The Legislature has decided, by its explicit reference in the statute to the contributions of one spouse to the other's profession or career (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d] [6], [9]; [e]), that these contributions represent investments in the economic partnership of the marriage and that the product of the parties' joint efforts, the professional license, should be considered marital property. The majority at the Appellate Division held that the cited statutory provisions do not refer to the license held by a professional who has yet to establish a practice but only to a going professional practice (see, e.g., Arvantides v Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033; Litman v Litman, 61 N.Y.2d 918). There is no reason in law or logic to restrict the plain language of the statute to existing practices, however, for it is of little consequence in making an award of marital property, except for the purpose of evaluation, whether the professional spouse has already established a practice or whether he or she has yet to do so.

Notably, defendant, who retained her own expert to appraise plaintiff's business interests during the pendency of the action, failed to call her expert as a witness. Regarding the equitable distribution of the marital value of plaintiff's business assets, there is no support for defendant's claim that she was entitled to 50% of their marital value (seeArvantides v. Arvantides , 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 1034, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58, 478 N.E.2d 199 [1985] ). The court, after correcting a scrivener's error, properly accepted the Referee's recommendation that defendant receive 10% of the total value of certain entities valued at $ 19,942,898.

Some established general principles are pertinent to many of the parties' arguments. “ ‘[T]here is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be on an equal or 50–50 basis' ” ( Quinn v. Quinn, 61 A.D.3d 1067, 1069, 876 N.Y.S.2d 720 [2009], quoting Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 1034, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58, 478 N.E.2d 199 [1985] ). “A trial court has substantial discretion to fashion such awards based on the circumstances of each case, and the determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or failure to consider the requisite statutory factors” ( Williams v. Williams, 99 A.D.3d 1094, 1096, 952 N.Y.S.2d 662 [2012] [citations omitted]; see Keil v. Keil, 85 A.D.3d 1233, 1234, 926 N.Y.S.2d 173 [2011] ). Credibility determinations by the trial court are accorded deference ( see e.g. Lurie v. Lurie, 94 A.D.3d 1376, 1378, 943 N.Y.S.2d 261 [2012] ). The husband argues that a $100,000 loan from Gabriel Contractors should have been calculated as a marital debt, which can serve as an “offset against the total marital assets to be divided” ( Jonas v. Jonas, 241 A.D.2d 839, 840, 660 N.Y.S.2d 487 [1997] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). He related that he asked his father for money and, even though his father was no longer an officer or shareholder of Gabriel Contractors, his fa

We first address plaintiffs contention that Supreme Court erred in failing to equally distribute defendant's medical business. Supreme Court is vested with "'substantial discretion in determining what distribution of marital property will be equitable under all the circumstances'" ( Farrell v Cleary-Farrell, 306 AD2d 597, 599, quoting Owens v Owens, 288 AD2d 782, 783), and "there is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be on an equal or 50-50 basis" ( Arvantides v Arvantides, 64 NY2d 1033, 1034; see Corbett v Corbett, 6 AD3d 766, 767).

Before: Saxe, J.P., Friedman, Sweeny, McGuire and Malone, JJ. Plaintiff's contributions to defendant's business interests, which accounted for a substantial portion of the marital assets, were modest ( see Arvantides v Arvantides, 64 NY2d 1033, 1034; Naimollah v De Ugarte, 18 AD3d 268, 269; cf. Niland v Niland, 291 AD2d 876, 877). Accordingly, and giving full consideration to plaintiff's contributions as a homemaker ( Arvantides, 64 NY2d at 1034), we modify the equitable distribution award as indicated above.

In determining the appropriate manner of distributing these assets, the Court is aware that, generally, "in a marriage of long duration, where both parties have made significant contributions to the marriage, a division of marital assets should be made as equal as possible" ( Chalif v. Chalif, supra, 298 AD2d, at 349). Nevertheless, "there is no requirement that the distribution of each item of marital property be on an equal or 50-50 basis" ( Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 NY2d 1033, 1034; Falgoust v. Falgoust, 15 AD3d 612, 614 [2nd Dept. 2005] ["Equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution"]). As relates to these assets, the Court recognizes that while plaintiff's financial contributions to the creation of EVCI, and EdTel, the forerunner of EVCI, were quite limited, it is undisputed that she was the partner in the marriage who cared for the parties' daughters and the Home so that defendant could commit his full time and energy to the formation and operation of his businesses.

In the 19 years since we adopted the O'Brien rule, we have adhered to the principle that both parties in a matrimonial action are entitled to fundamental fairness in the allocation of marital assets, and that the economic and noneconomic contributions of each spouse are to be taken into account. Trial courts that examine the statutory factors are granted substantial discretion in determining the extent to which the distribution of marital property, including enhanced earnings attributable to a professional license, will be equitable. Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court may not disturb the trial court's award ( see Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 1034, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58, 478 N.E.2d 199). Husband did not seek to overturn the precedent established in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d 712 [1985] in either Supreme Court or the Appellate Division.

As we stated in O'Brien, the complexity of calculating the present value of a partially exploited professional license is no more difficult than the problem of computing wrongful death damages or the loss of earning potential that is occasioned by a particular injury ( 66 N.Y.2d, at 588). Nor does it lead to significantly more speculation than is involved in the now-routine task of valuing a professional practice for the purpose of making a distributive award ( see, id., citing Arvantides v Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033; Litman v Litman, 93 A.D.2d 695, affd 61 N.Y.2d 918; see also, Burns v Burns, 84 N.Y.2d 369, 376-377). IV.

See LaBuda v. LaBuda, 349 Pa. Super. 524, 503 A.2d 971 (1986); Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 575 (Alaska 1983); Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 355, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-1299 (1981).See, e.g., Hairston v. Hairston, 454 A.2d 1369 (D.C. 1983); Miller v. Miller, 84 Ill. App.3d 931, 40 Ill.Dec. 7, 405 N.E.2d 1099 (1980); Libunao v. Libunao, 180 Ind. App. 242, 388 N.E.2d 574 (1979); In re Marriage of Castle, 312 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Iowa 1981); In re Marriage of Fehr, 573 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974); Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 1034, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59, 478 N.E.2d 199, 200 (1985); Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981); Papuchis v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 130, 132, 341 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1986); Lacey v. Lacey, 45 Wis.2d 378, 382, 173 N.W.2d 142, 145 (1970); Cross v. Cross, 586 P.2d 547, 549 (Wyo. 1978). In making a marital property monetary award, a trial judge must weigh the relevant factors in light of the legislative purpose, and then use his or her sound discretion to arrive at an award that is equitable and in accordance with the statute.

On appeal, plaintiff limits her claim to the value and percentage award of the Agrifos business assets based upon the alleged malpractice of Borstein & Sheinbaum at the 2015 hearing, i.e., that the Special Referee and Supreme Court ignored the justifications for the 40% award in two other assets by awarding her only 10% of the value of Agrifos, her former husband's fertilizer business. However, this Court previously affirmed the 10% award of the Agrifos assets, applying the well-settled rule that marital assets do not have to be divided equally ( Cotton v. Roedelbronn, 170 A.D.3d 595, 595–596, 97 N.Y.S.3d 28 [1st Dept. 2019], citing Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 1034, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58, 478 N.E.2d 199 [1985] ). Plaintiff's attempt to relitigate this issue is unavailing and the conclusory allegations do not adequately state a claim for malpractice (seeGarr Silpe, P.C. v. Gorman, 192 A.D.3d 633, 141 N.Y.S.3d 310 [1st Dept. 2021] ; Olsen v. Smith, 187 A.D.3d 675, 675, 131 N.Y.S.3d 554 [1st Dept. 2020] ; Sitomer v. Goldweber Epstein, LLP, 139 A.D.3d 642, 643, 34 N.Y.S.3d 8 [1st Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 906, 2016 WL 6273493 [2016] ).