Opinion
Civil Action 21-639-P
08-29-2023
BILLY TERRY ASHLEY v. DAVID YANELL, ET AL.
DOUGHTY, CHIEF JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARK L. HORNSBY, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In accordance with the standing order of this court, this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for review, report and recommendation.
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
Before the court is a civil rights complaint filed in forma pauperis by pro se plaintiff Billy Terry Ashley (“Plaintiff”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This complaint was received and filed in this court on March 10, 2021. He is currently incarcerated at the Union Parish Detention Center but claims his civil rights were violated by prison officials while incarcerated at the Caddo Correctional Center in Shreveport, Louisiana. He names David Yanell and the Caddo Correctional Center as defendants.
Plaintiff claims that on January 21, 2021, he fell in the day room because his jumpsuit was torn. He claims that on January 28, 2021, he fell off some steps because his jumpsuit was too long and torn. He claims he fell hard and his neck, right shoulder, hip, back, arm, and knee were in pain because of the fall. He also claims the fall caused pain in his stomach where he had an incision from cancer surgery.
Deputy Sheen and Deputy Gray sent Plaintiff to the doctor. Plaintiff claims he was only given Ibuprofen and Tylenol. He asked to be transported to LSU Medical Center and his request was denied by David Yanell and the nurse. He claims that the next day he was x-rayed everywhere he was in pain. He claims that every time his back was x-rayed, he was in a lot of pain. He claims the tech had to x-ray his back multiple times because the x-ray machine was not working. He claims the doctor told him he would be alright in three months and to take Ibuprofen. Plaintiff claims he should have been sent to LSU Medical Center to see a real doctor.
Plaintiff claims that when his Ibuprofen and Tylenol were discontinued, he had to buy Ibuprofen. He claims he made a sick call because he needed medication for pain.
Plaintiff claims he must pay for his sick calls and medication.
Plaintiff claims his requests for a jumpsuit that was not torn or too long were ignored.
Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff filed this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act which provides redress for persons "deprived of any rights, privileges or immunities" by a person acting under color of state law. The particular right protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in matters which concern alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials are required to provide humane conditions of confinement, ensuring that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee safety of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994).
An Eighth Amendment claim has two required components. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991). First, the deprivation alleged must be sufficiently serious. See id., 111 S.Ct. at 2324. "[O]nly those deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave" to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 111 S.Ct. at 2324 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399 (1981)). Second, the prison official must have acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See Id. at 305, 111 S.Ct. at 2328; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. In prison condition of confinement cases, that state of mind is deliberate indifference, which the Supreme Court defined as knowing of and disregarding an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See id., 114 S.Ct. at 1979. However, mere neglect and/or negligence do not constitute deliberate indifference. See Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, this court should consider the duration and the totality of the specific circumstances that constituted the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement. Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 1999).
After a thorough review of Plaintiff's complaint, read in a light most favorable to him, the court finds that the facts alleged do not support a finding that the defendants' conduct was sufficiently harmful enough to deprive him of life's basic necessities. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, 111 S.Ct. at 2324.
Plaintiff claims he fell because his jumpsuit was torn and too long. The court finds that having an inmate wear a jumpsuit that is torn or too long does not create a substantial risk of serious harm. Plaintiff admits that he was able to tie his jumpsuit [Doc. 1, p. 3]. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See Thornton v. Phillips County, 240 F.3d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming the preservice dismissal of a prisoner's § 1983 claim that he tripped and fell because his jail jumpsuit was too long, as alleging “no more than negligence”).
Thus, Plaintiff's claim has failed to satisfy the first and second component of an Eighth Amendment claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim regarding the conditions of his confinement should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Medical Care
Plaintiff claims he was denied proper treatment for his injury. Plaintiff filed this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act which provides redress for persons "deprived of any rights, privileges or immunities" by a person acting under color of state law. The particular right protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in matters which concern alleged denial of or inadequate medical care is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The lack of proper inmate medical care rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution only if the evidence shows that the prison officials showed "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 (1976); See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1978 (1994). It is only deliberate indifference, "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or an act "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," that constitutes conduct proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. at 292; See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976). Further, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants possessed a culpable state of mind. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-302, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2323-27 (1991); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838-47, 114 S.Ct. at 1979-84. In addition, disagreement with the diagnostic measures or methods of treatment afforded by prison officials does not state a claim for Eighth Amendment indifference to medical needs. See Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997).
After a thorough review of Plaintiff's complaint, read in a light most favorable to him, the court finds that the facts alleged do not support a finding of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that Defendants were attentive to the medical needs of Plaintiff. It has been consistently held that an inmate who has been examined by medical personnel fails to set forth a valid showing of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.2d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997); Callaway v. Smith County, 991 F.Supp. 801, 809 (E.D. Tex. 1998); Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985); Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff admits he was sent to the doctor after he slipped and fell and was seen by David Yanell and the nurse. He admits that he was given Ibuprofen and Tylenol. He admits that he was x-rayed everywhere he was in pain. Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of factual allegations that would tend to show Defendants acted with a culpable state of mind or that their actions were "unnecessary and wanton."
Plaintiff disagrees with the treatment Defendants provided him. He claims he should have been transported to LSU Medical Center to see a real doctor. As previously discussed, disagreement with the diagnostic measures or methods of treatment afforded by prison officials does not state a claim for Eighth Amendment indifference to medical needs.
Plaintiff's allegations, if accepted as true, may amount to a state law claim for negligence, a tort. However, mere negligence, neglect or medical malpractice does not amount to a denial of a constitutional right as these actions on the part of Defendants do not rise to the level of a constitutional tort. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664 (1986); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292; Lewis v. Woods, 848 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1988). The fact that Plaintiff does not believe that his medical treatment was as good as it should have been is not a cognizable complaint under the Civil Rights Act. See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1985). Prisoners are not constitutionally entitled to the best medical care that money can buy. See Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d. 91 (5th Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's medical care claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Payment of Medical Fees
Plaintiff claims he had to pay for sick calls and medications. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to free medical care. Hutchinson v. Belt, 957 F.Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1996). Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied medical treatment because he could not pay the fee.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's medical fee claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Caddo Correctional Center
Plaintiff names Caddo Correctional Center as a defendant. The defendant Caddo Correctional Center is not a proper defendant. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, only a “person” may be sued for the violation of an inmate's constitutional rights. The Caddo Correctional Center is not a person within the meaning of this statute. See, e.g., Castillo v. Blanco, 2007 WL 2264285, (E.D. La., Aug. 1, 2007) (finding that a state prison is not a person within the meaning of this statute). See also Glenn v. Louisiana, 2009 WL 382680, (E.D. La., Feb. 11, 2009) (noting that “a jail is merely a building, not a ‘person' subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted relative to the Caddo Correctional Center.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff filed this proceeding in forma pauperis ("IFP"), if this court finds Plaintiff's complaint to be frivolous, it may dismiss the complaint as such at any time, before or after service of process, and before or after answers have been filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986); Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1985). District courts are vested with extremely broad discretion in making a determination of whether an IFP proceeding is frivolous and may dismiss a claim as frivolous if the IFP complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. See Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995); Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989).
For the reasons heretofore stated, it is recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
OBJECTIONS
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an extension of time is granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). A party may respond to another party's objection within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge at the time of filing.
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations set forth above, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking, on appeal, the proposed factual findings and legal conclusions that were accepted by the district court and that were not objected to by the aforementioned party. See Douglas v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)