2. (a) The progenitor of Webb, and the seminal decision in this area, is City of Atlanta v. Hill, 238 Ga. 413 ( 233 S.E.2d 193) (1977), which held, in the field of liquor licensing, that local governing authorities must comply with requirements of due process and equal protection in issuing business and occupation licenses. (b) In Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11 ( 334 S.E.2d 677) (1985), we were presented with a case in which a local alcoholic-beverage licensing ordinance contained objective standards to be utilized in determining whether an alcoholic-beverage license should be granted. One such standard related to the location of the proposed business.

OCGA § 3-3-2 (b).Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11, 12 ( 334 SE2d 677) (1985) (quoting Levendis v. Cobb County, 242 Ga. 592 ( 250 SE2d 460) (1978)). In Bryant v. Mayor c. of Americus, this Court held that an ordinance that committed "to the sole discretion of the mayor and city council the determination of whether or not these grounds to revoke exist in a given case . . . does not per se derogate from or conflict with due process principles."

New Image contends that the Administrator’s authority to require a site plan during the business application process is arbitrary because there are no express guidelines set forth in the Ordinance governing her discretion to do so. In support of this argument, New Image cites to Arras v. Herrin , 255 Ga. 11, 334 S.E.2d 677 (1985). We are not persuaded.

In order to exercise that discretion, it is incumbent upon state aviation agencies to develop ascertainable standards to gauge whether landfill operators qualify for an exemption request. See generally Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11, 12 ( 334 SE2d 677) (1985). "[T]he state agency's exercise of discretion under § 503 (d) (1) . . . is not unprincipled; it is clear that the touchstone for any exemption request must be tied [to] the landfill's compatibility with air traffic safety, especially concerns about the potential for bird strikes."

McWhorter v. Settle, 202 Ga. 334, 335 (3) ( 43 S.E.2d 247) (1947). See also Fulton County v. Bartenfeld, 257 Ga. 766, 771 (4) ( 363 S.E.2d 555) (1988); Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11, 12 ( 334 S.E.2d 677) (1985). "[T]he legally flawed exercise of discretion is the same as refusal to exercise any discretion, which is a manifest abuse of discretion. [Cits.]"Wilson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 239 Ga. App. 168, 172 ( 520 S.E.2d 917) (1999).

In addition, the requirement that the distance between competing businesses must be measured from their property lines instead of buildings is not arbitrary, illogical, or vague. Because the county's use of voting districts and property lines to determine the number and location of licensed stores is reasonably related to its goal of regulating the retail sale of beer and wine, we conclude that the ordinance does not violate due process. See Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11, 11-12 ( 334 S.E.2d 677) (1985) (holding that county violated due process in denying liquor license when applicant met all the ordinance's objective standards for location). Cf. Mayor Council v. Anderson, 246 Ga. 786, 787-788 ( 272 S.E.2d 713) (1980) (concluding that county ordinance tying the number of liquor licenses to the number of city inhabitants is not void for vagueness); see also OCGA § 3-3-2 (b) (1) (requiring ascertainable standards in local licensing ordinances).

Any circumstances which may cause minors to congregate in the vicinity of the proposed location, even if the location meets the distance requirements under § 6-2-63 (b) herein. Chu asserts that the ordinance vests the Commission with unbridled discretion and fails to meet due process standards under Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11, 12 ( 334 S.E.2d 677) (1985). In Arras, we reviewed a county code which provided that the local governing authority have "full and sole authority, in its absolute discretion," to determine whether an applicant for an alcoholic beverage license is fit to operate the business, and whether the location is "proper and to the best welfare and in the best interests" of the county.

The exercise of discretion in the issuance of licenses "must be tempered with `ascertainable standards . . . by which an applicant can intelligently seek to qualify for a license. . . .' [Cit.]" Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11, 12 ( 334 S.E.2d 677) (1985). "[T]his preamble contain[s] no objective criteria upon which the [Planning Commission] could base its decision.

We have recognized that, notwithstanding the right of local governments to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages as a valid exercise of their police powers, local governments are not exempted from the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment in that exercise. Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11, 12 ( 334 S.E.2d 677) (1985). Since licensing consists in the determination of factual issues and the application of legal criteria to them — a judicial act — the fundamental requirements of due process are applicable to it.

Levendis v. Cobb County, 242 Ga. 592, 594 (1) ( 250 S.E.2d 460) (1978); accord Suddeth v. Forsyth County, 258 Ga. 773, 775 (2) ( 373 S.E.2d 746) (1988). Applying this test, we hold that the purpose statement contains only a statement of general goals and purposes, and provides no criteria to govern the BZA's determination. Arras v. Herrin, 255 Ga. 11 ( 334 S.E.2d 677) (1985); Lithonia Asphalt v. Hall County Planning Comm., 258 Ga. 8 ( 364 S.E.2d 860) (1988). Accordingly, we find that appellants are entitled to the approval of the BZA for the permit they sought.