his property, and the traffic congestion that hindered ingress and egress to his property. Atkinson-Barrs interrogatory responses stated: "The stadium complex activities have created a nuisance by way of noise and traffic on each and every afternoon which precludes Plaintiffs ability to rest in his home, even with windows closed." Atkinson— Barr also explained: "As a direct consequence of the stadium complex nuisance Plaintiff cannot enjoy his home and entertain in his home at weekends and in the evenings. Rather than be subject to the nuisance Plaintiff has dined away from his home and traveled to friend[s] homes at weekends." These interrogatory responses raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Atkinson-Barr suffered a private nuisance as a result of the baseball stadium complex.
On appeal, defendants contend Atkinson-Barr waived his cause of action for private nuisance by failing to argue the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to this cause of action. While Atkinson-Barrs brief is not a model of clarity, he argues his discovery responses are sufficient to support a cause of action for private nuisance, and that the trial court misapprehended controlling authority.
D. Public Nuisance
Defendants challenged Atkinson-Barrs cause of action for public nuisance only on the basis of standing; defendants did not attempt to prove there was no triable issue of material fact as to whether the baseball stadium complex constituted a public nuisance.
Defendants have not defeated Atkinson-Barrs cause of action for private nuisance with respect to the baseball stadium complex. Thus, Atkinson-Barrs cause of action for private nuisance provides the necessary standing for him to pursue a cause of action for public nuisance.
To the extent defendants argue on appeal that Atkinson-Barr lacks evidence to support a cause of action for public nuisance, even though this was not the basis of the motions, we disagree. Atkinson-Barr submitted voluminous evidence from his fellow residents as to the interference with their use and enjoyment of their property caused by the baseball stadium complex. Defendants disregard this evidence, either on the theory that it was inadmissible or that it did not pertain to Atkinson-Barrs own property rights. As defendants failed to obtain rulings on any of their evidentiary objections, they are waived and we therefore consider all of Atkinson-Barrs evidence. Since we are concerned with Atkinson-Barrs cause of action for public nuisance, the harm need not take place on his property.
E. Conclusion
Both the motion for summary judgment and the motion for summary adjudication were improperly granted. Atkinson-Barr alleged a substantial interference with his rights to use and enjoyment of his property, which is sufficient to support a cause of action for private nuisance. The fact that these interferences also impact the rights of other property owners does not prohibit Atkinson-Barr from pursuing his cause of action for private nuisance. Instead, it also provides the basis for a cause of action for public nuisance, which Atkinson-Barr has standing to pursue.
II. Discovery Rulings
Atkinson-Barr contends the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on three discovery motions.
"We review discovery orders under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. [Citation.] Thereunder, a trial courts ruling "will be sustained on review unless it falls outside the bounds of reason."" (Fuller v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 299, 304.)
In the first motion, Atkinson-Barr sought to compel the School District to produce documents evidencing vandalism at the School. Atkinson-Barr argued the patrons of the baseball stadium complex parked their cars in the School parking lot, and walked through the School to get to the stadium complex. Additionally, they used the bathrooms in the School. Believing stadium patrons vandalized the School, Atkinson-Barr sought discovery of records of vandalism. The trial court concluded the evidence sought was not relevant, because it did not relate to Atkinson-Barrs own property and Atkinson-Barr had no standing to pursue a public nuisance cause of action. Nonetheless, the trial court granted the motion in part, allowing Atkinson-Barr to discover records of vandalism relating to the School parking lot, bathrooms, and the baseball stadium complex only. Atkinson-Barr had also sought discovery of vandalism in the Schools pathways and cafeteria, which were also open to the patrons of the stadium. As the trial courts ruling allowing Atkinson-Barr no further discovery was based on the trial courts misapprehension that Atkinson-Barr did not have standing to pursue a public nuisance cause of action, we direct the trial court to vacate its order and reconsider the proper scope of discovery in light of Atkinson-Barrs cause of action for public nuisance.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Atkinson-Barr submitted a letter from a neighbor who had witnessed baseball players urinating in the School drinking fountains on more than one occasion.
We do not direct the trial court to grant the motion outright. The parties disputed the years for which records should be disclosed. On remand, the trial court may exercise its discretion to limit the scope of discovery.
In the second motion, Atkinson-Barr sought to compel School District to produce all construction and conditional use permits pertaining to the baseball stadium complex, and all writings pertaining to the zoning of that property, in order to prove the stadium complex constituted a zoning violation. School District opposed the motion on the basis that the requested discovery was relevant to a cause of action for public nuisance only. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that "Atkinson-Barr erroneously construes this to be a public nuisance cause of action, whereas it is not." As this premise is incorrect, we direct the court to vacate its order and grant the motion.
The trial court also denied the motion on the basis that permits are public records and are equally available to Atkinson-Barr. Atkinson-Barr represented that he "made [a] diligent search with the zoning and permitting authority . . . and there are no permits on file."
In the third motion, Atkinson-Barr sought to compel Baseball to produce its income statements and balance sheets from 1990 to the present. "An intentional invasion of anothers interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable [and therefore constitutes a nuisance] if (a) the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actors conduct, or (b) the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible." (Rest.2d Torts, § 826.) In other words, even when the social utility of the conduct outweighs the harm it causes, it may still constitute a nuisance if the harm caused is serious and it is economically feasible to compensate for the harm. (Rest.2d Torts, § 826, com. f.) "The financial burden of this cost is therefore a significant factor in determining whether the conduct of causing the harm without paying for it is unreasonable." (Ibid.) As such, the profits and costs associated with the baseball stadium may become relevant to the determination of whether the stadium constitutes a nuisance, and Baseballs balance sheets and income statements therefore may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The trial court should not have denied this discovery.
As with the discovery sought regarding vandalism at the School, the trial court may choose to exercise its discretion to limit the years for which the balance sheets and income statements must be provided.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate its order granting the motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication, and enter a new and different order denying both motions. The trial court is also directed to vacate its orders denying in part Atkinson-Barrs first motion to compel further responses of the School District to his demand for production of documents (relating to vandalism at the School) and denying Atkinson-Barrs motion to compel further responses of Baseball to his demand for production of documents (relating to balance sheets and income statements), and to reconsider the motions in light of Atkinson-Barrs standing to pursue a public nuisance cause of action. The trial court is also directed to vacate its order denying Atkinson-Barrs second motion to compel further responses of the School District to his demand for production of documents (relating to permits and zoning) and enter a new order granting the motion to compel.
Defendants are to pay Atkinson-Barrs costs on appeal.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, J., and MOSK, J.