And it seems that it is not necessary to allege or prove that such goods have no market value to predicate proof of actual value. Wells Fargo Exp. Co. v. Williams [Tex.Civ.App.] 71 S.W. 314; Benedict v. C., R. I. P. Ry. Co. [Tex.Civ.App.] 91 S.W. 811; I. G. N. Ry. Co. v. Nicholson, 61 Tex. 550; Railway Co. v. Smythe, 55 Tex.Civ.App. 557, 119 S.W. 895. In such a case all such pertinent facts and circumstances as will place before the jury material data which will enable them to reach a fair valuation or estimate of the plaintiff's damage are admissible in evidence.
Dallas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Day, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 353, 22 S.W. 538, 540; Wichita Falls W. Ry. Co. v. Wyrick (Tex.Civ.App.) 158 S.W. 570; Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Smythe, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 557, 119 S.W. 892: Hancock v. Haile (Tex.Civ.App.) 171 S.W. 1053; 8 R.C.L. p. 538, § 90. In condemnation proceedings, the defendant owner is not required to file any pleading, and his prayer for general relief would entitle him to interest from the date the condemnor appropriates such owner's land to its own exclusive use.
It is our opinion that the prayer of the appellees for judgment "for the loss sustained by reason of the aforesaid fire" was sufficient to justify the inclusion of interest in the recovery; in fact was, in effect, a prayer for the recovery of interest, as an element of loss incident to and as a part of the amount due and payable under the policies. H. T. C. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 62 Tex. 209; Ft. W. D.C. Ry. Co. v. Greathouse, 82 Tex. 104, 111-112, 17 S.W. 834; Atchison, T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smythe, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 557, 119 S.W. 892, 896. Again, we are of the opinion that appellees were entitled to recover interest under their prayer for "general relief."
It is appellant's contention that under this Texas statute, the only way that the statutory laws of California could properly have been proved was to have introduced in evidence the statute book of the state of California, properly authenticated by the secretary of that state under the great seal of that state, and that a mere certificate, without the book, was not admissible under this Texas statute, and in this connection it is his further contention that the mode of proof prescribed by the Texas statute is exclusive. In support of his contention on this point, appellant cites in his brief the following cases: Vickers v. Faubion (Tex.Civ.App.) 224 S.W. 803; Martin v. Payne, 11 Tex. 292; Railway Co. v. Conrad (Tex.Civ.App.) 99 S.W. 209; Johnston v. Branch Banking Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 143 S.W. 193; Railway v. Smythe, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 557, 119 S.W. 892; Railway Co. v. Ryan (Tex.Civ.App.) 214 S.W. 642. Upon first consideration of this assignment, we thought that appellant's contention should be sustained.
It seems that it is not necessary to allege or prove the want of market value of such goods in order to make available proof of actual value. Wells Fargo Express Co. v. Williams (Tex.Civ.App.) 71 S.W. 314; Benedict v. C., R. I. P. Ry. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 91 S.W. 811; I. G. N. Ry. Co. v. Nicholson, 61 Tex. 550; A., T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smythe, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 557, 119 S.W. 892, 895, writ of error refused; Pecos N. F. Ry. Co. et al. v. Grundy et al. (Tex.Civ.App.) 171 S.W. 318. We have considered the other questions stressed in the motion for rehearing, but believe that we have correctly disposed of them on original hearing.
The measure of damages for loss of household goods by a common carrier is the actual or reasonable value of the goods at the place of destination at the time they should have been delivered — as distinguished from a fanciful or sentimental value — where the goods are secondhand and have no standard market value. A., T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smythe, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 557, 119 S.W. 892; St. L. Iron Mt. S. Ry. v. Green, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 13, 97 S.W. 531; I. G. N. Ry. Co. v. Nicholson, 61 Tex. 553; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Colquitt, (Sup.) 9 S.W. 604. Without considering the assignments in the order presented, we have disposed of all the contentions urged here, and, because of the errors pointed out, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Article 3692, R.C.S., provides that the printed statutes of other states, purporting to have been printed under authority thereof, shall be received as evidence of the acts therein contained. See, also, article 3693; Martin v. Payne, 11 Tex. 292; Railway Co. v. Conrad, 99 S.W. 209; Johnston v. Branch, 143 S.W. 193; Railway Co. v. Smythe, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 557, 119 S.W. 892; Railway Co. v. Ryan, 214 S.W. 642; Seiders v. Merchants Life Ass'n (Sup.) 54 S.W. 753; Cole v. District Board, etc., 32 Okla. 692, 123 P. 426, Ann.Cas. 1914A, 459. In the absence of an allegation and of proof of the laws of another state, the rights of parties arising out of the facts alleged, or alleged and proved, must be determined by the laws of this state.
Our statute (article 3692) provides Prat printed statutes under the authority of any state will be received in evidence in our courts, and there is no other way by which to prove the statutory laws of any other state. It was held in A., T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smythe, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 557, 119 S.W. 892, that the decisions of the Supreme Court of a state are not admissible to prove the laws of that state. Proof is to be made by the introduction of the statute books of the state.
And it seems that it is not necessary to allege or prove that such goods have no market value to predicate proof of actual value. Wells Fargo Express Co. v. Williams, 71 S.W. 314; Benedict v. C., R. I P. Ry. Co., 91 S.W. 811; I. G. N. Ry. Co. v. Nicholson, 61 Tex. 550; Railway Co. v. Smythe, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 557, 119 S.W. 895. In such a case all such pertinent facts and circumstances as will place before the jury material data which will enable them to reach a fair valuation or estimate of the plaintiff's damage are admissible in evidence.
Appellant contends the charge as given was erroneous for the reason that the true measure of damages in such cases is the market value of the trunk and its contents on the date of its conversion or loss. The measure of damages for injury or damage to household furniture, wearing apparel, etc., has been repeatedly stated by the appellate courts of this state to be the difference in the actual value of the same just prior to the damage or injury and the actual value thereof just subsequent thereto; and that the proper method of arriving at their value at the time of the injury or damage is to take into consideration the cost of the articles, the extent of their use, whether worn or out of date, and their condition at the time, etc. Wells Fargo Express Co. v. Williams, 71 S.W. 314; Railway Company v. Seale, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 364, 67 S.W. 437; Benedict v. Railway Company, 91 S.W. 811; Railway Company v. Smythe, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 557, 119 S.W. 892; Railway Company v. Nicholson, 61 Tex. 550; Railway Company v. Colquitt (Sup.) 9 S.W. 603; Barker v. Lewis, Storage Trans. Co., 78 Conn. 198, 61 A. 363, 3 Ann.Cas. 889, and note. And we think it clear that the measure of damages recoverable for similar articles in case of conversion, loss, or appropriation would be the actual value of the same at the time of such conversion, loss, or appropriation; such value to be arrived at in the manner we have just stated.