Opinion
Civil Action 21-136-SDD-SDJ
01-11-2023
WILBERT ARON and KAITLIN MORRIS v. G. LEWIS-LOUISIANA NO.2, L.L.C., GARRY LEWIS D/B/A GARRY LEWIS PROPERTIES
RULING
SHELLY D. DICK CHIEF JUDGE.
Before the Court is the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Plaintiffs Wilbert Aron (“Aron”) and Katlin Morris (“Morris”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”). Defendants G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, L.L.C. and Garry Lewis d/b/a Garry Lewis Properties (“Defendants”), filed an Opposition. For the following reasons, the Court shall grant the Motion.
Rec. Doc. No. 35.
Rec. Doc. No. 52.
Rec. Doc. No. 35.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendants allege the following facts which, for purposes of this motion, are taken as true. G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, L.L.C. is a Louisiana limited liability company that owns certain immovable property, including Suma Lake Apartments. Garry Lewis Properties is a sole proprietorship that manages Suma Lake. In March 2018, Plaintiff Morris signed a lease to live at the apartment complex. The lease was with Garry Lewis Properties.
Rec. Doc. No. 11, p. 7.
Id.
Id., p. 8.
Id.
Garry Lewis Properties evicted Morris in December 2018. In March 2021, Plaintiffs sued G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, L.L.C. and Garry Lewis Properties, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and state law. Defendants jointly filed a counterclaim against Morris for breach of contract. In the instant Motion, Plaintiffs seek to dismiss G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC as a party to the counterclaim.
Id., p. 9-10.
Id., p. 1.
Id.
II. LAW
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is evaluated under the same standard as a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he ‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” The Court may consider “the complaint, its proper attachments, ‘documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.'” “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dorsey v, Portfolio Equity, Inc., 540 F.3d 333. 338 (5th Cir. 2008).
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Martin v. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d at 467).
In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”A complaint is also insufficient if it merely “tenders ‘naked assertions]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” However, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.” “Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not ‘strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.'” “[O]n a motion to dismiss, courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and brackets omitted) (hereinafter Twombly).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted) (hereinafter “Iqbal”).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Id.
Taha v. William Marsh Rice University, 2012 WL 1576099 at *2 (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs argue that G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, L.L.C. lacks standing to enforce the lease agreement at issue. Plaintiffs assert that the lease is a contract between Morris and Garry Lewis Properties and does not contain a single mention of G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC. Defendants do not dispute this but argue that G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC merely passes its gains and losses through to Garry Lewis Properties for tax purposes, and so the rents due under the lease belong to G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC.
The Court finds that Defendants have failed to allege facts sufficient to support G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC's counterclaim for breach of contract. It is axiomatic that only parties to a contract have standing to enforce that contract. To maintain a breach of contract cause of action under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must either be in privity of contract with the opposing party or be a third-party beneficiary of the contract at issue. There is no privity of contract between G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC, and Plaintiffs. As Plaintiffs point out, the lease contains no mention of G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC. Further, the lease prominently displays the logo of Garry Lewis Properties and defines Garry Lewis Properties as “Lessor.” Defendants do not allege otherwise. Indeed, Defendants admit that Tasha Brady, who countersigned the lease, is an employee of Garry Lewis Properties, not G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC.
New Orleans Private Patrol Serv. V. Corp. Connections, Inc., 17-746 (La.App. 4th Cir. 03/21/18), 239 So.3d 480, 484.
Rec. Doc. No. 11-1.
Rec. Doc. No. 11-1., p. 1.
Rec. Doc. No. 11., p. 9.
Moreover, Defendants do not allege any facts showing that G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC is a third-party beneficiary of the lease agreement. Under Louisiana Law, a contract for the benefit of a third party is referred to as a stipulation pour autrui. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that there are three requirements for a stipulation pour autrui: “1) the stipulation for a third party is manifestly clear; 2) there is certainty as to the benefit provided the third party; and 3) the benefit is not a mere incident of the contract between the promisor and promisee.” Here, there is no stipulation for a third party in the lease agreement. The lease fails to even mention G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC, let alone plead facts that would identify it as a third-party beneficiary. Again, Defendants do not argue otherwise.
Succession of Schimek, 19-1069 (La.App. 4th Cir. 6/10/20), 302 So.3d 78, 84-85 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id.
Rec. Doc. 11-1.
Ultimately, Defendants have failed to allege any facts showing that G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC was a party to the lease agreement or an intended beneficiary thereof. By its own terms, the lease agreement was between Morris and Garry Lewis Properties. Because Defendants have failed to allege facts sufficient to support G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC's counterclaim, the Court will grant the Motion.
Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(b)(c) is hereby GRANTED and the counterclaim by G. Lewis-Louisiana No. 2, LLC is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Rec. Doc. No. 35.