Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-1391 (CKK).
May 6, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff brought this claim against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., arising from his arrest by officers of the United States Park Police. Defendant United States has filed a motion for summary judgment. Because the Court finds that the undisputed material facts establish that the police officers' conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, the motion will be granted.
Plaintiff's claims against five individual United States Park Police Officers were voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's amended complaint also contains claims against the District of Columbia and an individual police officer. These defendants have also filed a motion for summary judgment, which will be addressed by the Court in a separate Memorandum Opinion.
Background
At the outset, the Court observes that the District Court for the District of Columbia has supplemented Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 with Local Civil Rule 7(h), (formerly Local Civil Rule 7.1(h)), which is identical to Local Civil Rule 56.1. This local rule requires that each party submitting a motion for summary judgment attach a statement of material facts to which that party contends there is no genuine issue, with specific citations to those portions of the record upon which the party relies in fashioning the statement. The Rule provides, in relevant part:
Each motion for summary judgment shall be accompanied by a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue, which shall include references to the parts of the record relied on to support the statement. An opposition to such a motion shall be accompanied by a separate concise statement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated, which shall include references to the parts of the record relied on to support the statement. . . . In determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.
(LCvR 7(h)) (emphasis added). The party opposing such a motion must, in turn, submit a statement of genuine issues enumerating all material facts which the party contends are at issue and thus require litigation. See LCvR 7(h). Where the opposing party fails to discharge this obligation, a court may take all facts alleged by the movant as admitted. LCvR 7(h). As this Circuit has emphasized, the burden rests "on the parties and their counsel, who are most familiar with the litigation and the record, to crystallize for the district court the material facts and relevant portions of the record." Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Twist v. Meese, 854 F.2d 1421, 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 1992)). Because of the significance of this task and the potential hardship placed on the court if parties are derelict in their duty, courts require strict compliance with Local Civil Rules 7(h) and 56.1.
The Court notes that Plaintiff did not provide the Court with any helpful response to Defendant's statement of material facts. Because of the Plaintiff's lack of diligence, additional time and effort was spent by this Court, which only served to delay the resolution of these motions and did not inure to anyone's benefit. See Jackson, 101 F.3d at 150 (citations omitted).
The evidence submitted by the parties establishes that after midnight on April 13, 2003, on Georgia Avenue in Washington, D.C., United States Park Police Officers Jonathan Daniels and Martin Yates performed a traffic stop of Plaintiff's vehicle for failure to display a front license tag. Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment ("Deft.'s Mot."), Exhibit ("Ex.") 3, Deposition of Jonathan Daniels ("Daniels Dep."), pp. 24-26; Ex. 4, Deposition of Martin Yates ("Yates Dep."), pp. 25, 27, 28; Ex. 5, Deposition of Plaintiff ("Plaintiff's Dep."), pp. 58, 60, 64. After Plaintiff pulled over, Officer Daniels approached the driver's side of Plaintiff's vehicle and Officer Yates the passenger side. Daniels Dep., p. 29. Upon Daniels' request, Plaintiff produced a driver's license and registration. Id.; Plaintiff's Dep., pp. 63-64.
Officer Daniels noticed a clear ziplock bag on the passenger side floorboard of the vehicle. Daniels Dep., pp. 30-31. The two officers conferred in back of the vehicle. Officer Daniels asked Officer Yates to see if the ziplock bag contained narcotics. Id., p. 31. Upon request, the passenger in the car handed the ziplock bag to Yates. Yates Dep., p. 34. Officer Yates nodded to Officer Daniels because the substance in the bag appeared to be crack cocaine. Daniels Dep., p. 31. Officer Daniels then asked Plaintiff to step out of the vehicle. Id., p. 35. When Plaintiff failed to do so after two requests, Daniels reached his arms into the car to remove Plaintiff. Id., p. 39. Plaintiff then stepped on the gas, dragging Officer Daniels approximately 75 yards before the officer could extricate himself from the car. Id., pp. 39-40. Plaintiff sped off. Plaintiff's Dep., pp. 71, 81, 82. Plaintiff claims that he fled the scene because one of the officers had drawn his weapon and Plaintiff was afraid of being shot, that Plaintiff was in possession of .380 caliber gun at the time, and because he was on parole. Id., pp. 78, 83-84.
A chase ensued between the officers' and Plaintiff's vehicles. At some point during the pursuit, the passenger in Plaintiff's car jumped out and Plaintiff continued at an increased rate of speed along Georgia Avenue. Id., pp. 84-85. While attempting a left turn at the intersection of Georgia and Missouri Avenues, Plaintiff lost control of his vehicle and struck a median. Id., p. 85. Plaintiff crawled out of the passenger side window and ran down Rock Creek Ford Road. Id., pp. 85-86, 87-88. Plaintiff climbed two fences and reached a wooden fence in a residential yard. Id., pp. 87-88.
By this point in the pursuit, Officer Daniels had caught up with Plaintiff and struck Plaintiff from behind as he attempted to ascend the fence. Id.; Daniels Dep., p. 44. Plaintiff fell off the fence and to the ground and a scuffle ensued between Plaintiff and Officer Daniels. Daniels Dep., pp. 46-47. Sergeant Rick Murray, an unarmed off-duty officer of the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"), came upon the scene. Deft.'s Mot., Ex. 9, Deposition of Rick Murray ("Murray Dep."), pp. 16-17. Murray observed Officer Daniels pull Plaintiff from the fence. Id., p. 17. Murray assumed Daniels was attempting to handcuff Plaintiff so he hit Plaintiff three or four times in the ribs. Id., p. 16. Plaintiff's hand pushed straight at Daniels and Murray saw an orange muzzle blast. Id. Murray concluded that Plaintiff had shot Daniels in the face. Id., pp. 16-17.
As he came around to the yard, Officer Yates also saw a muzzle flash. Yates Dep., pp. 59-60. Plaintiff claims that he heard a pop, but did not know its source. Plaintiff's Dep., pp. 90. Plaintiff contends that his gun was on the ground at that time or that he had dropped it when he was pushed into the fence. Id., pp. 89-90. Officer Daniels had been shot in the face. Daniels Dep., p. 51.
Sergeant Murray tackled Plaintiff to the ground and held him in a bear hug. Murray Dep., p. 25. According to Murray, Plaintiff still had the gun in his hands. Id., p. 30. Murray attempted to dislodge the gun, but he could not do so. Id. Once Officer Yates was on the scene, Murray informed him he was unarmed and that Plaintiff had a gun. Id., p. 33; Yates Dep., p. 64. Officer Yates placed his gun at the back of Plaintiff's head. Id., p. 65. Murray screamed to Yates, "He's too strong. I can't get the gun away." Id., p. 66.
Yates could not see the gun in plaintiff's possession, but assumed it was underneath Plaintiff's body because Murray's arm was pinned there. Id., pp. 64-65, 87. Yates struck Plaintiff in the head with his gun a number of times. Id. Murray claims that he was unable to get control of the gun from Plaintiff and told Yates to keep hitting Plaintiff until he let go of the gun. Murray Dep., pp. 34-35.
Officer Russell Kidd of the United States Park Police arrived on the scene. Deft.'s Mot., Ex. 12, Deposition of Russell Kidd ("Kidd Dep."), p. 19. He saw Plaintiff laying face down and Officer Yates on top of Plaintiff's legs and Murray on Plaintiff's right side. Id. Kidd also observed Officer Daniels leaning against the fence and bleeding. Id., pp. 20-21. Yates said to Kidd, "This guy has a gun." Id., p. 21. Kidd then yelled at Plaintiff to let go off the gun. Id. When Plaintiff did not comply, Kidd struck Plaintiff with a baton. Id., pp. 21-22.
Officer Michael Peer of the Canine Unit of the United States Park Police appeared at the scene with a trained patrol dog named Lazer. Id., Ex. 10a, Deposition of Michael Alan Peer ("Peer Dep."), pp. 15-16, 28-29, 45. He was informed by the other officers that Plaintiff had a gun, but Peer did not see the gun. Id., p. 28. Peer instructed Lazer to use controlled bites on Plaintiff's right leg. Id., p. 31. Officer Peer loudly and persistently told Plaintiff that if he let go of the gun, he would take the dog off. Id., p. 37.
Sergeant Murray claims he eventually pulled the gun out of Plaintiff's grasp and threw it a few feet away. Murray Dep., p. 36. Yates thinks that out of the corner of his eye he could see Murray stripping the gun from Plaintiff's hand and tossing it out. Yates Dep., p. 71. Officer Peer saw an object being thrown, but could not identify it as a gun. Peer Dep., p. 41. Kidd never saw the weapon in the possession of Plaintiff or Murray. Kidd Dep., pp. 28-29. The weapon was a .380 automatic. Deft.'s Mot., Ex. 14.
Plaintiff was then handcuffed by the officers. Yates Dep., p. 72. Because Plaintiff had received injuries during the struggle, he was transported by ambulance to D.C. Hospital. Kidd Dep., pp. 31-33. Due to the dog bites, Plaintiff suffered scars on the front and back of his calf and right knee, causing the loss of muscle tissue. Plaintiff's Dep., pp. 100-103, 104-107. Plaintiff also sustained multiple lacerations, bruises and abrasions. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant United States' Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 6.
Based on this incident, Plaintiff was indicted in United States District Court for the District of Columbia on four counts: using a dangerous weapon (an automobile) to assault, resist, impede and interfere with the duties of the Park Police, attempted murder of a federal officer, discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1241 (2003). The jury deadlocked on the attempted murder and discharging of a firearm charges, but convicted Plaintiff on the remaining charges. Id. at 43. Plaintiff was sentenced to 240 months imprisonment. Id. Standard of Review
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 ©). Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
In considering whether there is a triable issue of fact, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The non-moving party must do more than simply "show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Moreover, "any factual assertions in the movant's affidavits will be accepted as being true unless [the opposing party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion." Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982)). The mere existence of a factual dispute by itself, however, is not enough to bar summary judgment. The party opposing the motion must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. To be material, the fact must be capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation; to be genuine, the issue must be supported by admissible evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.; see also Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Discussion
An individual has the Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force by the police stemming from, or incident to, an arrest. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Claims of excessive force should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204 (2001); DeGraff v. District of Columbia, 120 F.3d 298, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The subjective "good faith" of the officers is irrelevant. Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 758-59 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1231 (1997).
Since police officers must often make "split-second" judgments in "tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving" circumstances, the reasonableness of the officer's conduct should be judged from an on-scene perspective. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The facts and circumstances that should be examined in evaluating an excessive force claim include the severity of the crime, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to flee. Id. The question is whether "the excessiveness of the force is so apparent that no reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions." Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1204 (1994). The reasonableness of an officer's actions should be viewed from his perspective under the circumstances and not with hindsight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Given the situation faced by the officers, the use of force was reasonable. The sequence of events, which were increasingly escalated by Plaintiff's behavior, led to the level of force used by the officers. The officers executed a traffic stop on Plaintiff for a simple violation, failure to display a license tag. The officers observed a bag of what they believed to be crack cocaine in the passenger side of the car. Officer Daniels ordered Plaintiff to step out of the vehicle. When Plaintiff failed to do so, Daniels attempted to pull him out of the car. Plaintiff stepped on the gas, dragging Officer Daniels down the street, until the officer eventually fell off the car. A high speed chase ensued and Plaintiff crashed his vehicle.
The pursuit of Plaintiff by the officers then began on foot. Plaintiff was in possession of a firearm. U.S. Park Police Officer Daniels eventually caught up with Plaintiff and dragged him down as he climbed a fence. Officer Daniels was shot in the face. Based on MPD Officer Murray's statements to them, all of the federal officers believed that Plaintiff was in possession of the firearm while he was being subdued. The officers beat and subdued Plaintiff to get him to release the firearm from his possession.
In opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff states that three material facts are in dispute: (1) the propriety of the officers' conduct during the initial traffic stop; (2) Plaintiff's motive for fleeing the scene; and (3) whether Plaintiff had been apprehended and handcuffed prior to the use of force by the officers. As to the first issue, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is precluded from contesting the circumstances of the initial stop under the principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata.
Under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment in a case, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the earlier case. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. V. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5 (1979); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Elliott v. FDIC, 305 F.Supp.2d 79, 83-84 (D.D.C. 2004). In order for collateral estoppel to apply, (1) the issue must have actually been litigated, i.e., contested by the parties and determined by the court; (2) the issue must have been necessary to the court's disposition of the case; and (3) the relitigation bar in the second action would not create an unfairness against the party as to whom the issue preclusion is imposed. United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 24 F.3d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Meng v. Schwartz, 305 F.Supp.2d 49, 57 (D.D.C. 2004).
A criminal conviction is conclusive proof and operates as collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil action for the facts supporting the conviction. Emich Motors v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1951); United States v. Uzell, 648 F. Supp. 1362, 1365-66 (D.D.C. 1986). At his criminal trial, Plaintiff was convicted of using a deadly weapon to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with a federal officer "while engaged in or account of the performance of his official duties," in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a) and (b). See Arrington, 309 F.3d at 43. In order to obtain a conviction under that statute, the government need not establish the legality of the officer's conduct, but instead merely prove the officer was acting within the scope of what he was employed to do. See United States v. Clemons, 32 F.3d 1504, 1507 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1086 (1995); United States v. Streich, 759 F.2d 579, 584 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 860 (1985). Thus, the legality of the traffic stop was not a necessary finding of the jury verdict. Moreover, Defendant has presented no evidence that factual findings on the stop were made by the trial judge or that the stop was litigated at a suppression hearing. The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata do not preclude plaintiff from challenging the stop in this action.
Although Plaintiff is not barred by the above doctrines from raising the legality of the stop, the factual circumstances surrounding the stop are irrelevant in assessing whether the police used excessive force and is certainly not a defense to assaulting a police officer. See Lassiter v. District of Columbia, 447 A.2d 456, 459 (D.C. 1982). Even if such evidence was germane to a reasonable force inquiry, there was nothing improper about the officers' stop of Plaintiff's vehicle or their actions once the vehicle was pulled over. Plaintiff concedes that the officers had a valid reason for the traffic stop. When the officers approached the vehicle, one officer obtained license information from Plaintiff and the other noticed a substance resembling crack cocaine in the vehicle. At that point, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff further to investigate the possible controlled substance. Requesting Plaintiff to exit his car, therefore, was also proper.
Plaintiff alleges that he sped from the scene in his vehicle because Officer Daniels drew his gun and he was afraid of being shot. However, Plaintiff also stated that he fled because he was in possession of a firearm and was on parole. See Plaintiff's Dep., pp. 78, 83-84. Whichever version is true is of no material difference here. Assuming Officer Daniels in fact drew his weapon, he had reason to do so given the possible presence of drugs and Plaintiff's refusal to get out of the vehicle when ordered to do so by the officer. Moreover, there is no dispute that Plaintiff fled the scene, engaged in a vehicle chase with the police, exited his vehicle after crashing it, then fled on foot in possession of a firearm. If anything, these facts bolster Defendant's claim that the officers' use of force was reasonable.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that summary judgment should not be granted because there is a factual dispute about whether he was handcuffed and still in possession of the firearm when the police and the police dog assaulted him. For purposes of evaluating the use of force by the federal officers, it is important to view the circumstances that appeared to the federal officers at that time. When the federal officers came upon the scene, they saw that U.S. Park Police Officer Daniels had been shot. Plaintiff admits that the firearm in his possession was responsible for the shot. The parties agree that the area was dark. The federal officers saw MPD Sergeant Murray struggling with Plaintiff. Murray informed them that Plaintiff was in possession of a gun. The federal officers' conduct thereafter was based on a reasonable belief that Plaintiff was armed and dangerous. They could rely on information provided by another law enforcement officer even though they had no personal knowledge. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 n. 5 (1983); United States v. Williams, 951 F.2d 1287, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hegarty v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1376 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 (1995).
Since the officers had probable cause to believe plaintiff posed a threat of serious harm to themselves, it would not have been unreasonable to use deadly force, let alone the level of force committed here. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S.Ct. 596, 598 (2004). Therefore, the force used by the U.S. Park Police Officers was not unreasonable and thus not a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendant United States' motion for summary judgment will be granted. A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.