Opinion
B323250
01-12-2023
ASHLEY W., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Ashley W., in pro. per., for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest. Children's Law Center, Ann-Marissa Cook, and Michael Torcivia for Minor.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP06321A Philip L. Soto, Judge. Petition denied.
Ashley W., in pro. per., for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Children's Law Center, Ann-Marissa Cook, and Michael Torcivia for Minor.
HOFFSTADT, J.
Ashley W. (mother) has petitioned this court to overturn the findings made by the juvenile court following a 12-month status review hearing in this dependency case. Although mother's appointed counsel filed a Glen C. letter, mother's pro per brief is written and signed by an attorney. In that brief, mother argues that the juvenile court erred in (1) finding that returning her infant son to her would be detrimental to him, (2) finding that the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) made "reasonable efforts" to provide her reunification services, and (3) refusing to transfer the case back to Santa Clara County. Because none of these arguments has merit, we deny the petition.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because mother's appeal from the juvenile court's findings after the six-month status review hearing has arrived simultaneously with mother's writ petition attacking the juvenile court's findings after the 12-month status review hearing, we have considered the two proceedings in conjunction with one another. We accordingly adopt the "Facts and Procedural Background" discussion set forth in the companion opinion of In re Jayson W., No. B319944, except to insert a new subdivision IV.C and subdivision VI as follows:
IV. Reunification Period
C. Twelve-month status review hearing
On July 14, 2022, Jayson was transferred to the custody of the maternal grandparents, who by that time were living in Ventura County.
Between February 2022 (when the six-month review hearing was conducted) and August 2022 (when the 12-month review hearing was conducted), mother progressed as follows with her case plan:
• Parenting classes. Mother had completed the parenting classes by the time of the six-month status review hearing, but the monitors observing mother's visits with Jayson in the sixth through twelfth months of the reunification period observed that mother (1) was often in a "catatonic state" or "falling asleep" during the video visits, and (2) continued to show a "lack of knowledge of age-appropriate engagement," as she often danced or "play[ed] rap music with inappropriate lyrics."
• Psychological assessment. Mother had completed the psychological assessment.
• Individual counseling. Although mother's counseling with a trainee therapist had previously not met the court's requirement of therapy "with a licensed DCFS approved therapist," at the six-month hearing the court modified the requirement to allow "individual counseling with [an] intern under [the] supervision of a licensed professional therapist." Despite the court relaxing the requirement to allow mother to continue with her preferred therapist, by early February 2022, mother had become inconsistent with her visits to the therapist. On April 6, 2022, mother told the therapist intern she had been seeing that she was "done with therapy" and "no longer want[ed] to participate." The intern accordingly discharged mother because mother was "disengaged" and "does not seem ready to fully acknowledge, process, or take accountability for her actions at this time." Although mother had attended 24 sessions, the intern found that mother had made "minimal progress" due to her "resistan[ce] and reluctan[ce] to engage in treatment." In August 2022, mother attended two therapy sessions with a different therapist "for general mental health concern[s, ] not part of any court-ordered therapy," but the therapist did not respond to the Department's request for a progress report.
• PCIT. PCIT-short for parent-child interaction therapy-involves in-person parent-child interaction observed and directed by a therapist observing from a different room, to give the therapist the opportunity to direct either the parent's or child's behavior as they interact. The therapist mother had been seeing until March 2022 did not provide this type of therapy; it was also not offered in Kern County. Mother also told the Department she did not think it was necessary.
• Transportation. Once the Department explained to mother that it would not buy her a car, mother asked the Department for funds to travel from Northern California to Southern California for in-person visits with Jayson. The Department explained that its authority was limited to issuing vouchers for travel within Los Angeles County, but offered to reimburse mother for bus fare. When mother explained that she could not afford to "front" the money for bus fare, the Department applied several times to obtain funds for mother through an inter-county agency, but the agency repeatedly rejected the Department's application on procedural grounds. The Department's most recent application was submitted in August 2022, but not ruled upon by August 24, 2022.
• Housing. Mother obtained housing in Santa Clara County in March 2022, but started to complain about the quality of the housing and about her neighbors. She asked the Department for assistance in helping her relocate to any other county but Los Angeles County, and specifically asked for assistance in finding housing in Santa Barbara or Santa Cruz Counties. The Department provided mother with the contact information for two housing departments in those counties, and after mother complained those were insufficient, the Department supplied two more.
• Visitation. Mother regularly attended the monitored, video visits with Jayson. However, for the reasons articulated above, the "quality" of those visits was "poor."
On August 1, 2022, mother filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 asking the court to (1) return Jayson to her custody, and (2) transfer the case to Santa Clara County. The juvenile court set the petition for hearing on August 24, 2022.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
The juvenile court convened the 12-month status review hearing on August 24, 2022. At that hearing, mother's attorney urged that the court not count mother's failure to complete the PCIT against her because PCIT "was a suggestion" by counsel and "not part of mother's original case plan." The court found that the Department had made "reasonable efforts" with regard to mother's case plan and had "d[one] what they could" in light of mother's residence in another county, but found that mother was "not in substantial compliance with [her] case plan" and terminated reunification services. The court held that returning Jayson to mother would create a substantial risk of detriment. The court also declined to transfer the case to Santa Clara County. The court then turned to mother's pending section 388 petition, and denied it on the grounds that there was "[n]o change of circumstances" and that placing Jayson back in mother's custody and transferring the case to Santa Clara County was "[n]ot in the best interest of the child based on the evidence presented."
VI. Appeal
Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. Mother's counsel filed a Glen C. letter, and mother submitted a brief written by a different attorney.
DISCUSSION
In this writ petition, mother challenges three rulings from the 12-month status review hearing. Specifically, she argues that the juvenile court (1) erred in finding that Jayson would suffer a detriment if returned to her custody, (2) erred in finding that the Department had made "reasonable efforts" in providing mother the services needed to complete her case plan, and (3) erred in not transferring the case back to Santa Clara County, where mother resided at the time.
We can quickly address mother's first argument regarding detriment. That is because mother, in the period between the six- and 12-month status review hearings, backslid in her efforts to address the problems that necessitated dependency jurisdiction-namely, (1) mother stopped attending therapy, and (2) mother's visits with Jayson continued to decline in quality, with mother exhibiting the same type of affect-being catatonic or "zombie-like"-that resulted in jurisdiction because it imperiled Jayson as mother ignored his needs while in that state. Mother responds that she completed the "majority" of her case plan. But case plan compliance is not a matter of fractions or percentages; it is a matter of whether a parent has modified their behavior as a result of working through the case plan. (See In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1142-1143 [rote fulfillment of case plan requirements, without more, does not mandate reunification].) Here, the reports of mother's visitations with Jayson show that mother may have gone through the motions of completing the parenting classes and attending individual therapy sessions, but that mother continued to exhibit the very same behaviors that endangered Jayson in the first place and that would continue to pose a danger to him if he were placed back into her custody at the time of the 12-month status review hearing.
We now turn to the two remaining issues.
I. Reasonable Efforts to Provide Reunification Services
Where, as here, a child is removed from his parent during a juvenile dependency proceeding, the juvenile court in most cases is required to "order the social worker"-here, the Department- to provide reunification services to the child and parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); see also § 362, subd. (d).) To effectuate this mandate, the court will set forth the services that must be provided to any involved parent in a "case plan." The court is thereafter required to hold periodic status review hearings-typically, at six and 12 months after the child's removal from his parent-and, at those hearings, assess "[t]he extent of the" Department's "compliance with the case plan." (§ 366, subd. (a)(1)(B), § 366.21, subds. (e)(8) [six-month hearing], (f)(1) [12-month hearing].) A court may not keep a removal order in effect and may not terminate the reunification services unless it finds, in most instances by clear and convincing evidence, that the Department has provided the "reasonable services" previously ordered by the court. (366.21, subd. (e)(8); Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 594; Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164 (Robin V.).) An agency provides "reasonable services" when it "offer[s] services designed to remedy" the problems identified in the parent's case plan, "maintain[s] reasonable contact with the parent[] during the course of the . . . plan," and makes "reasonable efforts to assist the parent[] in areas where compliance proved difficult." (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics omitted; accord, In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) "Reasonable efforts" are "good faith" efforts that are "reasonable under the circumstances." (Robin V., at p. 1164, 1166; In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254; T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1240.) To be reasonable, the efforts need not be ideal or perfect (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972), and the Department need not "force a parent to participate in [the offered] services" (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233 (Nolan W.)). We review a juvenile court's finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Department has provided reasonable reunification services, including the subsidiary finding that the Department has made good faith efforts to provide those services, for substantial evidence. (T.J., at pp. 1238-1239; Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011 (O.B.).) In applying this standard of review, we review the record in the "light most favorable" to the juvenile court's finding. (O.B., at pp. 1011-1012.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Department made "reasonable efforts" to provide mother reunification services for the following reasons:
• Parenting classes. The Department arranged for mother to attend parenting classes.
• Psychological assessment. The Department arranged for mother to complete the psychological assessment.
• Individual counseling. Although the Department was unable to locate a licensed therapist for the counseling, at the six-month hearing the juvenile court changed its instructions and required mother to undergo counseling "with an intern under the supervision of a licensed professional therapist," which allowed mother to continue working with her chosen trainee therapist.
• PCIT. The Department was unable to secure PCIT therapy with mother's current therapist or with one in Kern County, but mother's counsel later acknowledged that PCIT was not part of the original case plan and was made part of the juvenile court's orders at the six-month status review hearing at counsel's request. What is more, PCIT seems premised largely on the notion of in-person interaction, something that was not feasible given mother's residence in a different county than Jayson. Even if we assume PCIT could be done remotely (perhaps with a therapist advising mother as mother interacted with Jayson on video), the Department's efforts to try to secure a therapist suffice; mother has not shown that there was anything more or different the Department should have done.
• Transportation. The Department made reasonable efforts to obtain funding for mother to visit Jayson in person, even though the Department had not succeeded by the time of the 12-month hearing. The Department explained to mother that it did not have the power to issue vouchers for transportation outside of Los Angeles County and could only reimburse her expenses. When mother explained she could not "front" the money for travel, the Department submitted several applications to a state agency capable of funding inter-county travel. However, that agency rejected those applications on various procedural grounds that seemed to shift. Yet the Department kept applying.
• Housing. Although the Department's efforts to find mother housing were unsuccessful until just after the six-month status review hearing, mother secured housing in March 2022.
• Visitation. The Department arranged-and mother participated in-regular monitored video visits with Jayson.
Given these efforts, the juvenile court had substantial evidence upon which to conclude that the Department's efforts in implementing mother's case plan were reasonable.
Mother raises two further arguments.
The sole challenge mother presents in her writ petition is that the Department's efforts to secure funding for transportation did not show reasonable efforts. Citing In re L.M. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 645 (L.M.), mother asserts that the Department was obligated to fund her travel. Mother is wrong. L.M. dealt with whether a probation department has to fund travel of a juvenile ward's family to visit the ward. L.M. held that probation should make "reasonable efforts" to arrange for that travel and that courts "may, in an appropriate case, order the probation department to financially assist a parent's travel to and from visitation," but also noted that this did not amount to a constitutional entitlement. (Id. at pp. 650.) Here, the Department's rules prohibited it from just giving mother transportation funds and the Department was actively pursuing the only other lawful means of securing funding evident in the record-that is, seeking funding from the inter-county agency. Because the duty to provide transportation funding to parents is not a constitutional imperative that can override statutory limits, mother's insistence that the Department should have undertaken acts beyond its jurisdiction in order to get her funding is not supported by L.M. and does not render the Department's efforts unreasonable.
In her reply brief in the companion appeal challenging the juvenile court's finding of reasonable efforts at the six-month review hearing, mother asserts that the Department's efforts with regard to the psychological assessment were not reasonable because the psychologist's report recommended further testing "to rule out a neurodevelopmental, social communication, spectrum disorder," and the Department did not subject her to further testing. As a threshold matter, the Department's inaction in this regard could not reflect on the Department's efforts at the six-month status review hearing in February 2022 because the psychologist did not issue her report until a few weeks before, in January 2022; there was not enough time to conduct any further testing. More to the point, the Department's efforts to conduct further testing were stymied by mother herself, due to a "denial of symptomology and rigidity in specifically providing a psychological assessment [versus] a neurodevelopmental assessment of her presentation." Mother now urges that the Department should have applied more pressure to get mother to undergo the further testing. However, it is well settled that the Department is not obligated to foist upon an unwilling parent reunification services that the parent does not want. (Nolan W., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1233 ["'It is . . . well established that "[r]eunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent"'"]; In re L.A. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 413, 424.) Thus, the Department's failure to force mother to undergo supplemental testing she did not want to undertake does not render its effort unreasonable.
II. Transfer Back to Santa Clara County
Under the pertinent standards set forth in the companion case, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's request at the 12-month status review hearing to transfer the case back to Santa Clara County. By this time, Jayson was in a stable placement with the maternal grandparents in Ventura County, mother was in Santa Clara County but had expressed a desire to move to two different counties, and the juvenile court had terminated reunification services. Declining to transfer the case back to Santa Clara County was not an abuse of discretion given mother's indication of an intent to leave that county and the lack of any need for local reunification services. Instead, the juvenile court acted within its discretion to keep the case where it was in order to finish it out. (See In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 [after reunification services are terminated, the court's focus shifts to the child's need for permanency and stability].) Mother seems to hint that transferring the case to Santa Clara County would have prompted an order transferring Jayson to the custody of someone in Santa Clara County, but there is no reason to believe that a Santa Clara County-based juvenile court would rip Jayson from his stable placement with the maternal grandparents to place him with someone new in Santa Clara County (as the detriment finding precluded placing him with mother).
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
We concur: LUI, P. J., CHAVEZ J.