Opinion
No. CV03-0566899.
December 8, 2006.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD
This action arises out of a fee dispute between an attorney and his client. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the disposition of this matter. After the defendant, Catherine Heath, failed to pay attorneys fees to the plaintiff, Asselin Connolly, LLC (Asselin), the court, on April 19, 2004, ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of an arbitration clause contained within an attorney-client retainer agreement that the parties had entered into on November 30, 2001. An arbitration hearing was subsequently held, which the defendant failed to attend. Before proceeding to the merits of the dispute, the arbitrator considered the defendant's motion to dismiss the matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In support of her motion, the defendant had argued that the arbitration clause was invalid and that the American Arbitration Association's rules were inapplicable to disputes arising out of the attorney-client relationship. On September 17, 2004, the arbitrator denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and rendered a written award in favor of the plaintiff. On April 12, 2005, the plaintiff filed an application to confirm the September 17, 2004 arbitration award in accordance with General Statutes § 52-417. Shortly thereafter, on May 6, 2005, the defendant filed both an objection to the plaintiff's application to confirm the award and a motion to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator (1) improperly applied a set of American Arbitration Association rules, and (2) improperly determined that the matter was arbitrable.
The Supreme Court has indicated that, for the purposes of applying the procedural requirements set forth in General Statutes § 52-420(b), an objection to the confirmation of an arbitration award shall be treated as an application to vacate pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418. See Wu v. Chang, 264 Conn. 307, 311 n. 6, 822 A.2d 1197 (2003).
On May 23, 2005, the court, Hurley, J., granted the defendant's motion to vacate and denied the plaintiff's application to confirm. Subsequently, on June 23, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court granted on August 1, 2005. On September 12, 2005, the defendant filed a supplement to her motion to vacate, claiming that the submission of the dispute to arbitration under the arbitration clause violated public policy, and contending that both her inability to pay for her share of the arbitrator's fee and the enforcement of the arbitration clause foreclosed her constitutional right to obtain redress for her alleged injuries under article first, § 10, of the constitution of Connecticut. On October 25, 2005, the court granted the plaintiff's application to confirm the arbitration award. On October 27, 2005, the defendant filed a motion to reargue along with a supporting memorandum of law, which the plaintiff objected to on November 1, 2005. The court granted the defendant's motion to reargue. On December 29, 2005, the defendant filed a second supplement in opposition to the plaintiff's application to confirm.
On June 22, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's motion to vacate on the grounds that: (1) the defendant failed to comply with the thirty-day statutory time limit required to properly file a motion to vacate under § 52-420(b); and (2) the grounds advanced by the defendant in her motion to vacate and objection to the arbitration award are beyond the scope of the court's review pursuant to § 52-418(a). On August 10, 2006, the defendant filed a memorandum in response.
In support of its motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion to vacate. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that § 52-420(b) requires a party to file a motion to vacate within thirty days of receiving notice of the arbitrator's award. The plaintiff also asserts that the defendant's failure to attend the arbitration hearing constitutes a waiver of the right to object to the arbitration award. In response, the defendant appears to argue, inter alia, that enforcement of the arbitration clause would violate public policy.
DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006); see also Kozlowski v. Commissioner of Transportation, 274 Conn. 497, 501, 876 A.2d 1148 (2005); Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." Mercer v. Rodriquez, 83 Conn.App. 251, 255, 849 A.2d 886 (2004).
A. Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Application to Vacate the Arbitration Award for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Where an arbitration submission is unrestricted, the Supreme Court has "listed three recognized grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute . . . (2) the award violates clear public policy . . . or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of [General Statutes] § 52-418." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoonmaker v. Cummings Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., 252 Conn. 416, 428, 747 A.2d 1017 (2000).
"Where the language of the arbitration clause indicates an intention on the part of the parties to include all controversies which may arise under their agreement, and where the record reveals no specific questions which the parties submitted to the arbitrator, the submission will be construed as unrestricted . . . A submission is deemed restricted only if the agreement contains express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Hutchinson, 244 Conn. 513, 519, 710 A.2d 1343 (1998).
Upon review of the issue submitted to the arbitrator in this action, the court finds that the parties did not expressly limit the breadth of the issues to be considered, reserve explicit rights in the submission, or condition the arbitral award on court review. The court also finds, based on a review of the defendant's application, memoranda of law and oral argument, that the defendant did not claim that the issue submitted to the arbitration panel was restricted. Therefore, the court determines that the submission in this case was unrestricted.
Thirty-Day Limitations Period under § 52-420(b)
In support of its motion to dismiss, the plaintiff first argues that the defendant's failure to file her motion to vacate within thirty days of the date she received notice of the arbitration award requires this court to order the dismissal of her motion to vacate.
"Section 52-420(b) requires that a motion to vacate an arbitration award be filed within thirty days of the notice of the award to the moving party. If the motion is not filed within the thirty day time limit, the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the motion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wu v. Chang, 264 Conn. 307, 312, 823 A.2d 1197 (2003). "[O]nce the thirty day limitation period of § 52-420(b) has passed, the award may not thereafter be attacked on any of the grounds specified in . . . § 52-418 . . ." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 313.
Section 52-418(a) provides in relevant part: "Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides . . . shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
The defendant filed her motion to vacate on May 6, 2005, more than seven months after the September 17, 2004 arbitration award. As a preliminary matter, the court finds that the defendant received notice of the arbitration award on or about September 17, 2004. Because the defendant failed to file her motion to vacate within the thirty-day limitations period in accordance with the plain language of § 52-420(b), this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear any arguments that may have been raised under § 52-418. In the present case, as one of the grounds in support of her motion to vacate, the defendant contends that the arbitrator "improperly appl[ied] the Supplementary Procedures for Consumer Related Disputes" to this matter. In her memorandum in support of the motion to vacate, in light of this alleged error, the defendant invites the court to "vacate the arbitration award pursuant to [General Statutes] § 52-418, subsections (3) and (4)." While the court agrees with the defendant that such a claim is properly within the purview of § 52-418(a)(4), the plain language of § 52-420(b) requires a party seeking vacatur of an arbitration award to file a timely motion to vacate, modify or correct within thirty days of the date they receive notice of the arbitration award. Because the defendant failed to file such a timely motion, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her claim that the arbitrator incorrectly applied the American Arbitration Association's rules to this matter.
Waiver of Right to Object to Arbitrability of Dispute
In further support of its motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's failure to appear at the arbitration hearing and argue the arbitrability of the matter resulted in a waiver of her right to object to the arbitrator's award. The plaintiff also contends that the defendant's failure to file a timely motion to vacate prevents the court from hearing any objection relating to the arbitrability of the dispute. In response, the defendant appears to argue that her failure to attend the court-ordered arbitration hearing bars this court from confirming the arbitration award.
"The authority of the arbitrator is a subject matter jurisdiction issue, and as such it may be challenged at any time prior to a final court judgment." Bennett v. Meader, 208 Conn. 352, 364, 545 A.2d 553 (1988); see also MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Boata, 94 Conn.App. 559, 564, 893 A.2d 479, cert. granted, 278 Conn. 912, 899 A.2d 38 (2006). "The final judgment in an arbitration proceeding is ordinarily an order of the trial court modifying, vacating or confirming the arbitrator's award." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Boata, supra, 564. "Further, since the parties' agreement to arbitrate is the sole source of the arbitrator's authority, the validity of that agreement is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction." Total Concept/New York, Inc. v. A.I.G. Financial Products Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV 94 0138179 (November 8, 1994, Mottolese, J.) [ 12 Conn. L. Rptr. 669]. "Accordingly, the defendant is not limited by the time constraints of Conn. Gen. Statutes § 52-420 with regard to the issue of jurisdiction." Whitney Whitney, LLC v. Goldman, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV 030197485 (April 29, 2004, D'Andrea, J.T.R.).
The Supreme Court has held "that there are two procedural routes by which a party may preserve the issue of arbitrability of a particular dispute for judicial determination. First, a party may refuse to submit to arbitration at the outset and instead compel a judicial determination of the issue of arbitrability . . . Alternatively, threshold questions of arbitrability may properly be committed to the arbitrators themselves for determination under the terms of the contract, along with the merits of the underlying dispute . . . In such cases a court, on a motion to vacate, may properly entertain a challenge to an award alleging disregard of the limits in the parties' agreement with respect to arbitration." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) White v. Kampner, 229 Conn. 465, 476, 641 A.2d 1381 (1994). "[A] party who voluntarily submits a dispute to arbitration without objecting to the arbitrability of the dispute waives judicial review of that issue." (Emphasis added.) Id., 477.
In the present case, the defendant objected to the arbitrability of the dispute prior to the matter's submission to arbitration. In response to the defendant's objection, the court informed the parties that the question of arbitrability could be reviewed by the court following arbitration. Thus, the defendant properly preserved her objection as to the threshold question of the arbitrability of the dispute. Furthermore, because this question of arbitrability implicates the arbitrator's subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant's failure to file a timely motion to vacate under § 52-420(b) is irrelevant as to the court's ability to review the defendant's claim that the arbitration clause itself is unenforceable and contrary to public policy. Therefore, the defendant's failure to attend the arbitration hearing in accordance with the court's order, while ill-advised, does not constitute a waiver of the defendant's right to object to the arbitrability of the matter in a subsequent motion to vacate.
Additionally, the court determines that where a party receives adequate notice of an arbitration hearing, the party's subsequent failure to attend the scheduled arbitration hearing cannot thereafter be asserted as grounds for vacating the resulting arbitration award. See Superior Court Rules § 23-65; General Statutes § 52-549y(a).
Public Policy Grounds for Granting Motion to Vacate
The plaintiff next asserts that the grounds asserted by the defendant in her motion to vacate are beyond the scope of the court's review under § 52-418(a). In response, the defendant posits a number of public policies that she claims would be violated by enforcement of the arbitration clause or confirmation of the arbitration award, including arguments that important public policies advanced by the Code of Professional Conduct would be violated, that the defendant's due process rights would be violated and that the submission to arbitration is contrary to article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution.
Article first, § 10, of the constitution of Connecticut states "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay."
"The court's power to vacate an arbitration award on . . . [the common law public policy grounds] exists independent of any specific statutory authority." Wu v. Chang, supra, 264 Conn. 311 n. 8. Thus, in the event that the arbitration award violates public policy, a court may properly consider a motion to vacate, even where the statutory limitations period has expired. See Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 6, 612 A.2d 742 (1992); see also Bloomfield v. United Electrical, Radio Machine Workers of America, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 4020925 (April 27, 2006, Keller, J.) [ 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 281]; Shrader v. Zeldes, Needle Cooper, 45 Conn.Sup. 130, 133-34, 702 A.2d 1214 (1997). "When a challenge to the arbitrator's authority is made on public policy grounds, however, the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator's decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award." State v. New England Health Care Employees Union, 271 Conn. 127, 135, 855 A.2d 964 (2004). "The public policy exception applies only when the award is clearly illegal or clearly violative of a strong public policy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 7. The public policy exception "is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests." State v. New England Health Care Employees Union, supra, 136. "The party challenging the award bears the burden of proving that illegality or conflict with public policy is clearly demonstrated." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In Bahre v. Hunter, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 99 00749420 (August 23, 1999, Pickett, J.T.R) [ 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 387], one court has determined that a motion to vacate based upon a violation of public policy must be filed within the thirty-day limitations period under § 52-420(b) ("Although there may be common law grounds a court can consider in a motion to vacate beside the four statutory grounds enumerated in § 52-418(a), the right to file a motion to vacate exists in a statutory provision. Section § 52-420(b) confines the statutory right under § 52-418 to a thirty-day period"). The court determines that Bahre is not in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Garrity, where the Supreme Court noted that "the power to strike an arbitration ruling as violative of public policy exist[s] apart from any particular grant of authority from the legislative branch . . . [W]e therefore deem inaccurate the implication . . . that § 52-418(a)(4) is the sole source of the court's power to review." (Emphasis in original.) See Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 6, 612 A.2d 742 (1992); see also Wu v. Chang, 264 Conn. 312.
In the present case, the defendant also appears to contend that both the submission of the fee dispute to arbitration and the confirmation of the resulting award would violate public policy. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction to review claims that an arbitration award violates public policy as the thirty-day limitations period of § 52-420(b) does not apply to the common-law grounds for challenging an arbitration award. Alternatively, the court has jurisdiction under § 52-408, which permits a party to challenge a contract's arbitration clause where "there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of written contracts generally." Accordingly, where a party claims that an arbitration clause is void or voidable under § 52-408, the six-year statute of limitations governing contract actions under § 52-576 applies. In the present case, the parties entered into the attorney-client retainer agreement on November 11, 2001. Therefore, the defendant's challenge to the validity of the arbitration clause is timely.
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion to dismiss is granted as to the defendant's claims under § 52-418(a)(4), but denied as to the defendant's claims that the dispute is not subject to arbitration and that confirmation of the award violates public policy. This court now turns to the merits of this matter.
B. Plaintiff's Motion to Confirm/Defendant's Motion to Vacate
"Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined." Stratford v. International Ass'n. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, 248 Conn. 108, 114, 728 A.2d 1063 (1999). "Because . . . [the court] favor[s] arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, . . . [the court] undertake[s] judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution." Id., 115. "Every reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of an award of arbitrators and of their acts and proceedings . . . Hence, the burden rests on the party attacking the award to produce evidence sufficient to invalidate or avoid it." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Ass'n. v. Zasun, 52 Conn.App. 212, 224, 725 A.2d 406 (1999); Almeida v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 234 Conn. 817, 824, 663 A.2d 382 (1995).
"Arbitration is a creature of contract between the parties and its autonomy requires a minimum of judicial intrusion . . . The parties themselves, by the agreement of the submission, define the powers of the arbitrator . . . The submission constitutes the charter of the entire arbitration proceedings and defines and limits the issues to be decided . . . When the parties have agreed to a procedure and have delineated the authority of the arbitrator, they must be bound by those limits . . . An application to vacate or correct an award should be granted when an arbitrator has exceeded his power . . . [The court] need only examine the submission and the award to determine whether the award conforms to the submission." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hartford v. International Ass'n. of Firefighters, Local 760, 49 Conn.App. 805, 811-12, 717 A.2d 258, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 920, 722 A.2d 809 (1998).
In support of her motion to vacate, the defendant first claims that her dispute with the plaintiff, which arises out of an alleged failure to pay attorneys fees, is not arbitrable. The defendant appears to argue that the submission of a dispute to arbitration in accordance with an arbitration clause contained within an attorney-client retainer agreement violates the public policy embodied in the Rules of Professional Conduct as the inclusion of such a clause is "not in the defendant's best interest because it completely foreclosed the defendant from seeking her constitutional right of redress for her injuries." In sum, the defendant appears to contend that the use of an arbitration agreement providing for the resolution of disputes between an attorney and her client and any subsequent arbitration proceedings are void and unenforceable as against public policy. In support of her argument, the defendant has appended the Rules of Professional Conduct in their entirety and cited article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution. The court disagrees with this contention.
Although the defendant appears to characterize her arguments in support of her motion to vacate as claims that the award itself violates public policy, presumably in an attempt to invoke the public policy exception to the normally deferential review accorded to arbitration awards, the court better understands the defendant's arguments as an attack on the enforcement of the arbitration clause itself rather than the resulting arbitration award.
The Supreme Court "has for many years wholeheartedly endorsed arbitration as an effective alternative method of settling disputes intended to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and vexation of ordinary litigation." Stutz v. Shepard, 279 Conn. 115, 124, 901 A.2d 33 (2006). Accordingly, the legislature has enacted General Statutes § 52-408, which, without qualification, expressly permits contracting parties to agree in writing to arbitration. Homonnay v. Nusbaum, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 05 4011886 (May 3, 2006, Arnold, J.).
General Statutes § 52-408 provides: "An agreement in any written contract, or in a separate writing executed by the parties to any written contract, to settle by arbitration any controversy thereafter arising out of such contract, or out of the failure or refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or a written provision in the articles of association or bylaws of an association or corporation of which both parties are members to arbitrate any controversy which may arise between them in the future, or an agreement in writing between two or more persons to submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement to submit, shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, except when there exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of written contracts generally."
In the present case, the parties invoked this statutory right, as the retainer agreement specifically provides in relevant part, as follows: "The Client and the Firm agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and/or claims either may have against the other including, but not limited to disputes regarding the amount of and/or payment of fees and/or expenses and any claims of legal malpractice. The Client and the Firm further agree to utilize the services of the American Arbitration Association for this purpose, and that the arbitrator's findings and awards must comply with the laws of the State of Connecticut."
Although not expressly called upon to resolve this precise issue, a number of Connecticut courts have enforced arbitration clauses contained within an attorney-client retainer agreement. See, e.g., Homonnay v. Nusbaum, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 05 4011886; see also Alexandru v. Cappalli, 82 Conn.App. 432, 844 A.2d 914 (2004); Roisenblum Filan v. Larkin, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV 99 0172657 (September 18, 2001, Lewis, J.T.R.). After careful consideration of the defendant's arguments, the court finds that the fee dispute between the defendant and her attorney was properly submitted to arbitration in accordance with the express language of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. In the present matter, the court is unable to discern any reasons that would support a departure from Connecticut's strong public policy favoring arbitration as a means of resolving disputes and enforcing arbitration decisions. The arbitration clause contained in the retainer agreement requires both parties to submit all disputes arising out of the representation to binding arbitration, ostensibly with the hope of "avoid[ing] the formalities, delay, expense and vexation of ordinary litigation." See Stutz v. Shepard, supra, 279 Conn. 124.
The ABA has also approved the use of an arbitration clause providing for the binding arbitration of any fee disputes or malpractice claims arising between an attorney and her client. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002).
The court finds no merit in the defendant's arguments that submission to arbitration violates the public policies embodied in the Rules of Professional Responsibility or article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution. Although the court certainly appreciates the policies behind the Rules of Professional Conduct, the court finds that an arbitration clause contained within a retainer agreement does not contravene any of the policies embodied in the rules. The court can discern no violation of the public policy of fostering client control over the objectives or scope of representation. In the present case, the dispute between the defendant and her former attorney relates to the fee charged for legal services, rather than the objectives, manner or scope of representation. Although the court is aware that arbitration is not free, the court agrees that arbitration affords would-be litigants "an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution." See Stratford v. International Ass'n. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, supra, 248 Conn. 115.
A review of the record reveals that the arbitrator determined that the plaintiff was responsible for paying the arbitrator's fee.
The court further finds that the defendant's reliance upon article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution is misplaced. "Arbitration is the voluntary submission, by the interested parties, of an existing or future dispute to a disinterested person or persons for final determination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Preston v. O'Rourke, 74 Conn.App. 301, 310, 811 A.2d 753 (2002). In the present case, the defendant voluntarily assented to the inclusion of the arbitration clause in the retainer agreement. Thus, it was the defendant who elected to submit her claims to arbitration in lieu of the state's court system.
Finally, the defendant appears to suggest in her supplemental memorandum that the retainer agreement was entered into under "coercive circumstances" involving "duress." While the defendant's usage of these terms of art appear to advance a contention that the retainer agreement's arbitration clause was unconscionable or, alternatively, amounted to a contract of adhesion, it is well-established that the court is "not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly . . . These same principles apply to claims raised in the trial court." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108, 120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003). In the present case, the defendant has failed to provide the court with any legal analysis or citation to authority that would support a claim for avoidance of the arbitration clause contained within the retainer agreement. Accordingly, the court finds that any claims relating to the avoidance of the written contract have been abandoned.
"General Statutes 52-417 provides that in ruling on an application to confirm an arbitration award `[t]he court or judge shall grant such an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in sections 52-418 and 52-419.' (Emphasis added.) The trial court lacks any discretion in confirming the arbitration award unless the award suffers from any of the defects described in General Statutes §§ 52-418 and 52-419." Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1588 v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 33 Conn.App. 1, 3-4, 632 A.2d 713 (1993). As the defendant's motion to vacate has been denied, the plaintiff's motion to confirm the award will be granted pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion to vacate and grants the plaintiff's motion to confirm the arbitration award.