Opinion
01 CIV. 1905 (GEL)
May 16, 2002
Fran M. Jacobs, Duane Morris Heckscher, New York, New York (Kurt Hunciker, of counsel) for Plaintiffs Astor Holdings, Inc. and Robot Wars LLC.
Daniel S. Schecter, Latham Watkins, Los Angeles, California (James S. Blank, Christopher R. Harris, Belinda S. Lee, of counsel) for Defendants Edward "Trey" Roski, III and BattleBots, Inc.
OPINION AND ORDER
This lawsuit concerns the enterprise of staging contests in which considerable technological talent is expended to create robots that destroy each other in a ring or cage. The present motion suggests the litigants think that lawsuits utilize legal talent in more or less the same way.
In a previous opinion, Astor Holdings, Inc. v. Roski, 01 Civ. 1905 (GEL), 2002 WL 72936 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2002), this Court disposed of various motions, dismissing one of the four counts of the complaint and denying various other motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs now seek to amend the complaint, principally to delete two claims: the claim for unjust enrichment that has already been dismissed by the Court, and a claim for tortious interference with business opportunity, which the Court ruled was properly stated, but about which the Court expressed some skepticism. See id. at 17-21. Defendants oppose this sensible effort to simplify the litigation, demanding that any dismissal of these counts be with prejudice, and be conditioned on the payment of attorneys' fees associated with defending the dismissed counts. Plaintiffs, in turn, oppose these conditions — understandably in the case of the attorneys' fees demand, and more peculiarly in the case of the dismissal with prejudice, which they argue is unnecessary since they wouldn't be able to bring the claims again anyway.
The instant motion practice is for the most part unnecessary and wasteful; unlike the robot battles, it does not even provide entertainment. Plaintiffs' motion is granted, on the condition that the dismissal of the abandoned claims shall be with prejudice.
First, as to the unjust enrichment claim that the Court has already dismissed on the merits, both the motion to amend and the defendants' response are completely unnecessary. While deleting the claim from the amended complaint is perfectly appropriate, the fact is that the claim has already been dismissed, and there is no need to seek permission to redact it. The conditions sought by defendants are respectively unnecessary and inappropriate. As to dismissal with prejudice, the claim has been dismissed on the merits, and defendants will be able to assert a res judicata defense if plaintiffs were ever to bring that claim again. In effect, then, the dismissal is already "with prejudice." As to attorneys' fees, defendants did not seek such an award in connection with their original motion to dismiss that count, nor did they argue that the pleading was sanctionable. There was, indeed, no basis for doing so. The claim was dismissed largely on equitable and discretionary grounds, because it was duplicative of other, more solidly grounded theories advanced in the complaint. Id. at 17-18. Its assertion was not frivolous, and because the count relied on no facts not otherwise in issue in the case, there could be no costs of defending it other than the costs of the portion of defendants' omnibus motion that addressed it.
Second, the withdrawal of the tortious interference claim is an entirely appropriate and commendable response to the Court's prior opinion. Once again, the assertion of the claim was not frivolous and entitled defendants to no sanction or costs; indeed, the Court sustained it against defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.Id. at 19-21. Nor can plaintiffs be taxed for unnecessarily requiring defendants to incur costs of defense, since plaintiffs notified defendants of their intention of dropping this count in February 2002, promptly after receiving the Court's decision on the motions. The time between February and the filing of the instant formal motion has been consumed largely by the parties' protracted exchange of correspondence embodying their inability to agree on the terms of this desirable simplification of the case.
On the other hand, plaintiffs' opposition to dismissing the claim with prejudice is difficult to understand, and lends credence to defendants' suspicion about plaintiffs' future intentions. As the Court has already noted, the tortious interference claim is factually dubious. Plaintiffs concede, moreover, that subsequent events have made it more difficult for them to prove damages, even if the claim were otherwise meritorious. (P. Mem. at 2.) Finally, plaintiffs acknowledge that statute of limitations and res judicata defenses will likely preclude later successful assertion of this claim. (P.R. Mem. at 3.) Under these circumstances, there is no legitimate reason to insist on a withdrawal without prejudice.
The Court has authority to condition withdrawal of a claim via a Rule 15 motion to amend on "the same standard of review as a withdrawal under Rule 41(a)," Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109, 114 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1985), that is, "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). Under these circumstances, there is no reason why these claims should be dismissed without prejudice. At the same time, there is no legitimate reason to condition the dismissal on the payment of attorneys' fees.
Plaintiffs' difficulty in sustaining a claim for damages stems from its success in achieving a television contract for broadcast of its robot combat events, in competition with defendants' similar enterprise. That the television market has room for two robot demolition leagues suggests that reasonable people could find a way to settle this dispute without further litigation. Given the parties' inability to agree on so simple a matter as the withdrawal of a single claim, however, such a sensible settlement might be too much to expect.
Robot demolition derbies may now be a permanent fixture in the American entertainment universe. This Court will do its best to assure that wasteful, unnecessarily combative approaches to litigation will not be. The motion to amend is granted, and the withdrawn counts of the original complaint are dismissed with prejudice.