Opinion
No. 294, 2000.
June 25, 2001.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County. Cr.A. Nos. IN95-10-1088, IN95-10-1090, IN95-10-1093.
AFFIRMED.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
HENRY ARTIS, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 294, 2000. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: May 3, 2001 Decided: June 25, 2001.
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County. Cr.A. Nos. IN95-10-1088, IN95-10-1090, IN95-10-1093.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices ORDER
This 25th day of June 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Henry Artis, filed this appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. We find no merit to the appeal.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2) In this appeal, Artis claims that: a) his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently because the Superior Court conducted the plea colloquy improperly; b) the Superior Court used an erroneous legal standard when it held that he was bound by his signed plea agreement in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary; c) the Superior Court erred in failing to properly address his ineffective assistance of counsel claim; d) his plea agreement should be set aside because it was based upon misrepresentations by his counsel; and e) an evidentiary hearing should be held to determine the facts surrounding his counsel's advice to accept the plea agreement. To the extent Artis has not argued other grounds to support his appeal that were previously raised, those grounds are deemed waived and will not be addressed by this Court.
This claim encompasses Artis' Arguments II and IV.
Murphy v. State, Del. Supr., 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1993). In his Rule 61 motion in the Superior Court, Artis also claimed that: i) his counsel improperly permitted him to plead guilty, did not move to withdraw the plea and failed to appeal the Superior Court's acceptance of the plea; ii) his counsel improperly failed to investigate, prepare and submit mitigating information to the Superior Court; and iii) his counsel improperly failed to object to his designation as an habitual offender by the Superior Court and failed to file an appeal on that basis.
(3) In February 1996, Artis pleaded guilty to Kidnaping in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony and Assault in the Second Degree. Artis stated during his plea colloquy that he understood that, as an habitual offender, he could be given a life sentence. In April 1996, Artis was sentenced as an habitual offender to 30 years imprisonment at Level V on the kidnaping conviction and to 10 years imprisonment at Level V on the conviction for possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. On the assault conviction, Artis was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment at Level V, to be suspended for 8 years of Level III probation. The Superior Court's denial of Artis' subsequent motion to correct sentence was affirmed by this Court.
Artis v. State, Del. Supr., No. 270, 1996, Veasey, C.J., 1996 WL 585905 (Oct. 1, 1996) (ORDER).
(4) Artis' claim that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently because the Superior Court judge conducted the plea colloquy improperly is without merit. There are numerous protections afforded a defendant who pleads guilty. Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the Superior Court judge must address the defendant in open court and determine that a) the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the penalties provided for the charged offenses; b) the defendant understands that the guilty plea constitutes a waiver of a trial on the charges and a waiver of the constitutional rights that could have been exercised at trial; and c) the defendant's guilty plea is voluntary-that is, it is not the result of force, threats or promises apart from the plea agreement. We have reviewed carefully the transcript of the plea colloquy with the Superior Court and conclude that the Superior Court properly questioned Artis and properly determined that his guilty plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
Somerville v. State, Del. Supr., 703 A.2d 629, 631 (1997).
Id. at 631-32.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969).
(5) Also without merit is Artis' claim that the Superior Court erroneously required him to show by clear and convincing evidence that he should not be bound by his guilty plea. A defendant's statements to the Superior Court during the guilty plea colloquy are presumed to be truthful and pose a "formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings."
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d at 632 ( quoting Voytik v. United States, 778 F.2d 1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 1985)).
The Superior Court properly placed the burden on Artis to show by clear and convincing evidence that he should not be bound by his guilty plea and, in the absence of any such evidence, properly denied Artis' claims.
(6) Artis' claim that the Superior Court erred in failing to properly address his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is equally unavailing. This claim is based on Artis' contentions that his defense counsel did not review the presentence report with him prior to sentencing or object to certain errors in the report. In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Artis must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable." Our review of the Superior Court's decision reflects that the Superior Court properly applied the Strickland standard to the facts of this case and properly determined that no error on the part of counsel resulted in prejudice to Artis.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990).
(7) Artis next claims that his guilty plea should be set aside because it was based upon misrepresentations by his counsel. Specifically, Artis contends that he would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial but for his counsel's representation that he would receive no more than four to six years imprisonment. The transcript of the plea colloquy reflects that the Superior Court specifically asked Artis if he understood that, as an habitual offender, he could receive as much as a life sentence, to which Artis answered "Yes, sir." Artis further acknowledged that his written plea agreement contained the entire agreement with the prosecution and no promises regarding the length of his sentence had been made. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Artis is bound by his answers on his guilty plea form and by his sworn testimony prior to the Superior Court's acceptance of the guilty plea.
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d at 632.
(8) Artis' final claim that an evidentiary hearing should be held regarding his counsel's representations to him is also without merit. Neither the transcript of the plea colloquy nor Artis' signed plea agreement suggests any factual ambiguity that would necessitate an evidentiary hearing.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.