Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer

58 Citing cases

  1. Antolovich v. Brown

    183 P.3d 582 (Colo. App. 2008)   Cited 59 times
    In Antolovich, the court noted that the plaintiff's personal injury resulted from “intangible, subjective, noneconomic losses, including inconvenience and loss of peace of mind” and proceeded to deem prejudgment interest appropriate under § 13–21101.

    Because C.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) is similar to its federal counterpart, Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3), case law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in analysis of the Colorado rule. See Forbes v. Goldenhersh, 899 P.2d 246, 249 (Colo.App. 1994)(C.R.C.P.56); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo. 1991) (relying on federal decisions in interpreting C.R.C.P. 60(b)(2)). Discovery violations can provide grounds for relief from judgment.

  2. Southeastern Colorado Water v. O'Neill

    817 P.2d 500 (Colo. 1991)   Cited 14 times

    "first, the applicant must establish that the evidence could not have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence and produced at the first trial; second, it must be shown that the evidence was material to an issue in the first trial; and third, the applicant must establish that the evidence, if admitted, would probably change the result of the first trial." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 172 (Colo. 1991); see People v. Distel, 759 P.2d 654, 660 (Colo. 1988); People in the Interest of P.N., 663 P.2d 253, 256 (Colo.

  3. Colorado National Bank v. Friedman

    846 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1993)   Cited 77 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming an award of “consequential damages for lost profits”

    1987)); see Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. O'Neill, 817 P.2d 500, 506 (Colo. 1991); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 172 (Colo. 1991); Buckmiller v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 727 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Colo. 1986).

  4. Gold Hill Dev. Co., L.P. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC

    378 P.3d 816 (Colo. App. 2015)   Cited 10 times

    ¶ 67 A disclosure violation may provide grounds for post-trial relief, but “the challenged behavior must substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party's ability fully and fairly to prepare for and proceed at trial.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 924 (1st Cir.1988) ); see alsoAspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo.1991) (relying on federal decisions to interpret C.R.C.P. 60(b) ). ¶ 68 Under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1), “all parties must make mandatory, automatic disclosure of certain key information to their opponents early in the handling of the case and without request by the opponent.”

  5. In re Marriage of Eisenhuth

    976 P.2d 896 (Colo. App. 1999)   Cited 16 times
    Upholding default permanent orders entered on only one party's evidence when the other party was served yet failed to appear in the case

    When considering this basis for seeking relief from a judgment, a court "must be mindful that there is a critical difference between perjury and the mere presence of factual conflicts or deficiencies in evidence." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo. 1991). In Aspen Skiing Co., the supreme court observed that inconsistencies, contradictions, lapses of memory, and unexplained voids in the evidence frequently accompany hotly contested trials.

  6. Rains v. Barber

    420 P.3d 969 (Colo. 2018)   Cited 9 times
    Explaining that shifting a party's burden of proof can constitute an "irregularity warranting a new trial" under C.R.C.P. 59(d)

    ¶ 8 We review a trial court's order for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 172 (Colo. 1991). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is "manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair," or when it misapplies the law.

  7. Phillips v. Stear

    783 S.E.2d 567 (W. Va. 2016)   Cited 1 times

    Diaz v. Methodist Hosp., 46 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir.1995) ( “If unequivocal evidence establishes that a party willfully perjured himself, and thereby prevented the opposition from fully and fairly presenting its case, use of Rule 60(b)(3) to grant the innocent party a new trial would be a proper response.”); Tas Int'l Travel Serv., Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (“When a final judgment is attacked on grounds that it was procured by false testimony ... the better course is to resolve this conflict in favor of assuring the fairness and integrity of judgments[.]”).Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo.1991).Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son Ltd., 427 F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir.2005).

  8. Phillips v. Stear

    236 W. Va. 702 (W. Va. 2016)

    . Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 174 (Colo.1991).

  9. Graven v. Vail Associates, Inc.

    909 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1995)   Cited 55 times
    Determining factual dispute as to whether slush, trees, a ravine, or the failure to post warning signs was the cause of the skier's fall into a ravine and resulting injuries

    By this emphasis, however, we do not mean to suggest that all imaginable types of terrain changes located within a ski run will always fall within the statutory definition of "variations in steepness or terrain" that are "inherent dangers and risks of skiing." During both the legislative debates preceding adoption of the 1990 amendments and the briefing and oral argument in the present case, much discussion centered on the case of Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166 (Colo. 1991). In Peer, the plaintiff was injured after encountering a drop of four or five feet created by the intersection of a service road with the trail on which he was skiing.

  10. People v. Hines

    491 P.3d 578 (Colo. App. 2021)   Cited 4 times

    In the context of newly discovered evidence, however, our supreme court has said that the "due diligence" requirement is satisfied when a party has made "reasonable efforts" to discover the evidence. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer , 804 P.2d 166, 173 (Colo. 1991).