A contract is not ambiguous simply because the parties disagree on its interpretation, and we see nothing in this case beyond that. Battista v. Horton, Myers Raymond, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 3, 128 F.2d 29, 31 (1942); McReynolds v. Mortgage Acceptance Corp., 56 App.D.C. 342, 343, 13 F.2d 313, 314 (1926); Turner v. Mertz, 55 App.D.C. 177, 180, 3 F.2d 348, 351, 39 A.L.R. 1140 (1925); Cowal v. Hopkins, 229 A.2d 452, 454 (D.C.App. 1967); Rich v. Sills, 130 A.2d 920, 922 (D.C.Mun.App. 1957); Arsenault v. Angle, 43 A.2d 709, 711 (D.C.Mun.App. 1945). See Turner v. Mertz, supra note 45, 55 App.D.C. at 180, 3 F.2d at 351; Arsenault v. Angle, supra note 45, 43 A.2d at 711.
We agree with the rulings of the trial court in admitting parol testimony showing the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of making the contract. Such evidence is admissible in order to ascertain but not alter the true meaning of the contract. Fox v. Johnson Winsatt, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 211, 127 F.2d 729; Arsenault v. Angle, D.C.Mun.App., 43 A.2d 709; 73 W.L.R. 817; Restatement, Contracts § 235(d); 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed. 1940) § 2470. We also agree with the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict for defendant.
The construction of unambiguous contractual provisions is a matter of law to be determined by the court rather than by the jury. Glayman v. Goodman Properties, Inc., supra; Battista v. Horton, Myers Raymond, 128 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1942); McReynolds v. Mortgage Acceptance Corp., 13 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Turner v. Mertz, 3 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1925); Cowal v. Hopkins, 229 A.2d 452 (D.C.App. 1967); Rich v. Sills, 130 A.2d 920 (D.C.Mun.App. 1957); Arsenault v. Angle, 43 A.2d 709 (D.C.Mun. App. 1945). Resort to extrinsic evidence, and its assessment by a jury depends upon the existence of an ambiguity in the contract.
Since the term of the lease here expired in 1977 and had never been extended, Section 35 was simply inapplicable. Moreover, we decided in Arsenault v. Angle, D.C.Mun.App., 43 A.2d 709, 710-11 (1945), that a tenancy by sufferance may be terminated by 30 days' notice even though the expired lease provides for a different time for notice during the term of the lease. Accordingly, the trial court's dismissal of the suit for possession in the instant case on the ground that the 30 days' notice given to Loeb was inadequate constitutes error.
Such new tenancy was then subject to termination upon thirty days' notice to quit. 45 D.C. Code, 1961 § 904; Arsenault v. Angle, D.C.Mun.App., 43 A.2d 709 (1945). This notice was duly given to appellant and, upon his failure to vacate, judgment for possession in favor of appellee was properly entered.
"If the language is ambiguous, then the intent of the parties must be ascertained by some other means." Arsenault v. Angle, D.C.Mun.App., 43 A.2d 709, 711. District of Columbia v. Northeastern Const. Co., 63 App.D.C. 175, 70 F.2d 779.
Accordingly, we must rule that there was no basis for submitting the question of ambiguity to the jury. Turner v. Mertz, 55 App.D.C. 177, 3 F.2d 348, 39 A.L.R. 1140; Friedman v. Thomas J. Fisher Co., D.C.Mun.App., 88 A.2d 321; Arsenault v. Angle, D.C.Mun.App., 43 A.2d 709. Cf. Bovello v. Falvey Granite Co., D.C.Mun.App., 71 A.2d 536. Hall v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 295 Mich. 404, 295 N.W. 204.
Penthouse Properties v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417, 422. Arsenault v. Angle, D.C.Mun.App., 43 A.2d 709. The basic question before us was presented to the Municipal Court in an earlier case, Osborne v. Page, 71 W.L.R. 225.
When the jury answered that no such promise had been made the whole defense failed and it followed that plaintiff was entitled to judgment. We said in Arsenault v. Angle, D.C.Mun.App., 43 A.2d 709, that parol evidence is admissible to show the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of making a written contract, in order to ascertain but not to alter the true meaning of the contract. The trial judge gave the defendants even greater leeway by allowing them to show oral promises made after as well as before the execution of the lease.
In a similar situation we said: "Whether defendant had recovered some or all — or none — of her original investment, whether the venture was a success or a failure, were not material to the questions to be decided." Arsenault v. Angle, D.C.Mun.App., 43 A.2d 709, 711. Finally, we think we should say that plaintiff's claim of good faith is not negatived by the fact that her sister and brother-in-law who propose to move in with her had lived in their present quarters for twenty years.