Opinion
559
March 20, 2003.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Kapnick, J.), entered on or about March 21, 2002, which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment to the extent of dismissing plaintiff's claims pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6), and denied plaintiff's cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as to his Labor Law § 240(1) and
Brian J. Isaac, for plaintiff-appellant-respondent.
Philip H. Ziegler, for defendant-respondent-appellant.
Before: Nardelli, J.P., Tom, Andrias, Williams, JJ.
§ 241(6) claims, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant defendant's motion to the further extent of dismissing plaintiff's ordinary negligence claim pursuant to Labor Law § 200, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint.
The motion court properly dismissed plaintiff's claims pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6) on the ground that the work in which plaintiff was engaged at the time of his accident, applying joint compound to the ceiling of a common hallway, was, under the circumstances presented, merely routine maintenance, not construction work involving "significant physical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure" (Joblon v. Solow, 91 N.Y.2d 457, 465; Futterman v. Rela Realty Corp., 283 A.D.2d 261, 262).
We modify only to grant defendant's motion to the further extent of dismissing plaintiff's negligence claim pursuant to Labor Law § 200. Recovery pursuant to Labor Law § 200 is conditioned on the defendant's supervision and control of the injured worker's performance of the work causing injury (Russin v. Picciano Sons, 54 N.Y.2d 311, 316-318). Defendant's contract with the owner did not require that defendant assume any supervisory responsibility, and it is uncontroverted that plaintiff was employed by the owner and directly supervised by the building superintendent employed by said owner. Defendant's mere oversight of the timing and quality of the work performed is not equivalent to direct supervision and control and is thus insufficient to support the imposition of liability under Labor Law § 200 (see Gonzalez v. United Parcel Serv., 249 A.D.2d 210, 210-211; Pacheco v. S. Bronx Mental Health Council, 179 A.D.2d 550, 551, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 754;see also Brezinski v. Olympia York Water St. Co., 218 A.D.2d 633, 634-635).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.