A limited remand ordinarily is the remedy applied by appellate courts throughout this country when a trial court fails to conduct a proper Batson analysis. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 100, 106 S.Ct. at 1725, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; Mejia, 328 Md. at 540-41, 616 A.2d at 364-65 ; Gorman, 324 Md. at 129-32, 596 A.2d at 631-33; Stanley, 313 Md. at 75-77, 542 A.2d at 1279-80; Galarza, 252 F.3d at 640-41; Jordan, 206 F.3d at 202; Barnes, 202 F.3d at 156-57; Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Joe, 928 F.2d 99, 103-04 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Romero-Reyna, 867 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hughes, 864 F.2d 78, 80-81 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987); Arnold v. State, 668 So.2d 109, 111 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995); People v. Trujillo, 15 P.3d 1104, 1106 (Colo.Ct.App. 2000); State v. Robinson, 676 A.2d 384, 391 (Conn. 1996); State v. Bolton, 23 P.3d 824, 828-29 (Kan. 2001); State v. Givens, 776 So.2d 443, 451 (La. 2001); Donaghy, 769 A.2d at 16-17. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 8-604, we remand this case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to make a determination whether the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons were pretextual and therefore whether petitioner has met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination as to jurors Ashe and Smith. If the court cannot effectively do so, or finds purposeful discrimination, it shall order a new trial.
Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2000); Alvarado III, 923 F.2d at 256; United States v. Joe, 928 F.2d 99, 103-04 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Romero-Reyna, 867 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hughes, 864 F.2d 78, 80-81 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987). For example, in Arnold v. State, 668 So.2d 109 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995), a case virtually identical to this one, the State responded to a Batson challenge by asserting that the jury actually selected was balanced, and this rationale was accepted by the trial court. The appeals court reversed and ordered the trial court to hold a new Batson hearing.
'Arnold v. State, 668 So.2d 109 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995). "In Thomas, the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the question, `[M]ay a defendant make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the prosecutor used a large number of his peremptory challenges to engage in a pattern of striking blacks from the venire, even though a higher percentage of blacks ultimately sat on the jury than on the venire?' Thomas, 659 So.2d at 4.
d its ruling that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination solely on a comparison of the percentage of blacks on the venire with the percentage of blacks selected to serve on the jury. This reasoning was disapproved in Ex parte Thomas (prosecution used 9 of 10 peremptory strikes to remove black veniremembers); see also, Hodges v. State, 673 So.2d 783 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995) (where prosecution used 2 of 7 peremptory strikes to remove black veniremembers case was remanded for trial judge to consider additional factors where trial judge "only considered the racial composition of the jury in determining that the defense failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination"); Wood v. State, [Ms. CR-93-2206, March 24, 1995, ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Cr.App. 1995) (case remanded where trial judge based ruling that a prima facie case of discrimination had not been shown on fact that prosecution had struck 2 of 6 black veniremembers and that remaining 4 were on the jury); Arnold v. State, 668 So.2d 109 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995) (case remanded where trial judge based ruling that a prima facie case of gender discrimination had not been shown where state used 4 of 6 strikes against males and it appeared that the trial court based its ruling "solely on the fact that the jury was composed of a large percentage of men"); Woods v. State, 675 So.2d 47 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995) (case remanded where trial judge based ruling that a prima facie case of discrimination had not been established where state struck 4 of 7 black veniremembers; "trial court's comments show that it based its ruling on its comparison between the percentage of blacks on the venire and the percentage of blacks on the jury"); Cobb v. State, [Ms. CR-93-1885, March 24, 1995] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Cr.App. 1995) (case remanded where state used 2 of 7 strikes to remove black veniremembers; "[I]n cases involving similar statistics, this court has remanded the causes for the trial court to determine whether a prima facie case of discrimination existed, when the tri
We remanded this case so that the court could conduct a Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), hearing. Arnold v. State, 668 So.2d 109 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995). We further directed the court not to rely solely on the percentage composition of the jury when determining whether a prima facie case of gender discrimination existed.
See also Raspberry v. State, 615 So.2d 657 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992); Ashley v. State, 606 So.2d 187 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992); Jones v. State, 603 So.2d 419 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992); Hood v. State, 598 So.2d 1022 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991)."Arnold v. State, 668 So.2d 109 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995). In Thomas, the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the question, "[M]ay a defendant make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the prosecutor used a large number of his peremptory challenges to engage in a pattern of striking blacks from the venire, even though a higher percentage of blacks ultimately sat on the jury than on the venire?