Opinion
No. 04-07-00249-CV
Delivered and Filed: February 20, 2008.
Appealed from the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2006-CI-16123, Honorable Joe Frazier Brown, Jr., Judge Presiding.
AFFIRMED.
Sitting: KAREN ANGELINI, Justice, REBECCA SIMMONS, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a trial court's judgment confirming an arbitration award. In a single issue appellant Aspri Investments, L.L.C. ("Aspri") contends the trial court erred in awarding possession of certain real property to Ahmed Afeef, Maryam Begum Afeef, and ENM Food Mart, Inc. ("Afeef"). We affirm.
Background
Afeef operated a convenience store on real property leased from Aspri. Aspri filed a petition claiming Afeef was in arrears for attorney's fees, rent, property taxes and insurance premiums in violation of the lease agreement. Aspri sought a restraining order and injunctive relief to prevent Afeef from "selling, converting, removing, utilizing, diminishing or disposing of" any inventory, furniture, fixtures, equipment, or other items from the leased premises and from "entering the premises without court approval." In the petition, Aspri also claimed the lease contained an arbitration provision and that it had commenced an arbitration proceeding against Afeef. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order as requested by Aspri and set the matter for hearing on the temporary injunction.
In addition to filing an answer, counterclaims, and a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order, Afeef filed a motion to abate based on the arbitration provision in the lease and alleged Aspri violated the terms of the lease "by seeking a temporary restraining order instead of arbitration." Afeef asked the court to dissolve the restraining order and abate any further action pending arbitration. The trial court granted the temporary injunction and in the injunction stated it would continue until the "case is arbitrated and tried and judgment entered thereon, based on the results of the parties['] pending arbitration." It set a trial date of April 2, 2007.
Aspri had filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") on October 10, 2006. The arbitration took place sometime after the entry of the temporary injunction. At the conclusion of the arbitration, the arbitrator entered an award. The arbitrator found Aspri had no right to terminate the lease when it did and that the termination "was wrongful, and the effective eviction of [Afeef] by virtue of obtaining the temporary restraining order was wrongful."
On April 2, 2007, the parties appeared for the previously scheduled trial. At the hearing, the trial court construed the setting as one to enter the arbitrator's award. The parties agreed to proceed with the entry of the award. Relevant to this appeal, Aspri introduced the arbitrator's award and its original demand to AAA for arbitration. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled, in pertinent part:
The Court is going to enter judgment based on the arbitrator's ruling that there was no right to terminate the lease; that the eviction of [Afeef] by the TRO was wrongful . . . That's what the arbitrator ruled in my opinion.
A final judgment based on the ruling was entered and stated, as relevant to this appeal:
The court hereby enters and confirms the Award of the Arbitrator as follows:
1. The court declares that the letter from plaintiff to defendants dated October 6, 2006 terminating the lease agreement between ASPRI INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., as Landlord and MARYAM BEGUM AFEEF and ENM FOOD MART, INC., as Tenants in and to the property located at 6644 Tezel Road, San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas, was wrongful and the eviction of the Defendants by the tempoerary [sic] restraining order was wrongful.
2. The Defendants and Counter Plaintiffs herein, AHMED AFEEF, MARYAM BEGUM AFEEF and ENM FOOD MART, INC.'S counterclaims are DENIED, other than that the court awards possession of the premises known as 6644 Tezel Road, San Antonio, Bexar county, Texas, to the tenants and Counter-Plaintiffs, Defendants, MARYAM BEGUM AFEEF and ENM FOOD MART, INC.
Aspri filed a notice of appeal. On appeal Aspri contends the trial court erred in awarding possession of the leased premises to Afeef because this was beyond the relief granted in the arbitrator's award and therefore the trial court had no basis to award possession to Afeef.
Analysis
Trial courts have authority to render judgment on arbitration awards. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.081, 171.092 (Vernon 2005). "Unless grounds are offered for vacating, modifying, or correcting an award under Section 171.088 or 171.091, the court, on application of a party, shall confirm the award." Id. § 171.087. Aspri claims Afeef made no demand for possession in the arbitration proceeding. Accordingly, possession was not an issue before the arbitrator and he was barred from making any such award. Aspri also contends the arbitrator did not expressly award possession to Afeef, did not mention 6644 Tezel Road (the leased premises) in his award, and did not award affirmative relief to either party. Finally, Aspri contends that the last sentence of the award, which states that "all damages, claims or other relief requested by claimant or respondents, which are not expressly granted or awarded herein, are hereby expressly denied," proves the arbitrator expressly denied any claim by Afeef to possession of the leased premises. Based on the foregoing, Aspri argues the trial court exceeded its authority because it did more than confirm the award, it awarded possession of the leased premises when no such award was made by the arbitrator. We review a trial court's confirmation of an arbitration award de novo. GJR Mgmt. Holdings, L.P. v. Jack Raus, Ltd., 126 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied). The trial court, on the other hand, must review an arbitrator's award with great deference. See Crossmark, Inc. v. Hazar, 124 S.W.3d 422, 429 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). The thrust of Aspri's complaint is that the trial court misinterpreted the arbitrator's award, awarding relief to Afeef that was beyond that awarded by the arbitrator. We disagree.
Aspri's written demand for arbitration to the AAA described the "nature of the dispute" as "forcible detainer/landlord possession of the premises." (emphasis added) At the hearing on confirmation, Aspri's counsel stated, "All that was asked for is possession and termination of the lease." Clearly, Aspri's claim for possession of the leased premises was an issue before the arbitrator. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Guidry, 160 Tex. 139, 327 S.W.2d 406, 408 (1959) (holding that "authority of arbitrators . . . is limited to decision of the matters submitted . . either expressly or by necessary implication."). In the award, the arbitrator specifically determined Aspri's eviction of Afeef by TRO was wrongful. In other words, the arbitrator found Aspri should have never obtained possession of the property and but for the wrongful TRO, Afeef would have never been dispossessed. Impliedly, by finding the eviction by TRO wrongful, the arbitrator determined possession should remain as it was before the wrongful TRO and awarded possession of the leased premises to Afeef. See Barsness v. Scott, 126 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (recognizing viability of implicit determinations by arbitrators). Any other interpretation would mean the arbitrator made absolutely no award. This would conflict with the arbitrator's concluding statement that "[a]ll damages, claims, or other relief requested by [Aspri] or [Afeef] which are not expressly granted or awarded herein are hereby expressly denied," which implies some actual relief was awarded. By finding Aspri wrongfully evicted Afeef through the TRO, the arbitrator necessarily awarded possession of the leased premises to Afeef. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment awarding possession is in conformance with the arbitrator's award. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. §§ 171.087 (Vernon 2005).
Conclusion
We overrule Aspri's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.