Even assuming that the "shocks the conscience" standard applies to petitioner as a probationary employee, we find that the termination here does not shock the conscience (see Matter of Arroyo v. O'Neill, 35 N.Y.3d 1030, 1031, 126 N.Y.S.3d 449, 150 N.E.3d 27 [2020], revg 175 A.D.3d 1150, 1151–1152, 108 N.Y.S.3d 130 [1st Dept. 2019] ; Matter of Kelly v. Safir, 96 N.Y.2d 32, 39–40, 724 N.Y.S.2d 680, 747 N.E.2d 1280 [2001] ).
Further, the fact that petitioner's application for disability retirement, which he submitted before pleading guilty to the initial disciplinary charges, was later recommended for approval, "does not demonstrate his termination was in bad faith" (Matter of Cipolla, 26 A.D.3d at 171). Even assuming that the "shock the conscience" standard applies to probationary terminations, the termination here does not shock the conscience (see id.; see also Matter of Arroyo v O'Neill, 35 N.Y.3d 1030, 1031 [2020], revg 175 A.D.3d 1150, 1151-1152 [1st Dept 2019]). Finally, contrary to petitioner's contention, equitable estoppel does not apply here, as the negotiated settlement placed him on notice that he could be dismissed at any time during the probationary period (Administrative Code of City of NY § 14-115[d]; see Matter of DePamphilis v O'Neill, 179 A.D.3d 589, 590 [1st Dept 2020]; Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d 320, 326 [2006]).
Further, the fact that petitioner's application for disability retirement, which he submitted before pleading guilty to the initial disciplinary charges, was later recommended for approval, "does not demonstrate his termination was in bad faith" ( Matter ofCipolla, 26 A.D.3d at 171, 812 N.Y.S.2d 462 ). Even assuming that the "shock the conscience" standard applies to probationary terminations, the termination here does not shock the conscience (see id.; see also Matter ofArroyo v. O'Neill, 35 N.Y.3d 1030, 1031, 126 N.Y.S.3d 449, 150 N.E.3d 27 [2020], revg 175 A.D.3d 1150, 1151–1152, 108 N.Y.S.3d 130 [1st Dept. 2019] ). Finally, contrary to petitioner's contention, equitable estoppel does not apply here, as the negotiated settlement placed him on notice that he could be dismissed at any time during the probationary period (Administrative Code of City of NY § 14–115[d]; see Matter ofDePamphilis v. O'Neill, 179 A.D.3d 589, 590, 118 N.Y.S.3d 569 [1st Dept. 2020] ; Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d 320, 326, 820 N.Y.S.2d 199, 853 N.E.2d 610 [2006] ).
We do not find the penalty "so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" ( Matter ofPell v. Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 233, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321 [1974] ; see e.g. Matter ofArroyo v. O'Neill, 35 N.Y.3d 1030, 1031, 126 N.Y.S.3d 449, 150 N.E.3d 27 [2020], revg 175 A.D.3d 1150, 108 N.Y.S.3d 130 [1st Dept. 2019] ; Matter ofAlfieri v. Murphy, 38 N.Y.2d 976, 384 N.Y.S.2d 157, 348 N.E.2d 614 [1976] ). Conduct far less serious than petitioner's has been found by the Court of Appeals to have a "destructive impact ... on the confidence which it is so important for the public to have in its police officers" (see e.g. Matter ofAlfieri, 38 N.Y.2d at 977, 384 N.Y.S.2d 157, 348 N.E.2d 614 ). We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.
Further, the fact that petitioner's application for disability retirement, which he submitted before pleading guilty to the initial disciplinary charges, was later recommended for approval, "does not demonstrate his termination was in bad faith" (Matter of Cipolla, 26 A.D.3d at 171). Even assuming that the "shock the conscience" standard applies to probationary terminations, the termination here does not shock the conscience (see id.; see also Matter of Arroyo v O'Neill, 35 N.Y.3d 1030, 1031 [2020], revg 175 A.D.3d 1150, 1151-1152 [1st Dept 2019]). Finally, contrary to petitioner's contention, equitable estoppel does not apply here, as the negotiated settlement placed him on notice that he could be dismissed at any time during the probationary period (Administrative Code of City of NY § 14-115[d]; see Matter of DePamphilis v O'Neill, 179 A.D.3d 589, 590 [1st Dept 2020]; Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d 320, 326 [2006]).