"The use of the streets for the purpose of parking automobiles is a privilege and not a right, and the privilege of parking must be accepted with such reasonable burdens as the city may impose as a condition for the enjoyment of that privilege." Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800, 804 ( 58 S.E.2d 815) (1950). We agree that the "practical and modern necessity of maintaining orderly traffic enforcement" dictates the need, especially in large cities, to enact an ordinance allowing illegally parked vehicles to be ticketed. City of Seattle v. Stone, 410 P.2d 583, 586 (S. Ct. Wash. 1966). It is neither feasible nor constitutionally mandated for a city to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to ticketing an illegally parked car.

5. `Where a municipal board is authorized to do a particular act in its discretion, the courts will not control this discretion unless manifestly abused, nor inquire into the propriety, economy and general wisdom of the undertaking, or into the details of the manner adopted to carry the matter into execution.' Chipstead v. Oliver, 137 Ga. 483 (2) ( 73 S.E. 576). See also Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800, 805 ( 58 S.E.2d 815)."

The evidence must be weighed in the light of the law applicable when a decision is made as to the validity of an ordinance. That law is that courts must uphold it, if any conceivable circumstance could justify it. Borough of Atlanta v. Kirk, 175 Ga. 395 ( 165 S.E. 69); Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167 ( 28 S.E.2d 135); Hamilton v. North Ga. Elec. c. Corp., 201 Ga. 689 ( 40 S.E.2d 750); Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800 ( 58 S.E.2d 815). In the category of such circumstances come safety, congestion, business operations, noise, fumes, and similar circumstances as disclosed by the evidence here.

While this court held in Gunby v. Yates, 214 Ga. 17 ( 102 S.E.2d 548), that ordinaries could not collect a $1 charge to be used in administering a pension fund because it was not in payment for services of the ordinaries in the cases where it was charged, and hence it was a tax, the Court of Appeals in Schaffer v. Oxford, 102 Ga. App. 710 ( 117 S.E.2d 637), upheld an executive order imposing charges for storing liquor, inspection fees, etc. The validity of the order rested upon the fact of services to the payer of the fees for which they were charged. This court has held in Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167 ( 28 S.E.2d 135), and Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800 ( 58 S.E.2d 815), that parking meter ordinances do not impose a tax unless the charge substantially exceeds the cost of installation, maintenance and regulation. The operation of parking meters is a governmental function.

Equal protection of the law is denied where laws are applied differently to different persons under the same circumstances. Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800, 806 ( 58 S.E.2d 815). The condemnee in the present case was denied "due process of law."

In the present case the ordinances set out in the petition, and the charter amendment (Ga. L. 1955, p. 3080), do not contain exceptions in favor of individuals or groups alleged in count two of the petition as being preferred. It is only in those instances where laws are applied differently to different persons under the same or similar circumstances that the equal protection of the law is denied. Baugh v. City of LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 81 ( 130 S.E. 69); Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167, 171 ( 28 S.E.2d 135); Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800 ( 58 S.E.2d 815). In the present case it is alleged that persons maintaining signs or billboards similar in character to those of the petitioners have procured a permit from the Building Official of the City of Atlanta. It, therefore, is not made to appear that there is any discrimination against the petitioners and in favor of those named as maintaining signs or billboards in court two of the petition, since the petitioners admit that they have not procured such permit.

Chipstead v. Oliver, 137 Ga. 483 (2) ( 73 S.E. 576). See also Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800, 805 ( 58 S.E.2d 815). 6. Applying the foregoing principles of law to the pleadings and evidence in this case, the trial judge did not err for any reason assigned in denying the temporary injunction.

We are also satisfied that while highways may legally be used by pedestrians for proper purposes (such as crossing, for example) their principal purpose is the expeditious movement of vehicular traffic, and regulations to that effect are generally upheld. In Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800, 804 ( 58 S.E.2d 815) the question at issue was the parking of vehicles at the side of the street and the court observed: "The use of streets for the purpose of parking automobiles is a privilege and not a right, and the privilege of parking must be accepted with such reasonable burdens as the city may impose as a condition for the enjoyment of that privilege." For a pedestrian to choose the paved area of a highway for a place to stand and transact his business, no matter how laudable the business itself might be, is certainly also a privilege rather than a right, and therefore subject to regulation by the state, which may if it deems proper forbid it entirely.

Messrs. Hyatt, DePass and Raman, of Spartanburg, forAppellant, cite: As to demurrer admitting facts properlypleaded: 219 S.C. 191, 64 S.E.2d 534; 211 S.C. 395, 45 S.E.2d 603. As to duty on the City to supply thenecessary public services, including adequate streets andstreet lights: 43 C.J. 922; 43 C.J. 906; 43 C.J. 907; 163 S.E. 462, 202 N.C. 496; 66 S.E. 835, 110 Va. 661; 58 S.E.2d 815, 206 Ga. 800; 75 S.E.2d 605, 223 S.C. 298; 58 S.E.2d 780, 134 W. Va. 249. As to aCourt of Equity being a Court of Conscience: 103 S.E. 551, 114 S.C. 306; 192 S.C. 671, 185 S.C. 27; 197 S.C. 375; 187 S.C. 382. As to seizure of Petitioner's propertybeing unconstitutional and therefore null and void: 66 S.C. 94, 44 S.E. 781; 65 S.C. 459, 43 S.E. 970; 63 S.C. 425, 41 S.E. 521; 178 S.C. 294, 182 S.E. 838; 172 S.C. 16, 172 S.E. 689; 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704; 229 S.C. 267; 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871. As to City havingno right to classify houses as fit or unfit: 88 S.E.2d 683, 222 S.C. 533. As to City's Director being disqualifiedto act as Appeal Judge: 198 Cal. 373, 245 P. 814; 33 C.J. No. 134; 58 S.C. 92; 35 N.D. 410, 160 N.W. 512. As toa suit, to obviate the effect of an illegal act of an officer assuch, not being a suit against the State: 59 Fla. 473, 52 So. 957; 185 S.C. 353; 22 S.E. 425, 44 S.C. 256; 58 S.E. 111, 78 S.C. 211. As to error on part of Trial Judge in failingto overrule the demurrer: