Arundel Corporation v. Board

9 Citing cases

  1. City of Bowie v. MIE, Properties, Inc.

    398 Md. 657 (Md. 2007)   Cited 122 times
    Holding that covenants that specify a duration should be enforced by courts to hold parties to their bargain

    As long as the covenant is as or more restrictive, and not less restrictive, than the underlying zoning classification, the goals of zoning are not frustrated. See Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 20, 432 A.2d 1319, 1330 (1981) ("Zoning provides a tool by which to establish general areas or districts devoted to selected uses.") (emphasis added); Arundel Corp. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 255 Md. 78, 84, 257 A.2d 142, 146 (1969) ("[T]he policy of zoning regulations is to restrict rather than increase any non-conforming uses.") (emphasis added); Grant v. Mayor City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 307, 129 A.2d 363, 365 (1957) ("[T]he earnest aim and ultimate purpose of zoning was and is to reduce nonconformance to conformance as speedily as possible with due regard to the legitimate interests of all concerned, and the ordinances forbid or limit expansion of nonconforming uses. . . .") (emphasis added). We are bound to interpret both the Covenants and the Agreement as written.

  2. Purich v. Draper

    395 Md. 694 (Md. 2006)   Cited 4 times
    In Purich v. Draper Properties, Inc., 395 Md. 694, 714 (2006) the Court of Appeals explained that "special exceptions are the 'grant of a specific use that would not be appropriate generally or without restriction....'" (quoting ยง 59-A-2.1 of Montgomery County the Zoning Ordinance) (Emphasis in opinion).

    Moreover, this Court has further recognized that the purpose of such restrictions is to achieve the ultimate elimination of nonconforming uses through economic attrition and physical obsolescence. The Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Howard County, 255 Md. 78, 83-4, 257 A.2d 142, 146 (1969); Stieff v. Collins, 237 Md. 601, 604, 207 A.2d 489, 491 (1965); Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652, 655, 657, 47 A.2d 613, 614-15 (1946); Beyer v. Mayor of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444, 446, 34 A.2d 765, 766 (1943); See Kastendike v. Baltimore Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., 267 Md. 389, 397, 297 A.2d. 745, 749-50 (1972)."

  3. County Council v. E. L. Gardner, Inc.

    293 Md. 259 (Md. 1982)   Cited 17 times
    In Gardner, the question was "whether, under the applicable provisions of the Prince George's County Code..., the owner of a nonconforming surface mining sand and gravel operation [could] obtain a special exception to operate a sand and gravel wet-processing facility at the same location."

    Moreover, this Court has further recognized that the purpose of such restrictions is to achieve the ultimate elimination of nonconforming uses through economic attrition and physical obsolescence. The Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Howard County, 255 Md. 78, 83-4, 257 A.2d 142, 146 (1969); Stieff v. Collins, 237 Md. 601, 604, 207 A.2d 489, 491 (1965); Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652, 655, 657, 47 A.2d 613, 614-15 (1946); Beyer v. Mayor of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444, 446, 34 A.2d 765, 766 (1943); See Kastendike v. Baltimore Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., 267 Md. 389, 397, 297 A.2d 745, 749-50 (1972). Whether a nonconforming use can be changed, extended, enlarged, altered, repaired, restored, or recommenced after abandonment ordinarily is governed by the provisions of the applicable local ordinances and regulations.

  4. Canada's Tavern, Inc. v. Town of Glen Echo

    271 A.2d 664 (Md. 1970)   Cited 29 times
    In Canada's Tavern, Inc. v. Glen Echo, 260 Md. 206, 271 A.2d 664 (1970), it was alleged that intent was required to abandon a nonconforming use under an ordinance providing that a nonconforming use, "once abandoned," could not be reestablished.

    He too returns home to find his nonconforming right to conduct his business gone. To my mind, it is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and a denial of due process of law to eliminate the vested property right without the fault of the owner and without any intention on the owner's part to give up or relinquish the vested right. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 398 (1915); Village of Terrace Park v. Errett, 12 F.2d 240 (6 Cir. 1926); ExParte Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82 P. 241 (1905) cited in Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning App. of Howard Co., 255 Md. 78, 81, 257 A.2d 142, 145 (1969). Such action, in my opinion, results in the taking of the owner's property right without just compensation as prohibited by Art. III, ยง 40 of the Maryland Constitution.

  5. New London v. Leskiewicz

    110 N.H. 462 (N.H. 1970)   Cited 26 times
    Defining variance as the "authority granted to the owner to use his property in a manner otherwise violative of the zoning regulations"

    However, where shortly after the passage of the ordinance the defendants were granted a variance by the Board of Adjustment to operate a picnic and camping area on their land based on approximately the same factors which would have established their nonconforming use, it is unnecessary to separate the sources of their rights. Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head District, 101 N.H. 460, 464, 146 A.2d 257, 261 (1958); Melody v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Conn. 516, 264 A.2d 572, 574, 575 (1969); Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning App., 255 Md. 78, 82-84, 257 A.2d 142, 146 (1969). "Since the extension or enlargement of a nonconforming use may be more detrimental to zoning than a variance, it has generally been held that a nonconforming use stands in no preferred position. Consequently most decisions that have passed on the point have held that the extension or enlargement of a nonconforming use is to be treated as a variance within the provisions of zoning ordinances."

  6. Zoning Bd. of Howard Co. v. Kanode

    267 A.2d 138 (Md. 1970)   Cited 4 times

    We shall reverse the decision of the circuit court. E. g., Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 255 Md. 78 (1969); Bowie v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 Md. 602 (1969); Haldemann v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 Md. 298 (1969); Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 252 Md. 578 (1969); Smith v. Board of County Comm'rs, 252 Md. 280 (1969); Board of County Comm'rs v. Tipton, 244 Md. 77 (1966); Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 243 Md. 138 (1966); Mandel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 208 (1965); George F. Becker Co. v. Jerns, 230 Md. 541 (1963); Phillips v. Zoning Commissioner, 225 Md. 102 (1961); Krieger v. Planning Commission, 224 Md. 320 (1961); Kreatchman v. Ramsburg, 224 Md. 209 (1961). The tract of land with a part of which we shall be concerned adjoins the town of Elkridge. It consists of 36 acres fronting 616 feet on the south side of Old Washington Boulevard (Md. Rte. 447) and extending in a generally southerly direction a half mile or so to the Baltimore Ohio Railroad, upon which it bounds for a distance of 1,300 feet. Augustine Avenue extends south from Old Washington Boulevard along the western boundar

  7. Commonwealth v. Ward

    37 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2024)

    Therefore, Appellant avers that his constitutional rights were violated and suppression is warranted. Appellant analogizes his case to this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.2d 142, 149 (Pa.Super. 2021). See Appellant's brief at 19-20.

  8. Kim v. Council

    180 Md. App. 606 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)   Cited 13 times
    Indicating that the District Court's exclusive original jurisdiction under Cts. and Jud. Proc ยง 4-401 depends on whether the relationship between the parties can be characterized as that of a landlord and tenant

    Baltimore Sun Co. v. State, 340 Md. 437, 454, 667 A.2d 166 (1995) (quoting Attorney General v. A.A. School Bus, 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749 (1979)). See Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Howard County, 255 Md. 78, 79, 257 A.2d 142 (1969) (Dismissing the appeal of a denial of an injunction as moot based on res judicata.); Roebuck v. Steuart, 76 Md.App. 298, 307 fn. 2, 544 A.2d 808 (1988) ("Steuart correctly observes in his brief that this issue would become moot by a holding in his favor that this judgment is barred because [] of the doctrine of res judicata[.]").

  9. State v. Siegel

    13 Md. App. 444 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971)   Cited 42 times
    In State v. Siegel, 13 Md. App. at 460 we construed the federal act to mean that a state may require procedures that are more restrictive than those spelled out in the federal act, but in the absence of such statutory provisions the procedures of the federal act are controlling.

    For example, in Potts v. Governor, 255 Md. 445 where the question concerned the validity of the appointment of members of various Boards of Election Supervisors, the case became moot because their terms expired. In Arundel Corporation v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 255 Md. 78, the hearing sought to be enjoined had been actually held before the appeal was determined. In State v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, the State sought to have Sheridan compelled to give further testimony to a Grand Jury and the term of that Jury had ended and it had been discharged when the case reached the Court of Appeals.