As a general rule, this Court reviews the evidence in support of summary judgment in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. AROK Const. Co. v. Indian Const. Services, 174 Ariz. 291, 293, 848 P.2d 870, 872 (App. 1993). We will affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 305, 802 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1990).

In reviewing summary judgment, we examine the facts and evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. AROK Const. Co. v. Indian Const. Services, 174 Ariz. 291, 293, 848 P.2d 870, 872 (App. 1993). Arizona's workers' compensation scheme provides that every employee covered by workers' compensation insurance who is injured in an accident "arising out of and in the course of his employment" is entitled to compensation for losses suffered as the result of the injury.

On review of a summary judgment, we view the facts and evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs against whom judgment was entered. E.g., AROK Const. Co. v. Indian Const. Serv., 174 Ariz. 291, 293, 848 P.2d 870, 872 (App. 1993). Mrs. Dugan had a history of cardiovascular problems.

Because this is an appeal from summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to Francini, the party against whom judgment was entered. See AROK Constr. Co. v. Indian Constr. Serv., 174 Ariz. 291, 293, 848 P.2d 870, 872 (App. 1993). Appellant Linus Francini (Francini) has been deaf since birth.

On review of summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. AROK Constr. Co. v. Indian Constr. Services, 174 Ariz. 291, 293, 848 P.2d 870, 872 (App. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense."

On appeal of that order, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Mohave. AROK Constr. Co. v. Indian Constr. Servs., 174 Ariz. 291, 293, 848 P.2d 870, 872 (App. 1993). A. Mohave's Corporate Structure and Byers's Employment with Mohave

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. AROK Constr. Co. v. Indian Constr. Servs., 174 Ariz. 291, 293, 848 P.2d 870, 872 (App. 1993) (citation omitted). In conducting our review, we determine de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. AROK Constr. Co. v. Indian Constr. Servs., 174 Ariz. 291, 293, 848 P.2d 870, 872 (App. 1993). We must consider whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court correctly applied the substantive law.

¶ 26 A contract may be formed, even if not formally executed, if it is clear the parties intended to bind themselves to the terms. AROK Constr. Co. v. Indian Constr. Servs., 174 Ariz. 291, 297, 848 P.2d 870, 876 (App. 1993); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 (1981). A court may look to surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties to determine the parties' intent.

This is not a case in which a plaintiff merely submitted a subcontractor's potential price or bid to a contractor, in which instance Appellant acknowledges there would be neither a contract formed at that point nor any legal obligation on the part of the contractor to accept the subcontractor's bid. AROK Construction Co. v. Indian Construction Services, 848 P.2d 870, 873 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) ("It is settled law that the bidding process alone does not create a contract."); Housing Authority of City of Fort Pierce v. Foster, 237 So.2d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); William A. Berbusse, Jr., Inc. v. North Broward Hospital District, 117 So.2d 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960). We conclude that the allegations in Count I satisfy the threshold requirements of Jacksonville Port Authority, 624 So.2d at 315, which stands for the proposition that the courts will recognize a contract so long as no essential terms remain open for consideration and negotiation.