This means that, subject to certain exceptions not here relevant, the carrier becomes an insurer of the goods during storage.See, e.g., General American Transp. Corp. v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 191 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 905, 72 S.Ct. 636, 96 L.Ed. 1324 (1952); Railway Express Agency v. Schoen, 70 Ariz. 87, 216 P.2d 420 (1950); United Fruit Co. v. New York Baltimore Transp. Co., 104 Md. 567, 65 A. 415 (1906); Atchison T. S.F. Ry. v. Homewood, 39 Okla. 179, 134 P. 856 (1913). See generally In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 52 I.C.C. 671, 702-705 (1919).
In that situation, the defendant, being without direction to ship the cotton, held it as a warehouseman, and was not bound to answer for its safety as an insurer, but was liable only for negligence while holding the property. 10 C.J. p. 226; Atchison, T. S.F. Ry. Co. v. Homewood, 39 Okla. 179, 134 P. 856, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 990. The plaintiffs were therefore bound to establish his negligence, as the proximate cause of the loss of the cotton.
It is a well-established rule that a carrier is not liable as an insurer of goods to be shipped until complete delivery thereof has been made to it and accepted by it. 4 R. C. L. p. 688; 10 C. J. p. 226; Moore on Carriers (2d Ed.) vol. 1, p. 170; Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Garrison, 169 Okla. 634, 38 P.2d 502; Atchison, Topeka S. F. Ry. Co. v. Homewood, 39 Okla. 179, 134 P. 856, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 990; Kansas City, M. O. Ry. Co. v. Cox, 25 Okla. 774, 108 P. 380, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 313. The testimony of plaintiff's manager was, in substance, that he had given defendant's agent all necessary shipping instructions except to name the consignee to whom the shipment was to be made.
This court has sustained this rule. See Atchison, T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Homewood, 39 Okla. 179, 134 P. 856, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 990, and Kansas City, Mexico Orient Ry. Co. v. Cox, 25 Okla. 774, 108 P. 380, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 313. In Atchison, T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Homewood, supra, this court quoted with approval Barron v. Eldredge, 100 Mass. 455, wherein the court said: