Opinion
A-14025 0384
07-24-2024
SAMUEL ATCHAK, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Jane B. Martinez, Law Office of Jane B. Martinez, LLC, Anchorage, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, for the Appellant. Scott Crawford, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Bethel, Nathaniel Peters, Judge. Trial Court No. 4HB-15-00192 CR
Appearances:
Jane B. Martinez, Law Office of Jane B. Martinez, LLC, Anchorage, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, for the Appellant.
Scott Crawford, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
In 2014, Samuel Atchak was living in the village of Chevak. One night, Atchak confronted R.S. while she was walking outdoors, strangled her until she lost consciousness, had sexual intercourse with her, and then stabbed her to death with a knife. Atchak pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to second-degree murder and attempted first-degree sexual assault, and he was sentenced to a composite term of 115 years with 30 years suspended (85 years to serve). Atchak now appeals, arguing that his sentence is excessive.
AS 11.41.110(a)(1) and AS 11.41.410(a)(1) & AS 11.31.100(a), respectively.
The plea agreement provided that Atchak would be sentenced to 35 years with 10 suspended (25 to serve) for the attempted sexual assault conviction, and that sentencing would be open to the court for the second-degree murder conviction (i.e., within the statutory range of 10 to 99 years). The parties also agreed that the sentences would run consecutively. The parties stipulated that the "most serious" aggravating factor applied to both offenses, and that Atchak would not seek, and the court would not consider, any mitigating factors. The superior court accepted the agreement, and Atchak's case proceeded to sentencing.
The applicable presumptive sentencing range for this conviction was 15 to 30 years. AS 12.55.125(i)(2)(A)(ii).
Former AS 12.55.125(b) (2014).
AS 12.55.155(c)(10). Aggravating factors apply only by analogy to unclassified felonies like murder. See Allen v. State, 56 P.3d 683, 684 (Alaska App. 2002).
At sentencing, the State called two witnesses: Dr. Cristin Rolf, the medical examiner who performed R.S.'s autopsy, and Sergeant Mark Pearson, the homicide investigator. Dr. Rolf testified that R.S. had been strangled, sustained sixteen stab wounds to the neck, chin, and chest, and sustained a blunt force injury to her vagina. Sergeant Pearson testified that almost one year after R.S.'s death, Atchak confessed to the murder and sexual assault after Pearson confronted Atchak with evidence that his DNA matched DNA taken from the crime scene. Sergeant Pearson further testified that Atchak initially evaded responsibility by lying to the police, falsely suggesting alternative suspects, and tampering with R.S.'s phone.
The superior court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of 35 years with 10 suspended (25 years to serve) for the attempted sexual assault conviction and a consecutive sentence of 80 years with 20 suspended (60 years to serve) for the second-degree murder conviction. The court declined the State's request to find Atchak a worst offender, but noted that it was a "very close call."
Atchak now appeals, arguing that his sentence is excessive because the court failed to sufficiently consider his potential for rehabilitation. When we review an excessive sentence claim, we independently examine the record to determine whether the sentence is clearly mistaken - i.e., whether the sentence falls within a "permissible range of reasonable sentences." The sentencing court "bears primary responsibility for determining the priority and relationship of the various sentencing objectives in a given case."
McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974); see also Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997).
Galindo v. State, 481 P.3d 686, 689 (Alaska App. 2021) (citing Asitonia v. State, 508 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Alaska 1973)).
In its sentencing remarks, the court identified its primary sentencing priority as isolation ("to protect the community [and] all victims who are similarly situated to [R.S.]"), and its secondary priorities as deterrence, community condemnation, and reaffirmation of societal norms. Regarding rehabilitation, the court acknowledged that Atchak was relatively young and had no criminal history. Nevertheless, the court found that Atchak's rehabilitative prospects were "poor" due to the "horrific" crimes he committed, his "minimal showing of remorse," and his lengthy record of institutional violations (including violent conduct) while awaiting trial.
See Starkweather v. State, 244 P.3d 522, 534 (Alaska App. 2010) (discussing consideration of the defendant's institutional record in evaluating his potential for rehabilitation).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the court's findings are supported by the record, and that the sentence imposed is not clearly mistaken.
See LaLonde v. State, 614 P.2d 808, 811 (Alaska 1980) ("It is within the discretion of the sentencing judge to assign priorities among the Chaney factors." (citing Asitonia, 508 P.2d at 1026)).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.