Opinion
Appeal No. 14574 Index No. 100092/20Case No. 2021-00685
11-09-2021
Karl J. Ashanti, petitioner pro se. Georgia M. Pestana, Corporation Counsel, New York (Philip W. Young of counsel), for respondent.
Karl J. Ashanti, petitioner pro se.
Georgia M. Pestana, Corporation Counsel, New York (Philip W. Young of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Manzanet-Daniels, J.P., Oing, Moulton, Scarpulla, JJ.
Determination of respondent, dated September 19, 2019, finding, after a hearing, that petitioner violated New York City Charter §§ 2604(b)(3), (b)(7) and (b)(2) and 53 RCNY 1-13(b), and ordering him to pay an aggregate civil penalty of $8,500, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County [Carol R. Edmead, J.], entered September 8, 2020), dismissed, without costs.
The determination that petitioner violated the above-cited Charter provision and City rule is supported by substantial evidence (see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176 [1978]). Initially, there is no basis for disturbing the Administrative Law Judge's credibility determinations. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the evidence presented at the hearing raised a reasonable inference that he disclosed his position with an agency of the City of New York in order to obtain a personal advantage in negotiations on behalf of his wife. The penalty imposed for each of the three sustained charges does not shock the conscience (see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 233, 240 [1974]), especially in light of the evidence that petitioner, an attorney held to a higher ethical standard, had been warned about the conflict of interest but continued to pursue his wife's case against a subsidiary of another City agency and that petitioner used City letterhead to advance a legal position contrary to the City's interests.
We reject petitioner's due process claim. Petitioner had an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (see generally Matter of Kigin v State of N.Y. Workers' Compensation Bd., 24 N.Y.3d 459, 469 [2014]). We also reject petitioner's claim of agency bias, particularly in the absence of any evidence that the outcome of the proceeding flowed from the alleged bias (see Matter of Cyrus v O'Neill, 184 A.D.3d 499, 500 [1st Dept 2020]).