Opinion
# 2017-032-023 Claim No. NONE Motion No. M-89832
05-01-2017
MICHAEL E. ARTIS v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, LINCON HOSPITAL, PAULA MANDEL
Michael E. Artis, Pro Se Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General By: Joseph L. Paterno, Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel
Synopsis
Movant's motion for late claim relief pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) is denied.
Case information
| UID: | 2017-032-023 |
| Claimant(s): | MICHAEL E. ARTIS |
| Claimant short name: | ARTIS |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK, LINCON HOSPITAL, PAULA MANDEL |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | NONE |
| Motion number(s): | M-89832 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | JUDITH A. HARD |
| Claimant's attorney: | Michael E. Artis, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General By: Joseph L. Paterno, Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | May 1, 2017 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Movant moves for leave to file and serve a late claim to recover damages from the State of New York, Linco[l]n Hospital, and Paula Mandel for alleged harassment, mental distress, and wrongful termination (see Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]). The State opposes the motion on the ground that the proposed claim is legally defective, as the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over the matter.
The proposed claim specifically alleges that, on August 10, 2014, after months of "bullying," Mandel wrongfully terminated claimant from his employment at Linco[l]n Hospital and had him arrested (Proposed Claim ¶ 2). The claim states that the place where the alleged acts took place was "Lincon [sic] Hospital" which is located "on 149th St, Bronx, New York" (Proposed Claim ¶ 3). As reflected in the documents submitted by defendant (Exhibit A), Lincoln Medical Center is a hospital owned and operated by the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (see Matter of Joseph v City of New York, 74 AD3d 440, 440 [1st Dept 2010]; Griffin v Lincoln Medical and Mental Health Center, et al., UID No. 2012-049-008 [Ct Cl, Weinstein, J., Feb. 8, 2012]). It is well settled that the Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction wherein claims are primarily brought against the State of New York and certain public entities (see Court of Claims Act § 9 [2]; McGuinness v New York State Workers' Compensation Bd., 41 AD3d 557, 557 [2d Dept 2007]; Plath v New York State Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., 304 AD2d 885, 886-887 [3d Dept 2003]). "Since the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited to those situations where the Legislature has specifically conferred it" (Plath v New York State Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., 304 AD2d at 886), causes of action seeking to hold Lincoln Medical Center and/or its employees liable are more appropriately brought in the Supreme Court of the county in which the corporation has its principal office (see CPLR 503 [c]; Griffin v Lincoln Medical and Mental Health Center, et al., UID No. 2012-049-008 [Ct Cl, Weinstein, J., Feb. 8, 2012]; see e.g. Matter of Joseph v City of New York, 74 AD3d at 440).
Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant movant late claim relief with respect to all cited defendants except the State of New York. Because claimant's motion for late claim relief was brought within the statutes of limitations applicable under the CPLR, such relief is left to the discretion of the Court (see Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]; CPLR 213, 214). In deciding whether to grant a late claim application, the Court must consider whether: (1) the delay in filing the claim was excusable; (2) the State had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim; (3) the State had an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim; (4) the State was substantially prejudiced by the delay; (5) claimant has any other available remedy; and (6) the claim appears to be meritorious (see Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]). While the presence or absence of any one of these factors is not dispositive (see Williams v State of New York, 133 AD3d 1357, 1357 [4th Dept 2015]), the last factor is generally the most decisive inasmuch as "'it would be futile to permit a defective claim to be filed even if the other factors . . . supported the granting of the claimant's motion'" (Ortiz v State of New York, 78 AD3d 1314, 1314 [3d Dept 2010], affd sub nom Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011], quoting Savino v State of New York, 199 AD2d 254, 255 [2d Dept 1993]).
As to the first factor, movant contends that he did not serve a claim or a notice of intention to file a claim upon the Attorney General within 90 days of accrual due to the "mental state of duress" caused by the alleged incident (Motion for Permission to File a Late Claim, ¶ 2). However, as movant has not submitted any evidence to demonstrate that his failure to timely serve the claim within the 90-day statutory period "was attributable to [his] incapacitation" following the incident, the Court finds that he has not sustained his burden as to that factor (Fenton v County of Duchess, 148 AD2d 573, 574 [2d Dept 1989]; compare Matter of Staley v Piper, 285 AD2d 601, 602 [2d Dept 2001]; Wolf v State of New York, 140 AD2d 692, 693 [2d Dept 1988]). Nevertheless, the absence of an excuse for late filing is only one of the factors considered by the Court in reviewing a late claim application and does not necessarily preclude the relief sought here (see generally Williams v State of New York, 133 AD3d at 1357).
The three factors of the State's notice of and opportunity to investigate the essential facts constituting the claim and the lack of substantial prejudice to be incurred by granting late claim relief are frequently analyzed together since they involve similar considerations. Here, movant does not posit any proof that the State had notice of or an opportunity to investigate his claim, but simply argues that he has no other adequate available remedy (Motion for Permission to File a Late Claim, ¶ 3). The Court disagrees, since, as stated above, movant could bring an action against Lincoln Medical Center and/or its employee(s) in the Supreme Court of the county in which the hospital has its principal office or where it has facilities involved in the action (see CPLR 503 [c]; Gembala v Audobon Assn., 97 AD2d at 346). Accordingly, these factors weigh against granting the motion.
Turning then to the final factor, in order to establish a meritorious cause of action, movant must establish that his claim is not "patently groundless, frivolous or legally defective, and [that] upon consideration of the entire record, there is cause to believe that a valid cause of action exists" (Rizzo v State of New York, 2 Misc 3d 829, 834 [Ct Cl 2003]; see Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]; Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d 1, 11 [Ct Cl 1977]). Inasmuch as movant's allegations are directed solely at Lincoln Medical Center and Mandel, as an employee thereof, the Court finds that he has not sustained that burden. Although he lists the State of New York as a defendant in the proposed claim, movant makes no allegations that would implicate the State. Accordingly, as movant has not established the appearance of merit with respect to his allegations, his motion to file and serve a late claim consisting of the stated causes of action must be denied (see Court of Claims Act § 10 (6); Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d at 11-12).
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, that movant's motion seeking permission to file and serve a late claim (M-89832) is denied.
May 1, 2017
Albany, New York
JUDITH A. HARD
Judge of the Court of Claims Papers Considered: 1. Motion for Permission to File a Late Claim, dated December 14, 2016, with exhibit. 2. Affirmation in Opposition, affirmed by Joseph L. Paterno, AAG, on February 3, 2017, with exhibit.