Opinion
Cause No. IP 00-1330-C H/K
February 26, 2003
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff James Ascherman is an Indiana prisoner. On February 8, 2000, Ascherman suffered a beating at the hands of two or three other prisoners. In this case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ascherman asserts claims under the Eighth Amendment against two prison employees who, he alleges, acted with deliberate indifference to the dangers to him, thereby contributing to the beating.
This action was tried to the court on April 29, 2002. Pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court now states its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court has combined the facts and the law into one discussion for the sake of clarity. As explained below, the court finds by a preponderance of evidence that defendant Evelyn Catt acted with deliberate indifference to Ascherman's safety when she indicated to other prisoners that Ascherman had acted as a "snitch" on prior occasions, but that Ascherman failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his claim against counselor Jason Clark. The court awards Ascherman compensatory damages in the amount of $2,500 against Catt.
The Facts
Plaintiff Ascherman was housed at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (WVCF) in February 2000. His work assignment was as a dishwasher in the "retherm unit" for the E Housing Unit, where food was heated and served to inmates.
Defendant Jason Clark was a correctional counselor at WVCF in February 2000. Defendant Evelyn Catt was employed by WVCF in February 2000 as a "Cook II." Her duties included supervising five prisoners, including Ascherman, who worked in the retherm unit preparing food and washing dishes.
As a Cook II, Catt also was responsible for ensuring that certain products were properly discarded. WVCF prisoners often try to steal fruit juice from cans of fruit so that they can make alcohol (popularly known as "hooch"). Catt and other prison food service employees therefore require that fruit cans be opened under their supervision so that extra fruit juice can be poured down a drain rather than stolen to supply the next run of hooch. When prisoners open cans of fruit without her supervision, which typically happens a couple of times a week, Catt testified that she searches for the missing fruit juice and usually finds it in bags, coolers, or hidden pans.
On February 7, 2000, Catt arrived at work and found that some cans of fruit had been opened without her supervision. The inmates working at the time solemnly assured her that they had poured the juice down a drain. Catt correctly assumed that the prisoners had in fact stored the juice somewhere. She searched for the missing juice, found it within five minutes or so in a cooler, and poured it down the drain. Inmates other than Ascherman expressed some frustration and dismay about this disappointing result for their efforts.
Inmates asked Catt whether Ascherman (referred to as "the dishwasher" or by his nickname "Iggy") had told her where the juice was. According to prison employee Donna Jones, whose testimony on this point the court credits, Catt said no, she had found it on her own. Central to this case, Catt added words to the effect: "He might tell sometimes, but not this time."
Catt had worked at WVCF for about six years at the time of this incident. She understood that labeling a prisoner as a "snitch," as someone who provided information to prison officials about misconduct by other prisoners, would put that prisoner in danger.
After finishing work for the day, Ascherman and the other inmates working in the retherm unit returned to their housing unit. During the evening of February 7, 2000, Ascherman was harassed and threatened by other inmates who accused him of being a snitch. Ascherman testified that he felt as though "a demonic cloud" was hanging over him. He left his cell during the recreational period that evening, but returned shortly thereafter because other prisoners were harassing him. He stayed in his cell for the rest of the recreational period, and he prepared a grievance. The grievance complained that Catt had falsely implied to other inmates that he was an "institutional informant," which had endangered his safety and welfare and had caused him to be harassed and threatened. Ascherman requested as relief that "somebody needs to speak to her [Catt] about this problem." His written grievance did not specifically request that he be removed from the E Housing Unit and put in protective custody. Early in the morning of February 8, 2000, Ascherman gave the grievance to an unidentified correctional officer.
According to Ascherman, while he was working during the afternoon of February 8, 2000, he was interviewed by defendant Jason Clark, a counselor at Wabash Valley, regarding his grievance. Clark told Ascherman that he had talked to Catt and that she had denied making any statements to the effect that Ascherman was a "snitch." Ascherman asked Clark to put him in protective custody, away from the general prison population that included those who believed that Ascherman was a snitch. Clark replied that it was too late in the day to take such measures. Again, this paragraph reflects only Ascherman's testimony, not the court's finding.
Between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. on February 8, 2000, two or three other prisoners entered Ascherman's cell and beat him to the point that he was briefly unconscious. He suffered bruises to his face, head, chest, and back, and he was bleeding all over his shirt and pants. See Ex. 11. He received medical treatment for those injuries. Ascherman was also placed in segregation for his own protection. Shortly after the beating incident, he was transferred to a different prison.
Ascherman also testified that he suffered a broken bone around his left eye and a cracked vertebra, but the court struck that testimony in the absence of any medical evidence corroborating his claim to have broken any bones. The record does not contain medical records of any treatment Ascherman received for his injuries.
Clark denies having a conversation with Ascherman about the grievance or the threat until after Ascherman had been assaulted. There is no evidence that Ascherman ever filled out the form needed to request protective custody, and he never identified the inmates he felt were a danger to him. Despite Clark's account of the timing, the grievance documents do not contain any reference to the facts that Ascherman had been assaulted and had already been put in protective custody. The omissions are certainly odd.
The evidence regarding Ascherman's contacts with Clark is in balance, and the court finds that Ascherman has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Clark knew of the danger Ascherman faced before he was assaulted.
Legal Discussion
The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because plaintiff's claims arise under federal law. The court also has jurisdiction over the individual defendants.
I. Defendants' Duties to Ascherman
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for claims that a person's federal rights have been violated by another person acting "under color of state law." The federal right in question is the right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Suffering physical assaults while in prison is not "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994), quoting Rhodes v. Chapma n, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Prison officials have a duty "to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833.
The duty, however, is not to guarantee that prisoners do not assault each other, or even to use reasonable care to prevent such assaults. Prisons are dangerous places with many dangerous people housed in close proximity. "Prisoners are dangerous (that's why many are confined in the first place)." McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Farmer v. Brennan, as stated in Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 644 n. 34 (7th Cir. 1996). Prison officials take on the "unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions." Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.), quoted in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 845.
The constitutional duty for prison officials is not to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 828. The deliberate indifference standard is a subjective standard. It does not require actual knowledge of an individualized threat. Rather, "it is enough that defendants are aware that their action may cause injury without being able to divine the most likely victim." Washington v. LaPorte County Sheriff's Department, 306 F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2002), quoting Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 2001). "The key is that the individuals must have actual knowledge of the risk." Id. (emphasis in original). A prisoner alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights must show that the defendant official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to a plaintiff-prisoner's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A court may infer the subjective awareness of a substantial risk from proof of the obviousness of a risk, but the court is not required to make such an inference. See Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 1996), citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
The federal courts of appeal have recognized that labeling a prisoner a "snitch" can violate the prisoner's constitutional rights, at least if the label is applied with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate. Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of qualified immunity when evidence demonstrated that prison official had circulated rumors that plaintiff was a snitch); Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1567 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming judgment in favor of prisoner against guard who spread rumor that he was a snitch that resulted in assaults by other prisoners; defendant guard testified that if he spread the rumor, the prisoner would probably be beaten); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment for defendants where inmate had evidence that prison officials called him a snitch to subject him to retaliation by other inmates); Harmon v. Berry, 728 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1984) (reversing dismissal of claim that prison officials had labeled prisoner a snitch, subjecting him to retaliation); Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1981) (remanding similar claim for further evaluation); see also Reece v. Groose, 60 F.3d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that reputation as a snitch places prisoner "at a substantial risk of injury" at other inmates' hands).
II. The Claim Against Defendant Catt
Ascherman has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Catt indicated to other prisoners on February 7, 2000, that he was a "snitch." The court credits Jones' account of what Catt said that day when other inmates asked Catt whether Ascherman had told her where the missing fruit juice had been hidden. Catt replied no, but she added words to the effect that Ascherman "might tell sometimes, but not this time." Catt's own testimony in her deposition was that she said words to the effect: "I don't know about any other time, but Iggy [Ascherman] never tells me anything." Catt Dep. at 29-30.
The court credits Jones' account because she was the only witness who was not directly interested in the outcome of this lawsuit, and because her account fits the undisputed facts most closely. We know from both Jones and Catt that other inmates confronted Catt after she found the missing fruit juice on February 7th and demanded to know if Ascherman had "snitched." We know from both Jones and Catt that Catt made some sort of reference to other times, and we know that Ascherman was beaten by other prisoners the evening of February 8th.
Catt's statement, as recounted by Jones, was a clear indication to other prisoners that Ascherman had "snitched" in the past. Catt had sufficient experience working in the prison, and the danger was so clear, that the court finds that Catt's indication was not merely negligent. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 842-44 (finder of fact may infer deliberate indifference from obviousness of risk, though the inference is not mandatory); Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 643 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming verdict for prisoner based on guards' deliberate indifference to threat from other prisoner). The court finds that Catt made her statement with deliberate indifference to the risk that other prisoners would take revenge upon Ascherman for the previous "snitching," which they did the next evening.
III. The Claim Against Defendant Clark
Plaintiff Ascherman has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he informed defendant Jason Clark of the risk he faced prior to the actual beating. Accordingly, Ascherman has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Clark acted with deliberate indifference to a serious risk to Ascherman's health and safety. The court will enter final judgment for defendant Clark.
IV. Damages
The evidence shows that Ascherman suffered bruises and cuts as a result of the beating by two or three other prisoners. There is no evidence that he suffered broken bones around his eye or a cracked vertebra, as he has claimed. There is no evidence that Ascherman suffered any out-of-pocket losses as a result of his injuries. The court has no record of the medical care for Ascherman's injuries. Any medical care that was provided was provided at state expense. Ascherman's injuries were painful but temporary. The court does not credit Ascherman's claims of continuing pain and suffering, such as headaches, attributable to the beating in 2000. Ascherman has offered no evidence of emotional distress or similar mental damages. Accordingly, the only compensable elements of damage in this case are physical pain and suffering, which are notoriously difficult to value in terms of dollars.
Juries are not required to explain their determinations of damages for pain and suffering, but the Seventh Circuit requires district judges to provide such explanations with citations to comparable cases when awarding damages for pain and suffering or similar difficult-to-quantify categories of damages. Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2001).
In making a decision in this case, the court has reviewed approximately thirty or so federal cases that have addressed pain and suffering awards, especially in the context of excessive force used by police or prison guards. Not surprisingly, the jury and court awards vary widely, but some cases were especially instructive for this case because they involved painful but relatively minor and temporary injuries, requiring little or no medical attention.
In Williams v. Omodt, 640 F. Supp. 120 (D.Minn. 1986), Judge Murphy found that one prison guard had used excessive force against a prisoner. The court found that the plaintiff "suffered bruises, contusions, swelling, and considerable pain, but no permanent physical injury." Id. at 122. The court awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages.
In Hynes v. LaBoy, 887 F. Supp. 618, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the plaintiff claimed that prison guards had used excessive force against him. A jury agreed with him regarding some incidents and awarded $1,250 for an incident that caused two cuts and a black eye, and another $1,500 for another incident in which he was kicked in the testicles. The court upheld the awards against the parties' contentions that the awards were both inadequate and excessive.
In Brown v. Triche, 660 F. Supp. 281, 287 (N.D.Ill. 1987), the plaintiff had been beaten by a deputy sheriff while in pretrial detention. The plaintiff suffered blows to the head that had caused cuts, abrasions, bruises, and a bloody nose, and he had vomited when he was examined by a nurse in lock-up, and still appeared dazed when he was later admitted to the hospital. He had lost consciousness at least briefly. Judge Shadur found that the plaintiff suffered pain for less than two weeks, without permanent injury, as well as humiliation. Judge Shadur awarded $9,000 in compensatory damages for those injuries.
In Edwards v. Kelly, 1990 WL 106851 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the plaintiff was a police officer on leave who claimed that he had been beaten by police officers in a late-night encounter. Judge Tenney found that plaintiff had been punched only once unlawfully, causing a cut lip and bruised jaw, with no permanent injuries and no visible injury just two days after the incident. The court awarded $500 in damages against the officer who punched the plaintiff. Id. at *5.
In Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 1982), the inmate-plaintiff proved that prison guards "repeatedly punched and kicked Freeman in the back, face, and testicles," that plaintiff's "entire body hurt," though there was no permanent eye injury. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $2,500 against one defendant and $250 each against two others. The Seventh Circuit described the modest awards as "certainly not excessive." Id. at 494.
In Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff proved that police officers had beaten him on the street for no reason. Giving the plaintiff the benefit of conflicts in the evidence, the plaintiff had lost eleven teeth as a result of the beating, though he saw a doctor only twice for brief examinations for which he paid just $35, and he was emotionally distraught. The jury awarded $47,000 in compensatory damages. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court had abused its discretion by denying a remittitur: "$47,000 is not a reasonable estimate of such an intangible loss when no effort at all is made to estimate an objective basis for quantifying the loss. We consider $25,000 the highest compensatory damages that can be justified on this record," and the court described even $25,000 as "generous by comparison to the much lower awards given by district judges in similar cases." Id. at 162, citing Adams v. Thompson, 557 F. Supp. 405, 411-12 (M.D.La. 1983) (for torn clothing and bruises in unlawful arrest supported award of $1500 for physical injuries for one plaintiff; second plaintiff suffered "slight cut" and was awarded $250 for physical injuries); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 621 (D.Mass. 1982) (where plaintiff suffered "superficial bruises and head and neck contusions" in unlawful arrest and search of home and in detention, court awarded $3,000 for pain and suffering against one defendant and $500 against another, but awards included awards for fear and humiliation connected with arrest and search); Ellis v. Zieger, 449 F. Supp. 24, 26-27 (E.D.Wis. 1978) (awarding $5,200 to estate of plaintiff who had been beaten in the head by police officers while handcuffed; blows required sutures to head and left plaintiff's hands badly swollen; plaintiff's death was not related to the incident).
These cases all involved claims against officials who actually used unjustified force against the plaintiffs. Defendant Catt herself did not use force against plaintiff Ascherman. And although she acted with deliberate indifference to his safety, the court does not find that she intended him to suffer any harm. Accordingly, in determining compensatory damages for pain and suffering, the court leans toward the low end of the range of reasonable compensation.
In light of these considerations and the scope of injuries described above, and after considering awards in roughly comparable cases recounted above, the court finds that a fair amount to compensate Ascherman for his injuries and pain and suffering is $2,500. The court will enter judgment in favor of Ascherman and against Catt in that amount. Deliberate indifference can support an award of punitive damages, at least as a matter of law, but such awards are left to the sound discretion of the finder of fact for consideration in light of the purposes of punitive damages, to punish and to deter. Because Catt did not act with intent to cause harm to Ascherman, the court finds that punitive damages should not be awarded in this case.
So ordered.