Opinion
2007-1717 S C.
Decided November 26, 2008.
Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (James P. Flanagan, J.), dated August 14, 2007. The order granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
Order affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: RUDOLPH, P.J., McCABE and MOLIA, JJ.
In this action by plaintiff employment agency to recover fees for its referral of an employee to defendant, plaintiff established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting, in support of its motion, the affidavit of its placement counselor, as well as substantial documentary evidence in support of its contentions. This evidence was sufficient to make out a prima facie case with respect to plaintiff's first cause of action for breach of contract ( see generally Bruce R. Raines Assoc. v Whitman Ransom, 138 AD2d 95; John William Costello Assoc. v Standard Metals Corp., 99 AD2d 227) as well as its second cause of action for an account stated ( see Yannelli, Zevin Civardi v Sakol, 298 AD2d 579; Greenspan Greenspan v Wenger, 294 AD2d 539). Accordingly, the burden shifted to defendant to demonstrate that there was a triable issue of fact ( see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562).
Defendant's proof in opposition to the motion, consisting solely of an affidavit of defendant's president, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact, since said affidavit was comprised of self-serving, bald allegations of fact, and was wholly unsupported by any proof of said allegations, such as, for example, an affidavit from the employee for whom the referral fees were sought by plaintiff, or even a copy of the newspaper advertisement purportedly placed by defendant which, it alleged, led to employment of the employee in question. In the absence of any supporting proof, the affidavit of defendant's president was insufficient to defeat plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the order of the District Court is affirmed.
Rudolph, P.J., McCabe and Molia, JJ., concur.