Opinion
No. CA 08 00735.
March 4, 2009.
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 64946B HONORABLE JULES D. EDWARDS III, DISTRICT JUDGE.
Michael Harson, District Attorney, Lafayette, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Michael Harson, District Attorney.
Bart J. Bellaire, Assistant DA, Abbeville, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Michael Harson, District Attorney.
Calvin Woodruff Jr., Abbeville, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Calvin Woodruff Jr.
Hubert Arvie, Rayburn Correctional Center, Rain One Angie, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, Hubert Arvie.
Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, OSWALD A. DECUIR, and ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, Judges.
The plaintiff, Hubert Arvie, appeals a judgment of the trial court granting the District Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial District's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
The plaintiff was convicted on May 19, 1989, of the April 1987 armed robbery of the Melancon Jewelry Store in Abbeville. Subsequently, a multiple offender bill was filed, and on July 31, 1989, he was sentenced to 50 years at hard labor without benefits.
The procedural history of this case was explained by the trial judge:
This case began as request for a writ of Mandamus which requested this court to (among other things) require the District attorney to respond to a Public Records Act Request for Information, filed by Mr. Arvie on 16 August [19]94. Mr. Arvie was successful in that aspect of his request for judicial relief after a hearing occurred on 26 September [19]94. This judgment was signed on 21 October [19]94. On 19 July 2006 Mr. Arvie filed a motion to enforce the 1994 Judgment that ordered the District Attorney to provide Mr. Arvie with "that portion of the file in Criminal Docket #88 — 25689 that is discoverable under the Public Records Act".[sic]
. . . .
Mr. Arvie apparently believes a grave injustice has occurred and he is seeking information that he believes will help him correct this wrong. On 18 DEC 2007 after a two day trial of the motion to enforce the 1994 Judgment, this court granted the District Attorney's motion for an involuntary dismissal of Mr. Arvie's motion.
In his "Reasons for Ruling" the trial judge explained why he granted the District Attorney's motion:
After careful consideration of all of the evidence presented during the course of this trial, I was clearly convinced beyond all reasonable doubt, that Mr. Arvie had possession of no facts that would cause him or anybody else to believe that the District Attorney had not complied with the 1994 Judgment. Additionally I was convinced that Mr. Arvie hoped he would be able to find some information if he asked enough people enough questions, but he had no idea of any particularized facts that would cause somebody to believe that the District Attorney had not complied with the 1994 Judgment.
The evidence presented during this trial also clearly convinced me that before Mr. Arvie filed his motion to enforce the 1994 Judgment, he did not possess any facts to support his assertion that the District Attorney had failed to comply with that judgment. It was equally clear that despite a substantial amount of discovery prior to the trial of this motion, Mr. Arvie did not possess any facts to support his claim before he called his first witness during the trial of this motion. During the time allotted for the presentation of evidence to substantiate his claim, Mr. Arvie used that time to discover that his claim was without merit.
The trial judge did note that "there was evidence that Mr. Woodruff [the Assistant District Attorney(A.D.A.) who originally prosecuted the plaintiff] referred to some documents as work product." The trial judge further noted that "[t]here was no identification of what . . . [Mr. Woodruff] determined to be work product." The trial judge stated that even if some documents were withheld from the plaintiff as "work product" "there was no proof that those documents currently exist in the District Attorney's file." He concluded that "[t]he plaintiff did not present any evidence that would support a conclusion that the District Attorney or any employee or contractor with that office was in violation of the 1994 Judgment."
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Inasmuch as the judgment in this case is based upon factual determinations of the trial court, it is reviewable under the "manifest error" standard of review which was set out by our supreme court in Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844-845 (La. 1989) (citations and footnote omitted):
It is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact in the absence of "manifest error" or unless it is "clearly wrong," and where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. The appellate review of fact is not completed by reading only so much of the record as will reveal a reasonable factual basis for the finding in the trial court, but if the trial court or jury findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. In applying the manifestly erroneous — clearly wrong standard to the findings below, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their initial review function is not to decide factual issues de novo.
When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error — clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may well find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. But where such factors are not present, and a factfinder's finding is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.
Our review of the record reveals o manifest error by the trial judge. Much of the information the plaintiff argued he should have been provided may be contained in the records of other agencies. The A.D.A. who participated in the hearing went over the plaintiff's request line by line with the trial judge. He even offered to re-copy his complete file for the plaintiff. However, nothing appeased the plaintiff. Our examination of the documents and the transcript convinces us that the District Attorney completely complied with the 1994 order issued by the court pursuant to plaintiff's request under the "Public Records Act." We find no error in the judgment of the trial court.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Inasmuch as the plaintiff is a pauper and is incarcerated, we pretermit the assessment of costs.
AFFIRMED.
THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules — Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.3.