As long as the covenant is as or more restrictive, and not less restrictive, than the underlying zoning classification, the goals of zoning are not frustrated. See Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 20, 432 A.2d 1319, 1330 (1981) ("Zoning provides a tool by which to establish general areas or districts devoted to selected uses.") (emphasis added); Arundel Corp. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 255 Md. 78, 84, 257 A.2d 142, 146 (1969) ("[T]he policy of zoning regulations is to restrict rather than increase any non-conforming uses.") (emphasis added); Grant v. Mayor City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 307, 129 A.2d 363, 365 (1957) ("[T]he earnest aim and ultimate purpose of zoning was and is to reduce nonconformance to conformance as speedily as possible with due regard to the legitimate interests of all concerned, and the ordinances forbid or limit expansion of nonconforming uses. . . .") (emphasis added). We are bound to interpret both the Covenants and the Agreement as written.
Moreover, this Court has further recognized that the purpose of such restrictions is to achieve the ultimate elimination of nonconforming uses through economic attrition and physical obsolescence. The Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Howard County, 255 Md. 78, 83-4, 257 A.2d 142, 146 (1969); Stieff v. Collins, 237 Md. 601, 604, 207 A.2d 489, 491 (1965); Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652, 655, 657, 47 A.2d 613, 614-15 (1946); Beyer v. Mayor of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444, 446, 34 A.2d 765, 766 (1943); See Kastendike v. Baltimore Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., 267 Md. 389, 397, 297 A.2d. 745, 749-50 (1972)."
Moreover, this Court has further recognized that the purpose of such restrictions is to achieve the ultimate elimination of nonconforming uses through economic attrition and physical obsolescence. The Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Howard County, 255 Md. 78, 83-4, 257 A.2d 142, 146 (1969); Stieff v. Collins, 237 Md. 601, 604, 207 A.2d 489, 491 (1965); Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652, 655, 657, 47 A.2d 613, 614-15 (1946); Beyer v. Mayor of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444, 446, 34 A.2d 765, 766 (1943); See Kastendike v. Baltimore Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., 267 Md. 389, 397, 297 A.2d 745, 749-50 (1972). Whether a nonconforming use can be changed, extended, enlarged, altered, repaired, restored, or recommenced after abandonment ordinarily is governed by the provisions of the applicable local ordinances and regulations.
He too returns home to find his nonconforming right to conduct his business gone. To my mind, it is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and a denial of due process of law to eliminate the vested property right without the fault of the owner and without any intention on the owner's part to give up or relinquish the vested right. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 398 (1915); Village of Terrace Park v. Errett, 12 F.2d 240 (6 Cir. 1926); ExParte Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 82 P. 241 (1905) cited in Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning App. of Howard Co., 255 Md. 78, 81, 257 A.2d 142, 145 (1969). Such action, in my opinion, results in the taking of the owner's property right without just compensation as prohibited by Art. III, ยง 40 of the Maryland Constitution.
However, where shortly after the passage of the ordinance the defendants were granted a variance by the Board of Adjustment to operate a picnic and camping area on their land based on approximately the same factors which would have established their nonconforming use, it is unnecessary to separate the sources of their rights. Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head District, 101 N.H. 460, 464, 146 A.2d 257, 261 (1958); Melody v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Conn. 516, 264 A.2d 572, 574, 575 (1969); Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning App., 255 Md. 78, 82-84, 257 A.2d 142, 146 (1969). "Since the extension or enlargement of a nonconforming use may be more detrimental to zoning than a variance, it has generally been held that a nonconforming use stands in no preferred position. Consequently most decisions that have passed on the point have held that the extension or enlargement of a nonconforming use is to be treated as a variance within the provisions of zoning ordinances."
We shall reverse the decision of the circuit court. E. g., Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 255 Md. 78 (1969); Bowie v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 Md. 602 (1969); Haldemann v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 Md. 298 (1969); Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 252 Md. 578 (1969); Smith v. Board of County Comm'rs, 252 Md. 280 (1969); Board of County Comm'rs v. Tipton, 244 Md. 77 (1966); Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 243 Md. 138 (1966); Mandel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 208 (1965); George F. Becker Co. v. Jerns, 230 Md. 541 (1963); Phillips v. Zoning Commissioner, 225 Md. 102 (1961); Krieger v. Planning Commission, 224 Md. 320 (1961); Kreatchman v. Ramsburg, 224 Md. 209 (1961). The tract of land with a part of which we shall be concerned adjoins the town of Elkridge. It consists of 36 acres fronting 616 feet on the south side of Old Washington Boulevard (Md. Rte. 447) and extending in a generally southerly direction a half mile or so to the Baltimore Ohio Railroad, upon which it bounds for a distance of 1,300 feet. Augustine Avenue extends south from Old Washington Boulevard along the western boundar
Therefore, Appellant avers that his constitutional rights were violated and suppression is warranted. Appellant analogizes his case to this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.2d 142, 149 (Pa.Super. 2021). See Appellant's brief at 19-20.
Baltimore Sun Co. v. State, 340 Md. 437, 454, 667 A.2d 166 (1995) (quoting Attorney General v. A.A. School Bus, 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749 (1979)). See Arundel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Howard County, 255 Md. 78, 79, 257 A.2d 142 (1969) (Dismissing the appeal of a denial of an injunction as moot based on res judicata.); Roebuck v. Steuart, 76 Md.App. 298, 307 fn. 2, 544 A.2d 808 (1988) ("Steuart correctly observes in his brief that this issue would become moot by a holding in his favor that this judgment is barred because [] of the doctrine of res judicata[.]").
For example, in Potts v. Governor, 255 Md. 445 where the question concerned the validity of the appointment of members of various Boards of Election Supervisors, the case became moot because their terms expired. In Arundel Corporation v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 255 Md. 78, the hearing sought to be enjoined had been actually held before the appeal was determined. In State v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, the State sought to have Sheridan compelled to give further testimony to a Grand Jury and the term of that Jury had ended and it had been discharged when the case reached the Court of Appeals.