I see no support for holding that the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act essentially has no applicability when the parents of a purportedly dependent child were previously divorced by a proceeding in the circuit court. Finally, as Judge Moore stated in his writing concurring in the result in the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion, the caselaw cited on appeal in support of the mother's position, Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So.3d 1117 (Ala.2009), and A.S. v. W.T.J., 984 So.2d 1196 (Ala.Civ.App.2007), did not involve dependency actions or § 12–15–314. 161 So.3d at 1220.

However, the courts of this State have consistently applied subsection (b) in considering whether to terminate a noncustodial parent's rights, even when the child is in the physical custody of the custodial parent. See In re T.M.A., 590 So.2d 298, 299 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991) (stating that, "[w]hen the child is not in the physical custody of the parent in question, the court may properly consider the parent's failure to provide for the child's material needs," a factor from subsection (b)); see also, e.g., A.S. v. W.J.T., 984 So.2d 1196 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007) (considering evidence of father's child-support arrearage in reviewing trial court's ruling on the mother's petition to terminate the father's parental rights, where the mother had primary physical custody of the children); A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So.2d 394 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007) (considering evidence of mother's child-support arrearage, failure to visit or to maintain contact, and inability to adjust circumstances to meet children's needs, in addressing the father's petition to terminate the mother's parental rights where the father had physical custody of the children). Moreover, in terminating parental rights, in addition to the factors listed in § 26-18-7, a court may consider "any other factors that are relevant to the child's welfare."

“ ‘[In M.D.C. v. K.D., t]he majority's reading of [former] § 26–18–7 [, Ala.Code 1975,] also violates established law that once a circuit court enters a child-support order in a divorce proceeding, the circuit court retains exclusive jurisdiction to modify that order, which precludes a juvenile court from adjudicating child-support issues in a termination-of-parental-rights action. See A.S. v. W.T.J., 984 So.2d 1196, 1202 (Ala.Civ.App.2007). In this case, the trial court entered a child-support order as part of a divorce judgment in February 2003, requiring the father to pay $540 per month for the benefit of his children. If the majority [in M.D.C. v. K.D.] is correct, the juvenile court terminated that child-support obligation in October 2005, although it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

"The majority's reading of § 26-18-7 also violates established law that once a circuit court enters a child-support order in a divorce proceeding, the circuit court retains exclusive jurisdiction to modify that order, which precludes a juvenile court from adjudicating child-support issues in a termination-of-parental-rights action. See AS. v. W.T.J., 984 So.2d 1196, 1202 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007). In this case, the trial court entered a child-support order as part of a divorce judgment in February 2003, requiring the father to pay $540 per month for the benefit of his children.

Based on the authorities cited above, we conclude that it cannot and that the trial court erred by adjudicating the damages claims on the merits; those claims should have been dismissed, without prejudice. See A.S. v. W.T.J., 984 So. 2d 1196, 1203 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (reversing a judgment "insofar as it purport[ed] to adjudicate the merits" of a claim over which the juvenile court had no jurisdiction and remanding the cause for the juvenile court to vacate that portion of its judgment); see also Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama, Inc., 990 So. 2d 344, 353 (Ala. 2008) (concluding that an order adjudicating a claim over which the circuit court lacks jurisdiction is due to be vacated and the claim dismissed without prejudice). Based on the foregoing, the June 2018 judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

" In AS. v. W.T.J., 984 So.2d 1196, 1202 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007), this court held that once a circuit court had "acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over matters of custody [when it adjudicated that issue as part of a divorce action], it also [had] acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over matters pertaining to visitation and child support." Furthermore, we have noted "that it is the general rule that a court of equity, vested with jurisdiction in a particular case, proceed to resolve all issues placed before it and `settle all the equities between the parties.

The majority's reading of § 26-18-7 also violates established law that once a circuit court enters a child-support order in a divorce proceeding, the circuit court retains exclusive jurisdiction to modify that order, which precludes a juvenile court from adjudicating child-support issues in a termination-of-parental-rights action. See AS. v. W.T.J., 984 So.2d 1196, 1202 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007). In this case, the trial court entered a child-support order as part of a divorce judgment in February 2003, requiring the father to pay $540 per month for the benefit of his children.